Introduction:

In order to suggest that a proposal for the renewal of Canadian federalism must be made to Quebeckers and other Canadians before another Quebec referendum, one must answer the three eternal questions: why, what and how. Why do we need to reform Canada's political structures? What needs to be done? How can we proceed with the agenda for renewal? This paper sets out to answer these questions. But before turning to them, let us use this introduction to recall some of the principles of federalism and a bit of the background to our topic.

After the failure of two major efforts at constitutional reform in Canada, the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, many are of the opinion that the country is condemned to continue its traditional routine of muddling through or to face the possibility of breakup. This article argues rather that the longevity of our constitutional debate is the best indicator of the need for renewal of the Canadian federal regime. We should learn from the past instead of throwing in the towel. Canada's present situation is a test of both political wisdom and determination.

The essence of federalism in complex, plural societies is that by its very nature it is not intended to lead to either centralized, socio-political unification or to secession and disintegration. One of humankinds eternal quandries has been the continuing struggle between the forces of individual and community, identity and sameness, interests and society, we and they, each and all. The goal of federalism is to find a balance between these forces.

Federalism's Achilles' heel is that there are always cultural and economic forces lurking in the background which entice politicians and citizens toward either centralization or decentralization. If they are not managed well, they become forces for the unified control of a senior government or secessionist fragmentation. True federalists resist these two temptations, preferring the advantages of unity in diversity. In this sense, as the Europeans tell us, federalism has both a normative and empirical base. Its supporters believe federalism is intended to maximize both the efficiency of socio-economic partnership and the protection of local and cultural autonomy. If today's partnership and protection in a federation such as Canada are not achieving their intended benefits then a federalist would want to look to the regime's reform to strengthen the federal partnership for tomorrow. Federalists believe this process of renewal and adaptation is not only necessary but preferable to the two other options.

In his recent comparative study of modern federations which have succeeded and failed, Ron Watts concludes:

1. More important than their formal constitutional structures has been the public acceptance of the basic values and processes required for federal systems. These include the explicit recognition and accommodation of multiple identities and loyalties within an overarching sense of shared purposes and objectives.

2. Because there is no single pure ideal form of federation, we should not be constrained to traditional arrangements or theories about federalism but should be ready to consider more imaginative and innovative ways of applying pragmatically the sprit of federalism as a way of combining unity and diversity. Efforts in Canada should be directed toward pragmatically accommodating the particular conditions and "realities" of Canada.

3. There is room in Canada for further decentralization and representation of regional inputs within the institutions of federal policy making.

4. Attempts at major, comprehensive constitutional reform have always proved extremely difficult. Instead substantial changes and even transformations have been achieved by incremental piecemeal constitutional adjustment and even more by pragmatic political adaptation, by means of ordinary legislative and administrative action to avoid the higher stake deliberations of mega-constitutional change.

5. Rigid and unbending federations that fail to make the substantial adjustments necessary to changing circumstances, however, are prone to crack and disintegrate.

Watt's advice has been heeded by many in Canada since the rejection of the Charlottetown accord and the near loss of the 1995 Quebec referendum -- but not by the governments in Quebec or Ottawa. Reform proposals have been put forward by experts, citizen groups, the business community, academic groups and most recently the provincial premiers. The sovereignist Parti Québécois government of Quebec, however, has ridiculed all proposals for the renewal of Canada and the federal government, after having passed parliamentary resolutions in 1995 recognizing Quebec as a "distinct society" and lending Ottawa's constitutional veto to the regions, says it cannot go any further because Quebec refuses to cooperate.

In such a context, one has to admit, the winter of 1998 is not the best time to be putting forth a reform agenda. With both of the major players has tried to give the impression of going about business as usual during the past two years, it is now clear Ottawa and Quebec are sharpening their battle axes, not looking for solutions. Quebec strives for a zero deficit "to offer our people a choice", proclaims itself a "people" or a "nation", claims it alone can decide its future, seeks international support, refuses to participate in administrative reform initiatives, and disparages the federal system at every opportunity. For its part, Ottawa persists with its Supreme Court referral to show that neither domestic nor international law accepts unilateral secession, comtinues to intervene in provincial jurisdictions, and generally promotes Plan 'B' to threaten Quebeckers with the negative consequences of separation. Both combatants try to bring the Aboriginal peoples on side. Both 'positon' themselves for the next Quebec election and the ensueing referendum and its aftermath. Both are reinforced in their hardline strategies by their radical allies, Bouchard by the "pur laine" and "pur et dur" separatists, Chrétien by "a mixed and troubling alliance of hardline federalists, federal bureaucrats, partitionists, Reformers, and old-time centralizers". The only thing that brings them together are natural disasters and, even then it leads to jockeying for position in the opinion polls and quibbling over who pays for what.

The three decade old war of the sovereignist and federalist Quebec clans, with all its suspicion, distrust and confrontation is still dominating the federal agenda. Chrétien and Bouchard are simply proxies for Trudeau and Lévesque. It's time to move on.

But the renewal process is not being helped, either, by the short term, idiosyncratic, sensationalist reporting of the media. To take but one example, Maclean's magazine's 1997 year-end survey of public opinion and issues portrayed the unity issue in a cartoon as a slugging match between Lucien Bouchard (Quebec, PQ) vs. Stéphane Dion (Ottawa, Liberals). There are four errors. It leads to the misperception that the unity issue is only between Quebec and the federal Government. In reality, renewal has foundered on our inability to deal with the concurrent demands of Quebec, the West, Aboriginals, and the linguistic minorities. Second, it portrays the struggle as one between individual politicians. While there is some truth in this, the underlying issue is one of structural weaknesses in the electoral system, federal institutions, and the constitution and its amendment formula, which help push politicians into the roles which they play. Third, it gives the impression that political unity is an all-absorbing Canadian issue when, in fact, our real conundrum is Canada's incapacity to focus on any one of its five inherent problems (Quebec/Canada, federal/provincial, Canada/U.S., rich/poor, French/English) for a sufficiently long period to move toward resolution. Fourth, the cartoon leaves the impression of immediacy, that unity is a current issue. This incites us to ignore the original causes of our problems which are now in their third and fourth decade.

This rapid survey of the current situation in Canada should be sufficient to introduce the reader to the issues and political stalemate which bedevil the country. The remaining sections of the paper: analyze the three major options that have been presented to Canadians; present a reform agenda for the federal regime; and concludes with the elements of a process for renewal.

2. Which Path For Tomorrow?

A. THE STATUS QUO:

The status quo which is being offered to Canadians by the present federal Government is not a status quo without change. Jean Chrétien's Liberals have gone to considerable pains to try to try to keep their Referendum promises and to improve the administration of the existing federal regime. The fiscal stability of the country has been reestablished; more headway has been made on Indian land claims than in previous decades and the new native territory of Nunavut has been authorized; considerable progress has been made in getting the federal government out of provincial jurisdictions and in ending duplication of programmes, including labour training and the environment. But none of this amounts to a system transformation. Nor does it deal with the real complaints of those who feel disadvantaged and unrepresented by the current system or the structural flaws which underlie their grievances. It does not begin to rectify the "unsettled settlement" which characterizes the Canadian federal regime.

By the "status quo", I mean the belief by the federal Government that no changes are required to the structures and institutions of the Canadian political system. Both the political spokesmen for intergovernmental affairs in Ottawa, Prime MInister, Jean Chrétien and Minister Stephane Dion are notorious for holding this view. Chrétien is reputed to have played a major back room role in sinking the Meech Lake Accord. In this they are supported by the Ottawa bureaucracy which also believes the country could not survive a decline in its directive role. In fact, one of the major deficiencies of Canadian federalism is Ottawa's belief that it is the senior level of government and it is not a partner with the provinces. The only exception to the government's position was its post-1995 conversion to the notion of Quebec's right to recognition as a distinct society and to a constitutional veto. With growing solvency and the positive impacts of its Plan B on public opinion, one can even argue that Ottawa is returning to its old interventionist habits. This is exemplified by it recent decision to spend up to a billion dollars on a millennial university scholarship fund in the provincial jurisdiction of education, without so much as consulting the provinces, let alone coordinating with them.

But, the stresses within the Canadian political system, stresses which go beyond resolution by tinkering or business-as-usual political processes, are obvious to whoever has eyes to see. As the world knows, Canada came as close as a state can to self-immolation in the 1995 Quebec referendum. The dissatisfactions of Quebec, the West and Aboriginals have gone beyond temporary spasms of negative public opinion. They are approaching their fourth decade and have jelled into two regional opposition parties which have persisted through two federal elections. Aboriginal defiance of the law has become almost an annual event. And despite highs and lows, despite changes of government and political leadership, despite good times and bad the seething dissatisfaction has only continued to increase. At least half of Francophone Quebeckers are dissatisfied with Quebec's position in Canada and the major political parties have lost most of their federal constituencies in the West to the Reform Party. Where there is smoke, there is fire. The need for various forms of structural reform has become so apparent it is even ensconced in first year political science text books.

Before proceeding, one caveat is in order. In a country as peaceful and stable as Canada, with a relatively content majority, a country that is now one of the world's oldest constitutional democracies, it is very easy to believe the present situation is just one of a continuing series of vicissitudes which simply require steady political management. French-English, East-West conflicts have been recurrent. Earlier periods of regionalized political forces have been weathered. The country has survived other politicians who have given it "just five more years".

Nevertheless, their is reason to believe there are other reasons motivating leaders to ignore the quantum change in present circumstances. These include the Prime Minister's penchant for cleaving to the middle path, the lack of trust between the nationalist and federalist Quebec clans, the increasing ideologisation of French-English relations, and the conviction of central elites that they, alone, must control the political agenda if Canada is not to fall off the rails. Such motivations prevent the adaptive flexibility that has been the hallmark of Canada's political community.

B. A NEW QUEBEC-CANADA PARTNERSHIP:

It was René Lévesque who originally proposed the idea of an economic partnership between Quebec and the rest of Canada in his 1980 referendum which asked the population to support the negotiation of a sovereignty-association pact with Canada. One of his major objectives was to overcome Quebeckers fear, at the time, of the economic consequences of independence. That the term partnership itself has close affinities with federalism can be seen in the conclusions to the Bélanger-Campeau commission on the future of Quebec and the subsequent writings of André Burelle. The idea was reheated, mainly under the auspices of Lucien Bouchard and the Bloc Québécois, for the 1995 Quebec Referendum. It is said to have swayed a number of Quebeckers to vote Yes.

The basic concept of a 'partnership' is an agreement between two or more equal partners for an economic and/or political union. The 1995 referendum proposal included the offer of both an economic and a political partnership to be completed within a year. Although, in part, the political partnership was to calm the fears of Canadians, the main aim was likely to make up for the fact that a purely economic agreement would not give Quebec any control over its monetary policy. The proposed partnership was to take place after Quebec had become independent. Although there has been considerable subsequent analysis of possible institutions, the original proposition included an economic union with a disputes tribunal, and a bipartite Council of Ministers which would have the decision-making power, and a debating assembly which would have a more rep-by-pop composition.

The greatest difficulty in commenting on the notion of partnership, like that of the independence of Quebec, is that it is still hypothetical and all our ideas are purely speculative. Already the speculations on post-independence scenarios has led to a rather clear division between 'chaos' theories founded on an anarchic situation and 'business-as-usual' theories based on the pragmatic necessity of cooperative negotiations. The speculations are compounded by the unknown reactions of potential outside intervenors such as the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and the countries of the Francophonie. So, I must admit from the outset that my propositions suffer from the same speculative weaknesses and are likely to be contested by others. Nor do I have the space to give them the detailed examination they merit so they will be presented as a series of propositions. I put them forth not from any sense of divine guidance but merely to explain my personal motivations for preferring the renewal of federalism as the best option open to Canadians. I would have to admit, however, that if the rest of Canada is not able to understand Quebec's position within the federation (and that of the West and the Native peoples), then some sort of partnership may be the best option for those who believe that a form of independent unit in the northern part of North America is a continuing necessity.

1.The proposal for an economic and political 'partnership' is simply new language for the old idea of 'confederation'. Historically, the few confederations which have been attempted have proven highly unstable. There is no attempt to develop the common values or citizenship which can create "an overarching sense of shared purposes and objectives". The central institutions and leaders are not legitimated by any direct election of the populace. The whole process is several steps removed from democratic governance. A dualist confederation would be in double jeopardy because disputes are more likely to lead to stalemate when there are no "third parties" to smooth the waters. Quebec and Ontario were supposed to have learned this lesson after the failed Union linking them between 1840 and 1866 which was replaced by the federation of 1867. There is no reason to expect a Quebec-Canada confederation could survive very long.

2. Stripped of its verbiage, "equal partnership" is just a means to obtain by the back door of a new political union what had proven unacceptable in federal politics. Even the compact of 1867 can be read as an implicit understanding that Canada had moved away from any exact equality between French and English (let alone Quebec and the other provinces) which had become untenable in a representation by population democracy. Federation was invented to provide protection for the French culture in Quebec and strong participation for the French in federal institutions. Francophones can hold the position of Governor General, Prime Minister, Chief Justice, Chief of the Armed forces and head of the federal public service, all at the same time (as at present), and there is no outcry. But, it is difficult to conceive that a population which has difficulty in recognizing Quebec as distinct society would be willing to turn around after separation and grant it equal status. Why would ROC all of a sudden be willing to give one quarter of the population equality with the other three quarters and one (former) province equality with the other nine? Possible, but difficult.

3. The separation of Quebec from Canada by a unilateral declaration of sovereignty and independent statehood is likely to create indignation, if not outright rage, in the rest of Canada. A people which has never really believed it could happen and which has been lulled by the "best country in the world" refrain will wake up with a shock. Two likely reactions are: "they are taking away a part of my country" and "they are doing it in the name of their French language and culture". We are then in a situation of conflict of French vs. English. The history of ethnic conflict tells us that an escalation of antagonisms is likely and that this process is spearheaded by renegade extremists who are unknowable and uncontrollable by political forces in the short run. This will not be a certain scenario in former-Canada, but it is such a great possibility that it should give all political forces in present-Canada pause for reflection -- on the benefits of renewed federalism.

4. Many observers who reject the possibility of conflict base their conclusion on a reading of the Canadian national character or identity which holds that Canadians are peaceful, non-violent, rational, law-abiding, tolerant and civil. But, a slightly different reading of the Canadian identity can lead to a rather different interpretation of the potential for conflict. It would be unreasonable to assume that, to the degree there are national characteristics, they can be disassociated from the milieu which gives rise to them. If the above marvellous characteristics can be attributed to Canadians it is not because they constitute a different genus on the face of the planet. Rather, I suggest, it is because Canada is a country of interdependent minorities which have learned that their individual and collective success is founded on their ability to get along peacefully through tolerance and civility. If the community which nourishes these characteristics is ruptured, it is very difficult to predict the future behaviour pattern of Canadians. We should avoid having to find out.

5. If ethnic conflict is not an absolute certainty following separation, disarray is. The rest of Canada (ROC) will not only be in shock but they will not know which political leaders or governments would have a legitimate mandate to speak for them and with regard to what political regime. Such political uncertainty is likely to be conjugated with economic instability in a short to mid-term spiral of social disruption. All of which has led Alan Cairns to propose a Plan C as a contingency strategy to deal with the fundamental question of the future of Canada without Quebec. He suggests it would be wise to continue with the traditional constitutional framework for a period of three to five years to avoid the distractions of panic, fear and insecurity likely to be triggered in ROC. This would provide the timer to handle short term negotiations on essentials with Quebec ( e.g.division of the debt) and to discuss a future constitution. He thinks Canadians and their governments outside Quebec should agree in advance that the constitutional status quo would be a viable interim arrangement. However, this presupposes that there is the will and the means to come to such an agreement in a climate in which leaders do not want to give credence to Quebec separatism.

In such a situation, it may be just as reasonable to suggest that in a period of disarray, ROC may move toward a third option between conflict and partnership. The rest of Canada could conclude that both conflict and partnership are unviable and turn to membership in the United States, let us call it Option Three. Opinion polls show a small but continuing support for this option. Change could come about if the "dream of Canada" as a continental, pluralist society is shattered and the will-power and leadership of Canadian federalists is broken. It is not unimaginable that, in their search for economic and political security following a rejection by Quebec, a growing number of Canadians from other provinces might consider that it is easier to imagine joining up with their English-speaking "American cousins" than taking months or possibly years to work out a potentially unstable relationship with Quebec. A number of analysts have suggested this movement might start in the east or the west. Unfortunately, very few Quebec nationalists seem to have contemplated this possibility.

6. With or without a potential amalgamation of ROC with the United States, it is difficult to imagine that independence would not lead to the progressive isolation of Quebec in North America. The position of the minority groups in both successor societies is likely to be increasingly tenuous. While the rest of the continent might go through the motions of free trade, there would be little goodwill towards French Quebec. There would hardly be elaborate efforts to deal in French with a minuscule portion of the North American market. Quebeckers would increasingly have to be able to operate in English. It is hard to believe that the loss of the Canadian buffer zone would be a benefit to the French culture in North America.

C. RENEWED FEDERALISM

A call for renewed federalism in Canada may be justified both on the grounds of the advantages the country has conferred on its citizens for more than a century and because of the federal system's evident need for improvement. More difficult is suggesting a process for reform. The proposals for renewal have been on the table for years, but the means of achieving them have eluded us to date. To these we will turn in the concluding section.

It can be maintained that few countries in the history of the world have offered to so many citizens such a great degree of peace, stability and wealth for such a long period of time. During its history relatively few Canadians have lost their lives in civil strife or criminal activity. Surveys show we actually like each other! For more than half a century we have had one of the highest standards of living in the world. Thanks to the invention of equalization payments and other redistributive transfers, these benefits have been spread across the country reasonably well, the major exception been the aboriginal populations. Laurier was right. The 20th century has belonged to Canada. Canadians are just too self-deprecating to admit it. Few other states have had longer or more stable histories as constitutional democracies. In 1992, Quebec celebrated the 200th anniversary of its legislative traditions. Other provinces can say as much. In one short century we have gone from an unpopulated, agricultural colony to our place among the world's major states. We are leaders in peace and international diplomacy. The French and English cultures are thriving. Our stars shine throughout the world. Enough already.

Canada has become the home not only of two major linguistic and cultural communities but also of ethnic and racial groups from across the globe who have learned to live in peace and mutual respect. With regard to Francophones, it is currently true that their culture is stronger in Canada than ever before and that the language has made more progress in Canada than in any country since the Second World War. Moreover, I would maintain that is the irreducible pluralism of Canada, mainly because of its French fact, which has challenged Canadians to become relatively open, creative and tolerant. Our tensions keep us respectful of each other. The multicultural makeup of the country renders it much more a model for the future of humanity than does that of more homogenized and unitary societies. And, you see, I have not even mentioned the fact that the United Nations has dubbed it the most developed state in the world. But the evidence seems clear: the race for Canada is worth the prize.

Nonetheless, with all its advantages, Canada is far from perfect. Too many people feel the current federal system is unfair to them. It needs change. This should not surprise us. If changes in our environment can produce changes in, say, the way we do business or in the state of our health (for instance, illnesses like anorexia, aids, Asian flu, or smoking-related cancer) there is no reason why politics should be immune from the constant need for renewal. After all, Canada had five constitutional documents before arriving at the Constitution Act of 1982. Change is inherent in politics and, as Watts has advised us, rigid federations which fail to adjust to changing circumstances crack and disintegrate. The question, of course, is: to which changing circumstances must we react, why now, and why with structural reforms?

We must find the principles for renewal within the concept of federalism itself. The theory of federalism tells us it is intended to promote unity in diversity, that it is to maintain and protect distinct cultural and regional communities within an overall political, economic and social union. The technique for doing this is a federation with two autonomous orders of government each mandated by its citizens, neither being subordinate to the other, and linked by a written constitution which is interpreted by an independent court acting as umpire. Federations should both protect the autonomy of the component units and provide for their participation in the common institutions. As Croisat points out, federalism exists to balance the simultaneous human aspirations for independence and solidarity. The tensions in Canada today are founded on the contention that its federal system does not operate in a manner consonant with this description. Further, it is argued that while there are other parts of the Canadian family home which need fixing too, such as the democratic and social justice mechanisms, it is the house itself which requires attention, first, so that life may go on within it.

Changes in Canadian circumstances that have upset previous balances or created new situations leading to demands for corresponding institutional reforms started mainly after the Second World War. They began with shifts in demographic and wealth distributions. The relative proportion of the Quebec population in Canada went into decline as did its weight in the federal Parliament. Assimilation rates of francophone minorities outside Quebec shot up. Inside Quebec, immigrants assimilated to the English language and Francophones found themselves on the bottom of the economic totem pole. There was fear for the survival of the French community and its political influence. By the 1970's the powerful Quebec state and the Francophone corporations of "Quebec Inc." were gathering steam. To the fear for the French culture has been added a new sense of national self-confidence within the confines of Quebec.

Meanwhile, out West, the exact opposite was taking place. There were immense increases in population as well as in agricultural and resource wealth. Urbanization and economic diversification has gone on swiftly. The traditional alienation from Ottawa's central-Canadian oriented policies has been replaced by a new determination to give the Western voice and power its rightful place in the federal government. Less noticed was the fact that the Aboriginal population had tripled since the 1930s, while growing by 60 per cent just between 1981 and 1996. This growth helped to generate both grave social problems and a new leadership which, in turn, sparked demands for political autonomy and an end to assimilationist and colonialist policies. Throughout the post-War period, an expansionist immigration policy led to a dramatic decline in the proportion of the population of the French and British founding peoples. A new emphasis on citizen equality and multiculturalism began to compete with traditional dualist policies.

It is these fundamental shifts in the nature of the Canadian political community, and not just the ideologies of political elites, which have produced new perceptions about the deficiencies of the Canadian political system. Quebeckers, recognizing the reduced weight of Francophones outside Quebec and the decline of their influence in the federation, want greater constitutional protection and recognition for Quebec, the one place Francophones have a majority. This falling back on Quebec and demand for constitutional reform has been reinforced by two other changed conditions. The first has been the use of the federal spending power in provincial jurisdictions for the goal of "nation-building", thus demonstrating the porousness of provincial autonomy in a federation with a strong English speaking majority. Hence the desire for the restitution of provincial powers and a control of Ottawa's unilateral interventionism.

The second was the patriation of the constitution in 1982, with a new amending formula that heightens the principle of the "equality" of provinces, and a Charter of Rights and Freedoms which enshrines in Canada the American values of judicialized liberal individualism at the expense of pretensions of collective autonomy. All this was achieved not only without but against the expressed views of the Quebec government, thus breaking an implicit French-English contract in Canada and nullifying Quebec's claims of a protective, constitutional veto. The 1991 Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec (Bélanger-Campeau) concluded that the combined principles of: a multiculturalism which sees French as one among many cultures; a national Canadian identity based on the uniform, individual equality of Canadian citizens across the country; centralization for efficient nation-building and social policies; the uniform equality of provinces meaning what Quebec gets everyone gets; and an inflexible amending formula -- means, "... it is hard to meet Quebec's needs and make room in the Canadian Constitution for the political expression of Quebec's uniqueness within the federation." In other words, the federal principle of diversity is being neglected within Canada.

Although Westerners have been behind a number of the principles which are a cause of so much concern for Quebec, their key concerns are institutional. They have seen that the present parliamentary and federal institutions favour the two large, central provinces which control the federal political parties, parliamentary majorities and caucuses, cabinets, and major policies. And this control is amplified by Canada's unrepresentative, first-past-the post electoral system which rewards majority parties and sometimes eliminates entire regions from the governing party. Because of party discipline and cabinet solidarity and secrecy, local politicians cannot break ranks and rarely heard on local issues. The normal outlet for regional priorities, especially of the smaller provinces, is the Senate. But because we have a non-elective upper chamber named by the central government on a patronage basis, Canada is the only federation not to have a territorially-based chamber where voices of regional protest can be effectively heard. It is also true there is no provincial voice in the nominations to the Supreme Court or federal agencies.

Senate reform and a provincial voice in the nominations of key federal personnel are the West's major aspirations for structural change, so they can have an influence in federal politics more commensurate with their demographic and economic weight. A second objective is to put a halter on what the West perceives as federal programmatic and spending decisions which are tipped to the advantage of the central provinces, particularly Quebec. The West seeks a policy of "fiscal neutrality" in Ottawa's spending so that resources are distributed across provinces in relation to their populations (with allowance for equalization and social programs).

While the Aboriginal peoples have been at it a little less long than Quebec and the West, they have been struggling for structural reform with little success since the 1980s. To all intents and purposes they are still wards of the federal government. The Indian Act and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs are still the main sources of policy. If the recent Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples can be our guide then the native peoples now have before them a broad, combined agenda of economic, health, social, educational and political reforms. In the structural domain, however, the major goals are founded on the negotiation of treaties to arrive at a third order of autonomous self-government and the recognition of territorial claims and the taxation and resource revenues that go with them. This would entail the consequent end of constitutional tutelage by the federal government and the Indian Act and the replacement of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs by a department of Aboriginal Relations and a department of Indian and Inuit Services. These steps would be accompanied by mutual recognition by Aboriginal Nations and Canadian governments; a new Royal Proclamation, enabling federal legislation, and a National Framework Agreement on self-government; and, eventually, an Aboriginal parliament to provide advice to the House of Commons and the Senate. Most of these reforms could be achieved without constitutional amendment.

The foregoing paragraphs were intended to explain the historical and social foundations, rationale, agenda and principles for the renewal of the Canadian federation. The principles are anchored in the effective operation of a federal system and the justifiable requests of structurally disadvantaged groups. The principles indicate a requirement for the rebalancing of the federation to assure greater effectiveness of the system; to enhance the protection, recognition, representation, and participation of these groups; and to promote a greater respect for the concept of diversity. Now let us consider the detailed agenda.

An Agenda for Renewal

As mentioned in the Introduction, a great deal of work has been done since the failure of the Charlottetown Accord and the close results of the 1995 Quebec referendum to rethink the notion of a renewed Canada and to develop a form of analytical consensus on its main elements. In this brief space, I simply wish to provide an overview of the proposed agenda for renewal, stressing those elements I consider to be crucial. For those who wish more detail and justification, I refer them to the very ample literature listed in Note 4 and to be cited further on.

Two background questions are, however, of overarching importance. One of the conundrums facing reformers was Pierre Trudeau's challenge that individual liberalism must be the bedrock philosophy of Canada for fear that any bow to collectivism can lead to extreme nationalism. Thanks to the work of political philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and James Tully this problem, crucial to the nature of Canadian society, has been largely resolved. We now have a greater appreciation that while the development of the individual may be in the forefront of our thinking, this development cannot take place without consideration for the particular community in which the person evolves. We must give thought to the psychic and material well-being of the both the individual and the milieu. The milieu cannot simply be taken as a given. Secondly, since the collapse of Meech Lake and particularly Charlottetown, the misgivings about "mega-constitutional" solutions has spilled over into a sort of angst that any constitutional change is either undesirable or unattainable. At the University of Ottawa Colloquium on Federalism for Tomorrow (Note 4) we attempted to show that a short constitutional agenda is both possible and necessary to an acceptable agenda for renewal. We will return to this at the end.

The Recognition of Quebec: The Canada created by the British North America Act in 1867 was like a three legged chair. It described the federal, legislative and executive mechanisms but not the most important relationship in the country, the relationship between French and English. Since then, Canadian history has been punctuated by French-English tensions both political and intellectual. The academics have argued about whether Canada was a contract between the founding provinces or a compact between French and English.. English-speaking Canadians, basing themselves on the legal documents, generally decided Canada was an agreement between provinces. Francophones believe, and studies have shown them to be correct, that they understood there was at least an implicit compact between the two founding peoples. This eventually became a belief in a French-English dualism across the expanding Canada as well as in the distinctiveness of Quebec because of its majoritarily French culture.

This recognition of Quebec and of Canadian dualism has become all the more imperative both for Quebeckers and Canadians as a result of: Quebec's decline as a portion of Canada's population; the continuing assimilation of Francophones outside Quebec; the challenge of multi-culturalism and "Charter Canadianism, and the ever-present threat of Ottawa's intervention in Quebec jurisdictions -- to say nothing of the challenges and opportunities of globalization and free trade. Following the 1995 Quebec referendum, a poll confirmed that even among No supporters 71 per cent thought that reform of Confederation was now a necessity, and that it had to include constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct society.

The Calgary declaration of the nine non-Quebec premiers have phrased a possible recognition:

If we can presume that the term "unique character" carries the same weight as "distinct society", without the offensive interpretations of the latter, then this formulation could be acceptable, although Quebec federalists may want to try to include the word "institutions" . Before being constitutionalized, it should be balanced by an article recognizing the official language minorities. It should also be noted that the second paragraph opens up the possibility of the minimal asymmetry any pluralist federation seems to require.

Recognition of Quebec in the constitution would have several benefits, both symbolic and practical. It would be a long awaited gesture of welcome to Quebec. It would provide additional constitutional recognition and, thus, protection for Quebec vis-à-vis the anglophone majority, both nationally and internationally. The importance of diversity within the Canadian federation and its implications for a distinctive Quebec society and government would be spelled out, thus rectifying the "abeyance" of 1867. After years of practice, the clause in the Calgary declaration has been carefully enough crafted to limit the recognition of collective rights. But to those who still fear even this mild formulation, it should be pointed out that the refusal to provide this protection for Quebec in the constitution has paralleled the rise of sovereignist aspirations.

A Constitutional Veto for Quebec: While the recognition of Quebec is primordial, it is unlikely to be sufficient to convince Quebeckers that the rest of Canada understands the practical implications of diversity in a federation. Among the greatest necessities, once we have recognized that Quebec's needs are different and that, for some purposes, it cannot simply be treated as "one province like all the others", is to grant it a constitutional veto. After the experience of 1982, it is improbable that Quebec can continue in a Canada where the Anglophone majority is able to modify the federal institutions and the number of provinces without Quebec's consent.

At present, there are a number of domains requiring unanimous consent for their amendment. But, generally the rule which applies is that the federal Parliament and seven provinces combining fifty per cent of the population must approve. The easiest way to give Quebec a veto is simply to say that it must be included among the seven provinces which are required for amendments that are likely to affect federal-provincial relations in Articles 38 and 42 of the Law of 1982, or at least with regard to the number of provinces and the central institutions. And this is what I would recommend. Some people fear that public opinion and provincial leaders find this unacceptable because of the proclaimed "equality" of provinces. It is time to say that although provinces do and must have an equal legal status as far as their federal jurisdictions are concerned, provinces neither are nor ever have been equal in the sense of identical as regards their nature, needs or capacities. It is precisely because Quebec, alone in North America, has a French culture that it requires special constitutional protection. The other provinces are simply cutting off their nose to spite their face by insisting on identical treatment and thereby worsening a procedure which is already too rigid. In fact, the First Ministers really should ask a group of experts to propose ways to lighten and improve the amending formula of 1982, at the same time as they reconfirm a Quebec veto.

Reform of the Senate: The Senate of Canada is a federal and democratic abomination. Unelected, a tool of the central government and appointed mostly on the basis of party patronage (but, not entirely -- there are some excellent Senators), the Senate does not fulfil the functions of a federal institution. Considered illegitimate by almost everyone, its reform or abolition has been proposed since the 1880s. But, a federal system requires a second house that can give voice to territorial problems within the central government. It becomes a prime instrument for its legitimation because regional frustrations can be expressed within the federal government rather than as a source of continuing rivalry with the provinces. A territorially based senate fulfils one of the operating principles of a federation. Of course, there is also the political reason that it is unreasonable to ask Western Canadians to put off their long standing desire for reform when they are being asked to accede to other's agendas. Many fine analyses and proposals for reform have been prepared, but it is Gordon Robertson who has most recently synthesized them and considered the trade offs between them.

There is general agreement that a reformed Senate should be elected by a form of proportional representation and have similar powers to the House of Commons, with the exception of most types of money bills. Also, to make the Cabinet only responsible to the House of Commons, the Senate would be limited to a suspensive veto on ordinary legislation. However, the Senate could be given a say in nominations to agencies with an impact on federal relations. There are three main areas of difficulty. The first is whether it should have a provincial or regional base of representation. Both cases have their merits. But because the Senate is meant to represent provincial interests, provincial representation would appear to be indicated. But, this leads to the question of equal or proportionate representation. Due to the extraordinary discrepancy in size of the provinces and the fear of creating to great a deficiency in the numbers from Quebec and also Ontario it would seem that a graduated distribution of seats based on a qualified weighting of populations is wisest. Robertson proposes 4 seats for Prince Edward Island and a weighting of 6, 12 and 24 seats for the others, with an automatic attainment of 24 seats with a population of five million. I would think that an intermediary quota of 18 seats when a population of 4 million is reached would find greater favour in the West. While many Westerners have promoted the idea of equal provincial representation, it is my impression that support for this concept is diminishing as it is realized it might not favour them in the future. It is further proposed that the Senate elections be held at a different time than those for the House of Commons, to give precedence to provincial concerns.

The third issue has to do with Quebec. There will be disappointed with a relatively smaller representation in a more powerful Upper Chamber. Quebec, however, will have 24 new, influential representatives visibly defending its interests in Ottawa, while this has not been the case with the present Senate. Moreover, it is proposed that laws on cultural and linguistic issues require a double majority of Francophones and Anglophones in the Senate. However, I think we can do even better. It is time the federal government had a body composed equally of Francophones and Anglophones. An Advisory Council on Cultural Affairs with parity French and English membership could carry out studies, publish reports and advise Parliament.

Federal-Provincial Powers: It has become common place to propose greater decentralization as one of the principal solutions to Canadian problems. Often this message comes from the West and the premiers as well as academics. While there is probably some room for limited decentralization, I am rather of the opinion of Roger Gibbins that, "...decentralization on a massive scale has never been an option of great popular appeal in the West, although it has tempted and continues to tempt provincial governments." Nor is this of the greatest concern in Ontario, certainly not in the East and not even very much for Quebec federalists. The problem with decentralization is that once one starts there is no automatic place to stop. To take the extreme, the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec heard some witnesses call for, "...the exclusive attribution to Quebec of powers and responsibilities related to its social, economic and cultural development as well as language...", which, of course means the end of the federation. In reality, it is difficult to go beyond the principle of attributing local affairs to the provinces which the Canadian founding fathers used and which modern Europeans have subsumed within the concept of 'subsidiarity'.

But, the nub of the problem has to do with the federal spending power and its past and present potential for Ottawa's interference and unwanted duplications in provincial jurisdictions. The solutions lie in the progressive disentangling of federal-provincial overlaps and duplications, the retreat of Ottawa from provincial jurisdictions where it is not wanted, controls on the federal spending power and the progressive negotiation of domains of concurrent powers with provincial paramountcy. The primary reasons are that both the analysts and practitioners of federalism have become convinced it is no longer possible to have water-tight divisions in federal-provincial powers and that sometimes, when there is agreement, it is necessary, for the good of all citizens, to use coordinated national policies and spending to surmount some national difficulties. It is therefore necessary to subject Ottawa's spending power, in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, to prior agreement of a majority of provinces including Quebec. In addition, provinces wishing to opt out could be offered fiscal compensation when they create similar programs. To the limited degree it is necessary to open the Constitution to attain these ends, we should, at the same time, do a way with the "quasi-federal" or "imperial" elements of the British North America Act, such as the federal power to reserve or disallow provincial legislation.

There is also the issue of the effective management of federal-provincial relations, both for greater harmony and to help Canada be competitive in international relations. Inter-jurisdictional and inter-communal disputes are inevitable in even the best functioning of federations. There must be agreed-upon procedures for resolving these conflicts. The principle of autonomy, combined with the realities of interdependence in modern federations, renders unacceptable in intergovernmental relations the continuing domination, rather than partnership, of Ottawa.

Two solutions have been proposed. Minimally, and perhaps as a first step, cooperative decision-making must be enhanced at federal-provincial meetings by shared chairmanship and agenda creation between Ottawa and a representative of the provinces, chosen on a rotating basis. More formal mechanisms must be established for decision-making procedures, dispute resolution and decision enforcement. Further, André Burelle has proposed the creation of a permanent Council of Ministers to be mandated by their legislatures to make executive decisions, with voting on different types of matters to be weighted by differentiated, pre-agreed formulae, as is done in the European Union. This could be a second, and I think inevitable, step toward rational decision-making in our federation.

The Electoral System and the Head of State: Normally these two items are not included in proposals for federal reform. I have become convinced a proportional representation electoral system and a Canadian head of state would make considerable contributions to a renewed federalism (to say nothing about democracy, but that is not the topic here). It has been 30 years since Alan Cairns warned us about the harmful effects of the electoral system on federal decision-making. Canada's single member plurality system, which Stein Rokkan dubbed "pre-political", leads to parties being over-represented in some regions and shut out of others. No federation can afford to have a whole region excluded from its national government for nearly twenty years, as was done with the West during the Trudeau era.

With a British head of state, Canada potentially alienates two-thirds of its citizens from French and other non-British extraction. Without our own head of state we lack a coordinating symbol and a person above politics who can talk to both the federal and provincial governments in times of disagreement. Our international image, which should be a rallying point for Canadians, suffers because of the confused perception others have of us as a relic of British colonialism. Over recent decades, francophone prime ministers have known they could not effectively challenge the monarchy for fear of stirring up an anti-French backlash -- although Trudeau did as much as he could to weaken it. So everyone put the issue on the backburner, saying it was not a crucial factor in federal reform. It is probably correct that the question should not be directly connected to the short agenda for federal reform. But the longer term expectation of no longer having a representative of the British monarch as Canada's head of state would surely send a strong message to Quebeckers that would also rally a large majority of all Canadians.

While considerable research has been done over the years on Canada's electoral system and Australia is now leading the way in reform of the monarchical heritage, much more consideration needs to be given to these two detriments to effective federalism. Representative federal commissions should be named without delay to consider these two issues and to make recommendations which can be submitted to referenda.

The Open-ended Agenda: Not only have Canadians (and many others) been quarelling over federalism for the past three decades, but we have also been thinking about it. Many creative ideas have been advanced only to be forced off the table by the necessity of responding to political priorities and time tables. In a wise, well- orchestrated federal system, the political leadership would recognize the obvious: there is a continuing need for the federal institutions to change in order to correspond to modifications in surrounding circumstances. What is needed, then, on a permanent basis, is an independent Federal Reform Council whose task it would be to capture imaginative ideas for federal improvement and to scan the system for adaptive requirements. It could also identify overlap and duplication. Its tasks would be investigating, identifying, consulting and reporting.

For instance, it has been proposed that so-called "public consultations" in the constitutional arena rarely achieve their goal as public hearings because they usually only give additional voice to the wealthy, the informed, the organized, in other words, those with interests to protect or axes to grind. What is required, in a large, diverse and dispersed society are more pro-active efforts at "consensus formation" and citizen participation undertaken by independent agencies, using new techniques of deliberative democracy. The Federal government has been more absorbed in gaining visibility by usurping provincial jurisdictions than it has been in obtaining the ultimate visibility of creating federalist Canadians. This it could do by fulfilling its own responsibilities for citizenship enhancement and socialization to the federation. Part of that socialization should be brought about in the most natural way imaginable, that is by Ottawa sponsoring a large scale and permanent exchange programme so that citizens could get to know each other and there country.

In another line of thought, the constitutional lawyer, Joseph Magnet, has recently summarized a number of non-constitutional techniques for enhancing the flexibility of the federation. These include the federal government simply vacating areas of provincial jurisdiction for which they have duplications; streamlining and rationalizing areas of joint program delivery; requiring deputy ministers to certify annually how they have respected Quebec's distinct society; experimenting with increased legislative oversight to review key federal appointments and departments that have inter-governmental impacts; and a combination of "trade offs, federal bluster and unilateral federal legislation" to strengthen the internal common market.

3. A Process for Renewal

It is very difficult to bring about reform, especially structural reform, in an on-going democracy. For each established identity or interest, there is a corresponding political force or pressure group to protect it. In addition, as we have come to learn in Canada during the past decade, this process is likely to be complicated by such obvious democratic proceedures as reversals in public opinion, elections, changing leadership, the constitutional amendment process, referenda, and economic somersaults. Because of all these inherent democratic obstacles to structural political change, it is less difficult to develop solutions to problems than it is to implement them. The difficulty is one of process, of getting from point A to point B.

Thus, while someone from far away may find the above agenda for renewal fairly reasonable, Canadians may be tempted to throw up their hands and declare, "been there, done that". For instance, at the present time their is a sort of unwritten consensus that any reform agenda should be short, uncomplicated, and unconstitutional, and should just deal with political priorities. But such a plan is as irrational as was our attempt to satisfy all comers in the Charlottetown mega-constitutional accord. In short, a Canadian reader might claim we have tried constitutional reform and it hasn't worked. But, before rejecting the agenda, consider the five following propositions.

1. It Is A Principled Agenda: The conflict between change and no change, constitutional and non-constitutional change, and mega vs. minimal change should signal to us that we are in desperate need of criteria which can guide our choice of which items to include in a renewal package. Although respondng to political priorities, the above renewal agenda is driven by the principles of federalism. They permit us to learn from others while keeping our past in perspective. Previous efforts at constitutional and federal reform have been dominated by a political agenda, an attempt to respond to the political demands of the moment. Such efforts are bound to be short term, incomplete and contentious. On the other hand, federal principles are drawn not only from Canadian but comparative experience and therefore tend to be long term, inclusive and satisficing. They are now called the "culture of federalism".

The federal principles that have been stressed include: combining unity and diversity; two autonomous orders of government, each mandated by their citizens, neither subordinate to the other; a written constitution representing the will of the people and an independent high court to interpret it; explicit recognition and accommodation of multiple identities; an overarching sense of shared purposes; representation and participation of regional inputs to central institutions; and protection of local autonomy. in a word, balancing the simultaneous human aspirations for independence and solidarity. As regards the evolution of federations the principles specify: pragmatically accommodating the particularities of the country; incremental piecemeal constitutional adjustment; reform brought about at the political level via legislative and administrative action; and the continuous necessity of substantial adjustment to changing circumstances. Such principles give us solid guidelines for anchoring our agenda for renewal so that it is not just an ad hoc mishmash of reponses to events and pressures.

2. We Don't Have To Do It All At Once: Not all the agenda has to be acted on at the same time. As we have just seen, the key is pragmatic, step by step adjustment over time using legislative and administrative mechanisms as well as those of the constitution. Calculating strategists will tell that, if this is the case, we should not have put all our cards on the table at once. On the contrary, I think now is a time when we must create a sense of trust in those who feel our institutions are unfair by establishing a vision of the future which clearly responds to their concerns. Hence the need to put the overall agenda on the table, even if we know it wiil be modified to some degree through negotiation and log rolling.

Still, we must also have a sense of priorities and timing. If an agenda for renewal is going to help us avoid another divisive referendum battle it must be offered to the people of Quebec preferably before the next Quebec election or immediately thereafter. This is a call to mobilization and action to the leaders and citizen groups of the rest of Canada. At a minimum, such an agenda must include not only the basic requirements for recognition and protection of Quebec but also the major conditions which will encourage ROC to make such a proposal. This essential short term agenda includes: recognition of Quebec in the Constitution, a constitutional veto for Quebec, Senate reform and constitutionalized control of the federal spending power. This short list may not suit everyone and will be the subject of tough discussions.

The list presumes, first, that the core of the recent Canadian debate is the necessity to recognize and to protect, at one and the same time, the legitimate aspirations of Quebec and the West. Second, the issues of decentralization, readjustment of powers, and the management of intergovernmental relations are on-going problems subject to the ebb and flow of federal debate -- once Ottawa can no longer unilaterally intervene in provincial (read: Quebec) jurisdictions. Changes to the electoral system and the head of state are parallel problems which require recognition by Canadians that their federal system cannot work effectively without proportioanl representation and the replcaement of the monarchy. Popular opinion appears to be shifting in both cases.

The astute reader will have noted that nothing has yet been said about the Aboriginals. This is not because they are in any way less important but because the crystal ball is less clear about a consensus on issues and priorities. Since the Royal Commission Report, it is clear that the reform agenda for the native peoples goes far beyond the constitution and politics to englobe every area of socio-economic affairs. But, only one of five national native organizations accepted the recent offer of apology and proposals for renewed relations of the federal government. Certainly it is necessary that the Aboriginal peoples feel confident that a long term process is in place to deal with their needs and aspirations. Perhaps the best place to begin, as proposed by the Royal Commission, is to convene a conference of Aboriginal, federal and provincial leaders to draft a National Framework Agreement. In addition, the federal government and the native associations should consider the establishment of an 'arms-length', independent commission to act as a facilatator which can spur on the response to the Royal Commission Report, as well as Ottawa's new Aboriginal Action Plan and future policy developments. The problem today is that the federal government is both judge and jury in its relations with Aboriginals. It is short-sighted to have the complex relationship repose on the presently good rapport between the Minister, Jane Stewart, and the Chief of Assembly of First Nations, Phil Fontaine. A permanent, institutionalized go-between is required.

3. We Know How To Carry Out the Renewal Process: A lot of people seem to be worried about getting into another "constitutional exercise". They fear it is a quagmire that drowns us in a useless debate. But from another perspective these national debates are a necessary part of our coming to terms with each other and working out a federal consensus -- if we have learned lessons about how to do to do it from our own experiences and that of other countries. In fact, social scientists have been hard at work studying comparative situations and the lessons of our past efforts to renew the Constitution. Michael Stein has recently synthesized the findings.

The major concerns with the process have focused on four sets of problems. The amendment formula adopted in the Constitution Act of 1982 seemed to be too lengthy, inflexible and unweildy. The Meech Lake process was generally considered to have been too closed, unrepresentative, inflexible and dominated by government elites. On the other hand, the Charlottetown procedure, while more open and representative, lacked coherence and unified leadership. It introduced major new proposals at the last minute and allowed little time for public consultation, information and mobilization before the referendum. The referendum itself was organizationaly deficient and did not include alternate ratification procedures. Based on learning from these cases, Stein proposes techniques for overcoming the major deficiencies.

His major recommendation is for a "blended process" which combines leading politicians and public servants making creative bargains on constitutional compromises with a parallel procedure to draw ideas, critical perspectives and legitimation from influential nonpartisan citizens and community-based groups. The two processes operate in tandem to compliment and act as a check on each other.

The initial "agenda-setting phase" of the renewal process calls for closer links between first ministers meetings (with rotating chairs) charged with responsibility for framing the initial bargaining agenda and various agenda-setting citizen policy forums. The "negotiating phase", largely by first ministers who can use a brokerage style to make the inherent "pragmatic compromises, issue linkages and trade offs", with the guidance of their officials, would be combined with consultations with opposition parties and unofficial panels of experts and leading citizens. However, it should focus on a single track, "integrative bargaining process" with single negotiating texts. There would be no artificicial deadlines. New ideas or "deal-making items" would be informally tested for public reaction with the parallel opposition and citizen panels. As a political scientist from Israel recently said, the goal is to move opinion from "what do I want to what can I live with". Thus, the aim of the whole process is to seek partial gains, mutual compromises and "win-win" situations. The more flexible, closed-door executive meetings could, at crucial moments include representatives of interested parties or groups. It would be linked to the panel of citizens and experts which would have strong ties to local communities and citizens groups.

The "ratification phase" should be longer and more inclusive than in the past. A detailed legal text, based on agreement in principle, would be submitted for non-partisan legislative hearings. Amendments would be submitted to a conference committee for compromise solutions which might include "opting out" concessions or "parallel accords". The first ministers could agree among themselves for a shorter ratification period than allowed for in the amendment formula. Different subsections of the agreement might require different legislative majorities. Prior to final legislative ratifiction, the agreement should be legitimized by a pan-Canadian, consultative referendum preceeded by a well-funded education phase. The threshold for approval might, by agreement, be reduced to two-thirds of the provinces, including a veto for all five regions. Vetoes could initiate a new round of legislative hearings.

More recently, a foreign observer and European federalist, Edgard Pisani, has put forth a fascinating idea that would permit us to concentrate on the renewal of our federal principles without necessarily having to open the entire Constitution. He proposes that parallel amd superior to the Constitution (but as an integral part of it) Canadians negotiate a new "Founding Pact" that would outline the basic principles of the federation and consecrate the notion of the two distinct societies. It would be initiated in a Throne Speech of the federal government, followed by a period of consultation and information leading to a national referendum. In case of success it would herald the creation of a Committee of Experts to adopt by consensus the text of the new pact and the means of its adoption. It could only be dissolved by a new national referendum. The concept has the merit of obliging the country to take a moment to focus once again on the fundamental consensus between the majority of its citizens that would leave a permanent reminder for reference by future leaders and generations. A pluralist society needs to have a visible, basic agreement to keep everyone in check.

So, we have learnt from our experience. So far so good. The only problem is that all this planning for a renewal process presupposes that there is public interest and the political will. The question remains, however, how do we get from A to B, how do we go from a concentration on the status quo to an offer of renewal?

4. We Are Half Way There: Without much fanfare and largely behind the scenes, a lot of time and effort has been invested in the concept of an agenda for renewal since 1995. One only needs to read the reports of the Confederation 2000 Conferences and the Group of 22 to see that disparate groups have come together and worked out some of the essential compromises for a new federal deal. I have summarized them. Heads have been knocked together and a consensus reached. It is possible. In addition, business has read the riot act to politicians. Investment comes at the price of stability and predictability. Seek a solution to dissention. Get back to Plan A. Provincial leaders who swore they would never touch the constitution have made an about turn. The premiers' Calgary Accord, recognizing Quebec and other federal principles, is soon likely to be ratified by nine provincial legislatures. Provincial populations have been sensitized to the issues. A scant year ago, no one would have believed such a change around was possible. And in Quebec, like it or not, Plan B seems to have had its effects. Support for separation has declined and large majorities in public opinion polls indicate they want to remain Canadian, if there is an opening from the rest of the country. Reading the polls, one can be astounded by how little it takes to be nice. Properly understood and handled, public opinion does not seem to be an obstacle to the renewal of Canada.

The turn around includes the federal government and Jean Chrétien's Liberal Party. They are already aboard on most of the crucial issues. It has alreay accepted the principle of the recognition of Quebec and of a veto in Parliamentary legislation. It has retreated from a number of provincial jurisdictions and pragmatically untangled overlaps. The fields of labour training, social programs and the environment come to mind. A new child support programme is being worked out in cooperation with the provinces. The same thing for reforms to health policy. In its 1996 Throne Speech the federal government accepted the principle of the control of their spending power in provincial jurisdictions. Despite a throwback to unilateral federal intervention in provincial jurisdictions, as in the Millennium Scholarships in Ottawa's 1998 budget, it can still be claimed the federal Liberals have adopted much of our renewal agenda.

Pressures from Quebec are likely to put the unity issue back on the front burner. But we are still left with that nagging question: how do we get to the point of offering a renewal agenda to Quebec and the rest of Canada? There are two answers. The first is to recognize we do not need to wait for the election of a federalist government in Quebec. It is to the people of Quebec that the opening must be made. The second answer is political leadership. Whether he was right or wrong in his methods, Brian Mulroney at least recognized the need and provided the leadership.

5. Prime Minister Chrétien Could Do It: My hope and expectation for Jean Chrétien's leadership are based on the following conclusions.

• One of the striking facts about the activities of all those who have promoted a Plan A of reconciliation since 1995 is that they rarely addressed themselves to those who have the capacity to bring about its realization. They have not talked truth to power. The evident reality is that Mr. Chrétien and his Liberals will be in power throughout all the period during which the national unity issue is likely to be brought back to the political foreground overng the next several years. Only they can provide the leadership to an agenda for renewal.

• The Nixon Paradox: It is much easier for a leader who has been perceived as being in the opposing camp to rally it to a course of major change. Jean Chrétien has great credibility outside Quebec and could muster the country to a policy of reconciliation. Once he realizes that Plan B intimidation has gone as far as it can, he will realize that only a positive plan based on mutual recognition and sound federal principles will provide a solution to the impasse.

• As we have just seen, the Liberals would not be acting alone. Most of the ground work has been laid and people across the country are waiting for the federal government to swing into action. In addition, the Liberals have already accepted most of the required reforms.

• Critics like to say that Chrétien is a middle of the roader without vision. In particular they like to quote his biographer, Lawrence Martin, who concluded, "...he showed few signs of being able to understand, as perhaps the greatest of leaders must, the great currents of change, both the dismal and the grand, sweeping the world around him." While I would contest this, the point here is that critics fail to add the second part of Martin's conclusion, "But if he wasn't a man of vision, what carried him on a steady course were his values: integrity, equality of people, equality of opportunity, dedication to country. With Chrétien, the values were the vision". These are the steadfast values that can carry through an agenda for renewal. As for the lack of vision and understanding the world around him, how does one explain that he has piloted the government which balanced the budget, invented Team Canada as a new concept to confront globalization; and built on Canada's reputation as peacekeepers to lead the world on the Landmine Treaty?

• In his own book, Straight From the Heart, Jean Chrétien stressed the following values: "getting things done...social justice and national unity... flexibility to the changing circumstance...the centre moves...moderation made it (the Liberal Party) the best agent for resolving conflicts and finding pragmatic solutions...I'm determined not to leave public life with a damaged reputation...Has faith in the country been restored?

• With such values in mind, it can be expected in the present circumstances, Jean Chrétien will come to three conclusions. History will forget him if he just carried through the Mulroney agenda and balanced the budget. History will never forget him if his inaction leads to the destruction of the world's model country. By showing determination and leadership in this time of impending crisis, he can leave his mark both on Canada and on history.