That infamous cry

July 20, 1997

by Michael Goldbloom, Montreal Gazette

On July 22, 1967, the president of the fifth republic of France left the French islands of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, off the coast of Newfoundland, and travelled up the St. Lawrence River toward Quebec City where he was to begin a five-day state visit to Canada.

Like all the heads of states represented at Expo 67, Charles de Gaulle had been invited to join in the celebration of Canada's centennial. He was but one of many state visitors in the summer of 1967. His visit, however, was to be among the most climactic in the history of Canada.

De Gaulle arrived aboard the French warship Le Colbert. He spent his first day in Quebec City, and the following morning left by motorcade for Montreal. The 150-mile trip took most of the day to complete as the cortege made numerous planned and unplanned stops for de Gaulle to address the more than 500,000 people who lined the route.

Late in the afternoon, de Gaulle arrived at Montreal's city hall where a crowd, variously estimated at between 5,000 and 20,000 people, had gathered. He made a short speech from a balcony on the facade of the city hall, and concluded his address with: Vive Montréal! Vive le Québec! Vive le Québec libre! Vive le Canada français, et vive la France!

"Québec libre" was the rallying cry and graffiti slogan of the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale, and de Gaulle's words ignited an explosive and emotional debate throughout English and French Canada.

The Canadian government found itself faced with a diplomatic and domestic crisis. While de Gaulle spent the day after his city hall speech visiting Expo '67, the federal cabinet met in Ottawa in an emergency session.

Late that afternoon, prime minister Lester B. Pearson issued this declaration: "Certain statements by the President tend to encourage the small minority of our population whose aim is to destroy Canada: and as such, they are unacceptable to the Canadian people and its government."

Early the next morning, de Gaulle decided that the Canadian government's view of his speech was in turn unacceptable to the president of the fifth republic. He canceled his official visit to Ottawa and flew back to Paris.

De Gaulle arrived home to almost universal condemnation of his conduct. Newspapers from the full range of the political spectrum in France, Canada, Britain and the United States severely chastised him for his intrusion into the domestic affairs of another country.

The Canadian government and news media were inundated with telegrams and letters denouncing de Gaulle. The most common reaction to his Quebec trip was that the world had witnessed a performance in poor taste by a senescent, 76-year-old man.

In its lead editorial on July 26, 1967, the London Times wrote: "General de Gaulle's term as French president has another five years to run and although it is perfectly possible that his successor will take over before 1972 (he is now 76 years old), it is necessary for French and foreigner alike to prepare a general line of conduct to adopt during the long, sad process of the general's erratic decline. ... He was a very great man but is not now a very sensible one."

The conservative French newspaper L'Aurore said, "One is forced at this point to ask what exactly is going on under the general's cap." The leader of Canada's New Democratic Party, T.C. Douglas, said de Gaulle's words were those of an "aging man at the end of a long day."

On Aug. 11, an editorial appeared in the French weekly Minute, stating that the time had come for de Gaulle to resign. It suggested that if he refused to do so, the constitutional provision allowing for the replacement of a "disabled" French president be invoked.

In the same issue that featured the story of de Gaulle's trip to Canada, Time ran an article concerning gerontology entitled "Charles le Vieux".

Le Monde attributed de Gaulle's behaviour to the "shipwreck of old age," the phrase de Gaulle himself had used about Marshal Philippe Pétain during the Vichy regime.

B.T., a Danish daily newspaper, wrote that "only senility or some other form of brain distraction" could explain de Gaulle's conduct.

According to the New York Times, one of de Gaulle's own ministers suggested that the president had lost his famed sense of logic and reasoning and was more to be pitied than reviled.

Official government interpretations, however, were rather different.

In late 1973 and early 1974, I interviewed Paul Martin and Maurice Couve de Murville, respectively Canadian and French ministers of External Affairs in 1967, and Gabriel Loubier, the leader of the Union Nationale and then a provincial cabinet minister. They all expressed similar convictions that de Gaulle had not realized the implications of his statements.

Each of the three claimed that if de Gaulle had known that "Québec libre" was the slogan of the separatists, he would never have employed it.

Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau, who was on the balcony with de Gaulle and Quebec premier Daniel Johnson, asserts that de Gaulle was stunned by the crowd's reaction. He says the French president turned to Johnson and asked him what it was that he had said that caused such a reaction.

According to Drapeau, Johnson told de Gaulle he needn't worry because "Québec libre" was the slogan of political opponents he had defeated.

An examination of the available evidence, however, reveals that de Gaulle was neither senile nor unaware, but rather acutely conscious of the repercussions which he suspected, and indeed hoped, might result from his actions.

One year before his trip to Canada, de Gaulle received an official invitation from Quebec. This was followed three days later by a similar request from Ottawa. The duplication of invitations was the first volley of a steadily intensifying competition between the federal and provincial governments.

René de Saint-Légier, who later became chief of the North American desk at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accompanied de Gaulle to Québec in 1967 as one of his political advisers. He subsequently stated that the president's initial reaction was to refuse both invitations because he had already been to Canada during his presidency. De Gaulle had stopped in Ottawa on his way to Washington in 1960. De Saint-Légier added that the general said his only reason for travelling to Canada would be to go to Quebec "pour y mettre le feu."

Gabriel Loubier stated, and de Saint-Légier confirmed, that de Gaulle initially refused Quebec's invitation. Premier Johnson, however, continually exhorted de Gaulle to change his mind, emphasizing how important his presence would be to Quebec. De Gaulle's eventual decision to go to Canada was in large part a consequence of Johnson's insistence.

De Saint-Légier said candidly that, in light of de Gaulle's initial statement that the sole motivation for going to Canada would be to stir things up in Quebec, he fully expected the president's conduct to be controversial; as a result he was not surprised by what occurred.

After de Gaulle decided to make the trip, both he and the provincial government made every effort to indicate that he would be primarily a guest of Quebec rather than of Canada. Gabriel Loubier said "Ottawa wanted to control the visit - specifically the Ministry of External Affairs - but for us it was another important contact with la francophonie."

Three months of intensive negotiations regarding the details of de Gaulle's trip were carried on between the governments of Quebec, Canada and France. The major area of controversy was de Gaulle's desire to arrive in Canada at Quebec City rather than at Ottawa, despite the tradition that a visiting head of state goes first to the national capital.

De Gaulle insisted, however, on landing at Quebec City, travelling through the province to Montreal, and spending only his last day in Ottawa, this final day as a protocolic appendage to what was essentially a visit of the president of France to Quebec. The federal government was strongly opposed to this itinerary, but in the end acceded in the face of de Gaulle's obstinacy and pressures from the provincial government.

Couve de Murville and Martin maintained that de Gaulle insisted on landing at Quebec City instead of Ottawa simply because he preferred to come by ship. This explanation, however, appears to have been a joint retrospective effort to downplay any basis for discord between Canada and France.

More than 200 years after the Conquest, de Gaulle sailed up the St. Lawrence River to the foot of the Plains of Abraham, eager, if not to reverse the defeat of the Marquis de Montcalm at the hands of General James Wolfe, at least to help liberate the French people of Quebec from English Canada.

De Gaulle arrived aboard the French cruiser Le Colbert, which in open disregard for international maritime custom flew the French Tricolore instead of the Maple Leaf. The battleship docked at L'Anse au Foulon, called Wolfe's Cove by the English, the exact spot where Wolfe had initiated the attack which resulted in the British conquest.

De Gaulle was greeted by Daniel Johnson, Paul Martin and governor-general Roland Michener and made a short speech of thanks for his warm reception. There was nothing particularly noteworthy about the address, except that he referred to Quebec as "la Nouvelle France" - something it had not been for more than two centuries.

De Gaulle ended his remarks in his customary manner: "Vive le Canada, Vivent les Canadiens français, Vive le Québec, Vive la Nouvelle-France, Vive la France!"

In speeches later that day in Quebec City and the following day in towns along the "Chemin du Roy" leading from Quebec City to Montreal, de Gaulle repeatedly referred to past ties between Quebec and France. He emphasized the need for future co-operation. He often referred to his audience as "the French of Canada" instead of French Canadians.

His basic theme was the need for Quebec to act independently in the pursuit of its own goals. He said that he observed in Quebec the same phenomenon he had witnessed throughout the world: the awakening of a people, which, in every domain, wanted to determine its destiny by seizing control of its own future.

Before he reached Montreal, de Gaulle did not mention explicitly the concept that Quebec should secede from Canada, yet the idea was implicit in almost every speech he delivered.

De Gaulle spoke to the people of Quebec almost as if they were citizens of France. Between Quebec and Montreal he wore his military uniform, although by that time in his career he habitually wore business suits. In Quebec he wanted to be seen in his heroic role as liberator and leader of the French people.

The provincial government helped establish a situation and mood in the province that allowed de Gaulle to play out his part. Hilary Bridgstocke, who covered the trip for the Times of London, wrote on July 22, 1967 that Quebec's associate minister of education, Marcel Masse, had told several reporters the federal information officers were not to be trusted in briefing foreign reporters on the situation in Quebec.

The Gazette confirmed the provincial government's effort to downplay the role of the federal government in the French president's visit. It reported the Quebec Information Department, which was responsible for the transportation of the press, decided not to provide service from L'Anse au Foulon to the Citadel, the federal installation where the Canadian government's official welcoming ceremony took place.

The provincial government not only controlled news coverage of the visit but took a variety of measures designed to augment the excitement surrounding de Gaulle's presence in Quebec. The Chemin du Roy, which was constructed under the French regime in 1735, was chosen as the route that the motorcade was to follow to Montreal. An Arc de Triomphe, 50 feet high and 50 feet wide, was constructed at the beginning of the route. The Fleur-de-Lis and the Tricolore were painted on the pavement. On virtually every utility pole along the way there were the flags of Quebec and France, and 300,000 Quebec and French flags were distributed free to people lining the road.

School buses transported people free of charge to the roadside, and at the entrance of most towns there were displays representing the French province from which the leading local families had come. The provincial government set up a mini radio network which provided a four-hour description of the cavalcade to 31 private stations throughout the province.

As de Gaulle spoke at the towns along the Chemin du Roy, he seemed to be building up to his speech at Montreal city hall. At Donnacona, his first stop: "And now I see the present, the present of French Canada, that is to say a country living to the full, a country that is in the process of becoming master of itself, a country that is taking hold of its own destiny. Today this is indispensable to a people, and you are part of the French people. You French Canadians, Canadian French, need only depend on yourselves."

At Trois-Rivières: "No matter what may happen, we are at a time when Quebec, French Canada, is becoming master of its destiny ... It is the genius and spirit of our time that every people, whoever and wherever they may be, are charting their own course."

At Louiseville and at Repentigny, de Gaulle reiterated the need for Quebec to assume control of its own destiny; at the conclusion of both speeches he asked his audience to join him in singing La Marseillaise. He acted as if he had never left France.

With these speeches as background, de Gaulle's words from the balcony of Montreal's city hall seem almost inevitable. "Vive le Québec libre" was the natural culmination of a progression which had begun even before his arrival in Canada.

World attention focused on de Gaulle's use of the slogan of Quebec separatists, but Prime Minister Pearson was reportedly more upset by a sentence near the beginning of the speech: "I shall confide in you a secret which you will keep to yourselves. This evening, and all along the road I travelled today, I have found myself in an atmosphere of the same kind as the Liberation."

The crowd responded with a thunderous ovation. These words outraged Pearson even more than "Vive le Québec libre," not only because he did not believe Quebec needed to be liberated, but because Canadians had fought and died for the liberation of France. (De Gaulle had, in fact, embarked on French soil for the liberation on Juno Beach in Normandy which had been liberated by Canadian soldiers). Pearson thought it was outrageous that de Gaulle could use the Liberation, for which France owed much to Canada, as an analogy with which to undermine Canadian unity.

If de Gaulle felt himself to be in a situation analogous to the Liberation, he no doubt saw himself as the liberator; his role was to free the French of Canada as he had freed France in 1945.

The contention of Couve de Murville, Martin, Drapeau, Loubier and others that de Gaulle had innocently used the slogan of the Quebec separatists because he had seen it on placards before him at city hall would appear to be disproven by the speeches he made before arriving in Montreal. Although a striking phrase, "Vive le Québec libre" was not a new idea for de Gaulle; he had been expressing this theme less explicitly throughout his stay in Quebec.

In addition, on July 23, Bridgstocke filed a story to the Times of London, reporting that on his first day in Quebec, de Gaulle had walked and talked with a crowd of separatists who were carrying signs and shouting "Québec libre." The following day on the road to Montreal, the separatist slogan was frequently visible. In any case, de Gaulle insisted on being thoroughly briefed; as R.D. Mathews wrote in an article entitled De Gaulle, Paris and the Future of Canada: "The man who measures the number of steps he will descend from the Elysée Palace to meet foreign dignitaries well calculated the so-called ambiguities he spoke."

The general was perhaps warmed and stimulated by the enthusiasm of the crowd before him, but de Gaulle, even at 76, was not a man to be carried away in any direction which he had not carefully prearranged.

Robert Escarpit wrote: "The orator is too great a master of his thought and words not to have perfectly measured in advance, and probably not without a certain delight, the extent of the commotion he was to provoke."

René de Saint-Légier confirmed the universal impression of de Gaulle as a man who judiciously prepared and, in fact, memorized most of the speeches he delivered. He rarely delivered extemporaneous remarks. He was a master of the French language, and he carefully weighed the meaning and effect of every word he spoke.

The conclusion of the speech at Montreal city hall is a prime example of de Gaulle's oratorial skills. He said, "Vive Montréal." The crowd began to cheer. He continued, "Vive le Québec." The ovation grew louder. He waited for the noise to subside; then he cried out, "Vive le Québec." He hesitated a half-instant and with rising emphasis added, "libre!"

He did the same thing with "Vive le Canada français!", pausing slightly before enunciating the last word. This speech was delivered with too refined a sense of timing and drama to have been an improvisational accident.

Nothing de Gaulle did or said thereafter did anything to dispel the conclusion that he had acted intentionally. At a dinner held on his second night in Montreal at the French pavilion of Expo 67, de Gaulle defended his actions. He said, "If on this occasion, the president of the French Republic has been useful to the French of Quebec, he rejoices profoundly in that."

In a toast to the mayor of Montreal on the final morning of his aborted visit, he stated: "During my voyage ... I believe that I have been able, with respect to you, to go to the heart of matters, and when it is a question of destiny especially of the destiny of a people, particularly of the destiny of the French-Canadian, of the Canadian French, as you wish, to go to the heart of things, to do it without second thoughts, this is, in reality, not only the best policy but the only policy worthwhile."

De Saint-Légier said de Gaulle was in good spirits as he flew back across the Atlantic, after the rebuke by the Canadian government. The general told him: "I could have done it differently, but I wouldn't have been de Gaulle if I hadn't said what I did."

Jean d'Escrienne, an aide-de-camp of de Gaulle from 1966 to the time of the general's death, did not accompany the president to Quebec but was at the Elysée Palace to welcome him upon his return.

De Gaulle's flight from Montreal did not arrive at Orly Airport until 4 a.m. D'Escrienne has written that despite the hour and length of the flight, "the general was smiling, apparently relaxed, with the satisfied air of a man who had just played a good trick on someone."

After returning to France, de Gaulle did not repudiate any statements he had made in Quebec. He defended his conduct in Canada and restated his attitude toward Quebec on two well-publicized occasions.

After a cabinet meeting on July 31, the French government issued a press release that made it clear the general stood firmly behind his actions. The announcement reiterated de Gaulle's opinion that the "French of Canada" had demonstrated to him their desire and need for emancipation, because after two centuries of oppression, the first under British rule and the second under the Canadian constitution defined by the British North America Act of 1867, they still had not achieved liberty, equality and fraternity in their own country.

The general's attitude toward Quebec was emphasized again four months later. On November 27, 1967, de Gaulle conducted a two-hour press conference. In his remarks about Quebec, he recounted the events of his four-day visit and reprimanded the French press for its criticism of his actions. He returned again to the theme that it was France's duty to respond to the "passion libératrice" that had manifested itself in Quebec before his eyes.

In his speeches about Quebec, both during and after his trip to Canada, de Gaulle repeatedly emphasized the need for the province to act independently. He spoke of French-Canadians as the long-lost and neglected children of France, who ought to be freed from a political system which denied them their right of self-expression and self-determination.

De Saint-Légier said de Gaulle felt French-Canadians to be one of the last colonized peoples of the world, and that the president was outraged people of French descent should be in that situation.

De Gaulle expressed this viewpoint in his Memoirs of Hope, which he wrote in 1970. He explained that during his first two visits to Canada in 1944 and 1945 the situation was obscured by the war effort, and he merely glimpsed the underlying realities which made the Canadian nation perpetually uneasy and artificial in its duality.

He wrote, however, that on his return to Canada in 1960 he was able to discern these "realities" clearly. He said he was received in Canada by his friend governor-general Georges Vanier, who tried to make the situation in Canada seem proper, but that the contradictions inherent in the federation could not fail to make themselves felt.

The insights into Canadian life that de Gaulle claimed to have had in 1960 must, however, be viewed with some skepticism. In reality, he did not begin to express his displeasure with the Canadian system until later in the decade.

In July 1944, de Gaulle spoke of Canada as prime minister Mackenzie King's "beloved and courageous country." In an address to the Canadian Parliament he said that in the effort to establish a new peace in the world "France is sure of finding at her side and in agreement with her the people who know her well. That is to say, she is sure of finding Canada there first of all."

At a press conference held at the French embassy in Ottawa on his return to Canada a year later, the general said the sentiments unifying Canada and France had never been stronger. He spoke of the numerous common interests of France and Canada and concluded: "I believe we are on the threshold of a vast development of Franco-Canadian relations, which will be for the good of our two countries and the good of the world."

There was no suggestion of criticism of the Canadian federation, or concern for the welfare of French Canadians in these words. Nor were these sentiments apparent in de Gaulle's speech in Ottawa 15 years later.

In Memoirs of Hope, he wrote that the inequality of the two communities in Canada could not be overlooked, but in a toast to prime minister John Diefenbaker in 1960 he said of Canada: "And now, what are you in our eyes?... Politically a nation which is finding a way to unify two communities of very different origin, language and religion ... and which is forging a national character even though it is spread out over 3,000 miles alongside a very powerful federation.... Finally on a moral plane a very sensitive people, on the one hand to an orderly society and on the other to the liberty and dignity of men."

There was still no suggestion, despite his repeated visits to Canada, of the dismay at the plight of French-Canadians that de Gaulle later professed to have felt.

The contention that de Gaulle acted and spoke as he did in Quebec in 1967 because he believed French Canadians to be one of the last colonized peoples of the world, and saw it to be France's responsibility as the mother country of the French Canadian nation to serve as its liberator, is not justified by the previous record.

If in 1967 French-Canadians were a persecuted or colonized people, and if in 1967 France had a historical duty to them, the same had been true in 1944, 1945, 1960 and 1964. Yet de Gaulle did not choose to recognize or exercise this responsibility on any of these earlier occasions.

What made 1967 different was not that French-Canadians were a more persecuted or more colonized people, but that the political climate of Quebec had changed.

The '60s saw the province begin to exercise greater autonomy within the Canadian system. Out of concern for the maintenance of its culture and the development of its economy, education, technology and natural resources, Quebec had turned to France for assistance.

Meanwhile, de Gaulle's concept of his foreign policy had evolved simultaneously with the changes in Quebec, and by 1967 he perceived a role for French Canada in support of French grandeur.

De Gaulle believed that France was in some Old Testament way chosen to play a leading role in the world; it was his responsibility to ensure that it did.

The restoration of France's power and grandeur was the primary goal not merely of de Gaulle's foreign policy but of his whole career and political philosophy. In his memoirs and in his speeches throughout his presidency, de Gaulle returned continually to the theme of France's unique role in the world.

Jean d'Escrienne, one of de Gaulle's aides, has written that on returning from Quebec de Gaulle told him that "even the highest officials of the administration are not yet accustomed to seeing France act without asking the opinions of others, acting alone, independently, according to her own conscience. That is what I did in Montreal."

What Quebec represented to de Gaulle in 1967, though it had not in 1945, 1960 and 1964, was another potential link in the chain of francophone countries whose loyalty would increase France's world prestige and influence.

His attitude toward Quebec was a reflection of his desire for a new alignment of world powers, on a cultural as well as an economic and political basis. This was for him the area of France's greatest potential strength vis-à-vis the other world powers.

For de Gaulle, Quebec was also a bastion of the French language that needed protection. An independent Quebec would be able to assist de Gaulle in his struggle to maintain French as an internationally recognized language. As he said at his first press conference in 1968: "Whether the French language wins or loses the battle in Canada will weigh heavily in the struggle being waged for it from one end of the world to the other."

What was important in de Gaulle's foreign policy, was that France should establish a world image that was distinctly French. He wanted French opinion to be recognized and reckoned with, and the way to achieve this was to ensure that France's policies were independent of Britain, the U.S., and even the rest of Europe.

In a television broadcast from the Elysée Palace on August 10, 1967, he defended his Canadian behaviour and attacked his critics by calling on France to abandon self-effacement. He spoke of the need for France to take a French stand on French-Canadian independence as it had on Vietnam, the Middle East and the EEC.

De Gaulle's political antagonism toward English-speaking countries was another motivation for his conduct in Quebec.

During his four-day stay in the province, and in subsequent discussions about the events, de Gaulle continually warned of the threats to Quebec from the English-speaking world around it. He emphasized that France was eager to give Quebec industrial and cultural aid in order to help it resist assimilation.

English Canada was to him the immediate danger, but he saw Canada, Britain and the United States as a vast web from which France and Quebec had to liberate themselves.

Anti-Americanism had become such an integral part of de Gaulle's policies by 1967 that the reaction to "Québec libre" at the Quai d'Orsay was that the speech would be seen as an important element in the grand international Gaulliste design, of which the principal objective was to stop and contain the American hegemony.

L'Année Politique en France 1967 arrived at a similar conclusion. It reported: "The last days of July were to see a new manifestation of General de Gaulle's hostility toward the United States and Great Britain."

De Gaulle believed that to attack any part of the English-speaking world was to attack the whole.

In the same terms, an attack on Canada was also, in de Gaulle's thinking, an attack on Britain. The French press seemed to view Canada as still dependent on England.

The French press disagreed with de Gaulle for the most part, but they concurred with him in regard to the effect that his conduct would have upon Britain. They used quotes from the English news media to prove that, much more than upsetting Canada, de Gaulle had directed his action against Britain.

Finally, de Gaulle's own reaction to his conduct in Quebec merits examination.

In 1970, de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs of his feelings on leaving Canada after his visit a decade earlier: "On leaving this country, I wondered whether the establishment of a state of French origin side by side with another of British origin, the two co-operating with each other in every sphere freely and by choice, uniting their twin nationhoods in order to safeguard them, might not be the only way for Canada eventually to obliterate the historic injustice on which it was based, to develop in conformity with its own true realities, and thus to remain Canadian."

This was written from the perspective of his 1967 trip and the repercussions it caused.

Historian J.R. Tournoux, however, reports, apparently verbatim, what de Gaulle told Ronald Nungesser, his secretary of state for external finance, in a relaxed and philosophical way less than 24 hours after the drama at Montreal city hall:

"Well! I can see that what I said was premature with respect to the French Canadians, who are perhaps not yet ready to face up to a new situation. I can see that I went at it pretty strongly. It will cause an enormous fuss.

"I have done a service to French Canadians and also to the federal government, which doesn't want to let the Canadian problem deteriorate the way the black problem has deteriorated in the United States.

"The mayor of Montreal, Mr. Drapeau, said to me, 'We have been waiting for you for 200 years.' They have been waiting for 200 years. At my age, I shall not return to the American continent. It was better that it was I who came to put the problem the way it had to be put. When would another president of the French Republic come to Canada? I thought that it was better that it be de Gaulle who brought it out."

Charles de Gaulle viewed himself as an instrument of history better able than anyone to determine what history required of his country and himself. As he said to prime minister Diefenbaker in a speech in Ottawa on April 19, 1960, "The first voice that I hear is the voice of history."

Although de Gaulle was not senile when he cried "Vive le Québec libre" from the balcony of Montreal city hall, age may have been a factor in his conduct, not because his intellectual faculties had diminished, but because as the time allotted him for attaining his goals grew smaller, he became increasingly impatient with his inability to achieve his international objectives for France.

"Vive le Québec libre" was an expression of de Gaulle's preoccupation in his later years, not with the immediate consequences of his actions, to himself or to France, but with the verdict of history.

De Gaulle statue unveiling ignites unity row

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star

Two prominent political figures from France - former premier Pierre Messmer and Philippe Séguin, current head of the neo-Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) party - reiterated their country's backing of the province's right to self-determination. ( ... )

Messmer, 82, a war hero and close lieutenant of de Gaulle, plunged directly into the current debate over the constitutional legality of a unilateral Quebec declaration of independence.

He said de Gaulle's cry of ``Vive le Québec libre'' from the balcony of Montreal city hall July 24, 1967, were ``four simple and striking words which reaffirm a universal and uncontestable principle: the inalienable right of peoples to decide their own future.''

Then, in what looked like a direct reference to the current Supreme Court of Canada examination of Quebec's right to secession, he added: ``And the legal arguments invoked to block the popular will are no more than paper barriers - gone with the wind.''

Séguin, here as personal representative of B>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star French President Jacques Chirac, repeated his 1995 statement that there is ``nothing to be added and nothing to be subtracted'' from de Gaulle's cry.

Speaking above the competing cheers and boos of the crowd, and in later interviews, Séguin repeated the standard French government line that Quebecers are ``masters of their destiny'' and France will go along with whatever they decide.

``What Quebecers decide will be the right decision,'' he said.

July 20, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star

Somewhere up there, Charles de Gaulle is enjoying himself. The 30th anniversary celebrations of his Vive le Québec libre speech here are stirring some of the same passions as in 1967.

Previous anniversaries of the late French president's tumultuous visit to Quebec were fairly humdrum affairs, but this time the event appears to have hit a raw nerve.

Perhaps it's the fact that Quebec sovereiB>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star gnists came within a whisker of victory in the October, 1995, referendum; perhaps it's the prospect of the Parti Québcois government holding another referendum within a couple of years; or perhaps it's the recent federal election which saw the Bloc Québcois lose ground but still return 44 separatist MPs to the House of Commons.

Likely, it's all of those things plus the trappings of this year's commemoration: a French postage stamp marking the anniversary, to be released later this year; a statue of de Gaulle being erected near the Plains of Abraham in Quebec city on Wednesday; a bicycle rally along the 280-kilometre route of de Gaulle's triumphant motorcade to Montreal; and a rally Thursday evening at Montreal city hall where loudspeakers will broadcast de Gaulle's bombshell address of 1967.

Last March, French sources said Prime Minister Jean Chrétien phoned French President Jacques Chirac to voice concern about a planned de Gaulle stamp. France offered assurances the stamp would not be released on a symbolic date, such as next week, and that the theB>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star me would be de Gaulle renewing ties with Quebec - with no specific mention of ``Long live a free Quebec.''

In the meantime, the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society of Montreal is compensating by printing 50,000 copies of a stamp of its own - a purely symbolic sticker of no use for mailing - showing de Gaulle speaking on the balcony at Montreal city hall with the words ``Vive le Québec libre.''

But the stamp incident was nothing compared with the campaign launched against the celebrations by radio talk-show host Andr Arthur on Quebec city station CHRC and Montreal's CKVL.

Arthur, the most virulently anti-separatist voice in the Quebec media, spent much of the week urging listeners to demonstrate their disapproval of the de Gaulle statue by dumping garbage and dog excrement at the foot of the monument during the Wednesday inauguration.

The main organizer of Thursday's Montreal event, Guy Bouthillier, head of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society, said he heard similar comB>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star ments from Ottawa-based phone-in host Lowell Green on Montreal's English-language CIQC station.

``All of a sudden, we're racists and fascists and so on,'' Bouthillier said, adding sarcastically: ``I suppose Gen. de Gaulle was a prominent fascist leader in World War II and was on friendly terms with such other well-known fascists as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini.''

Bouthillier said the emotions aroused today by the very memory of de Gaulle prove he hit at the heart of the Quebec problem in 1967. ``You'll see, it will all come out, the anger, the spite,'' he predicted.

`` `Vive le Québec libre' is such a strong statement that no Quebec politician has been able to use it since, with the exception, on only one occasion, I believe, of (former PQ premier) Jacques Parizeau,'' he said.

Bouthillier said he expects ``several thousand people'' in front of Montreal city hall.

The Quebec sovereignty movement took shape before de Gaulle came in 1967 and was neithB>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star er borrowed from or fashioned by anyone else, Bouthillier insists. De Gaulle, however, ``contributed in giving Quebecers confidence in themselves,'' he said.

Denis Simard, a young Quebec political science professor running for the PQ in a provincial by-election this fall, says de Gaulle is the historical figure who ``fires my imagination - the man who refused to give up, who fought back alone for France, who emancipated France's colonies, who saw, in 1967, that Quebec one day would have its autonomy in North America.''

Simard, 33, was 3 years old when De Gaulle shouted ``Vive le Québec libre.''

Much of the comment back in 1967, by angry Canadian federalists and de Gaulle's foes in France, suggested the 76-year-old presi dent didn't intend to utter the phrase at all - that he was carried away by placard-waving, slogan-chanting separatists in the crowds and went further than he meant to.

While de Gaulle may not have B>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star planned the exact words ``Vive le Québec libre,'' a mountain of evidence accumulated since points to his visit and his support for some form of Quebec sovereignty as being carefully planned.

De Gaulle had been encouraging Quebec's emergence as a state at least since 1961 when he authorized the opening of a permanent Quebec legation in Paris.

Long before Daniel Johnson Sr. became Union Nationale premier in 1966 and invited de Gaulle to visit Quebec during the 1967 Montreal Expo - and the centennial of Canadian Confederation - de Gaulle had spoken of a grand design for Quebec's future.

Alain Peyrefitte, a confidant and cabinet minister of de Gaulle, said the French president was talking of an independent Quebec - within a confederal arrangement with Canada - as early as 1963.

``French Canada is in full evolution and development,'' Peyrefitte quotes de Gaulle as having said. ``It is necessarily going towards secession. Sooner or later it will separate from English Canada. Of course, it is natural that tB>

July 24, 1997

By Robert McKenzie, Toronto Star hey form a confederation to handle common problems. But each must be independent of the other. French Canada must become a French state in America.''

Peyrefitte's recollections, published recently by Quebec's Centre de Recherches Lionel-Groulx, also include this remark in 1965: ``In Canada, the federation is going no better. Sooner or later, it will break up. The future of French Canada is independent. There will be a Canadian-French republic.'' A note in de Gaulle's handwriting dated Dec. 9, 1966 in the margin of a cable from the French embassy in Ottawa, is equally revealing.

``There can be no question of my addressing a message to Canada to celebrate its centennial,'' de Gaulle wrote. ``We can have good relations. We must have excellent relations with French Canada. But we are not obliged to offer congratulations for the creation of a state based on our past defeat and on the integration of part of the French people into a British system.''

De Gaulle, who had been in Canada twice before in 1944 and 1960, had pointedly avoided any precise response to ``Canadian'' invitations to Expo '67 before accepting Johnson's invitation.

Scalded by Quebec's budding incursions into international affairs in the early 1960s, the federal government had established strict rules by which foreign heads of state first had to land in Ottawa before going on to Montreal.

De Gaulle circumvented that requirement by announcing he'd arrive by sea, up the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the proud new flagship of the French Atlantic fleet, le Colbert.

Before his departure, he scattered plenty of clues for historians that what was to come was carefully premeditated.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it will be uniquely to light a fire - for the moment I have better things to do.''

And before de Gaulle boarded the Colbert, he told his nephew, Gen. Alain Boissieu: ``I intend to pull a major coup. It's going to be hot. But I must. It's the last chance to make amends for France's cowardice.''

That last remark is a reference to what de Gaulle called ``the debt of Louis XV,'' France's responsibility for having abandoned Canada in the wake of the Marquis de Montcalm's military defeat by Gen. James Wolfe in 1759.

De Gaulle boarded the Colbert with sheafs of documents including reports from the SDECE - the French spy agency - on Quebec. By the time the Colbert arrived at l'Anse aux Foulons, formerly Wolfe's Cove, near Quebec city, on July 23, he had written and memorized his speeches.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it o several accounts, had had a microphone at the front balcony disconnected.

But, with the crowd out front clamoring for de Gaulle, his bodyguard had the microphone reconnected and guided the short-sighted general to the balcony.

What de Gaulle said was short, but electrifying: ``An immense emotion fills my heart as I see, before me, the French city of Montreal. On behalf of the old country, in the name of France, I salute you with all my heart.''

Then, dropping his voice as if confiding a secret, he said that ``all along my route, I felt an atmosphere similar to that of the Liberation'' of France from the German occupant in 1944.

After saying that ``all of France is aware, can see, can hear what is happening here,'' de Gaulle concluded with ``Vive Montréal! Vive le Québec!''

Then he thundered: ``Vive le Québec . . . libre,'' pausing for a heartbeat between the two words.

The crowd held it's breath, the twice before in 1944 and 1960, had pointedly avoided any precise response to ``Canadian'' invitations to Expo '67 before accepting Johnson's invitation.

Scalded by Quebec's budding incursions into international affairs in the early 1960s, the federal government had established strict rules by which foreign heads of state first had to land in Ottawa before going on to Montreal.

De Gaulle circumvented that requirement by announcing he'd arrive by sea, up the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the proud new flagship of the French Atlantic fleet, le Colbert.

Before his departure, he scattered plenty of clues for historians that what was to come was carefully premeditated.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it n exploded, barely noticing the perfunctory ``Long live French Canada'' and ``Long live France'' which followed.

A stunned Ottawa took close to 24 hours to react. At a televised news conference at 6 p.m. the next day, prime minister Lester B. Pearson said he was happy de Gaulle was receiving a warm welcome, that Canada attached great importance to the friendship of France and that he looked forward to the discussion he would have with the French president in Ottawa later in the week.

But Pearson also said Canadians ``don't need to be freed'' and that certain terms used by de Gaulle were ``unacceptable.''

De Gaulle went ahead with a banquet offered by France that night as well as a visit to the Montreal subway the next morning, a speech before students at the Université de Montréal and a lunch hosted by Drapeau. But word filtered out in the morning that he was cancelling the rest of his trip to Ottawa in view of Pearson's statement.

He flew out of Dorval airport twice before in 1944 and 1960, had pointedly avoided any precise response to ``Canadian'' invitations to Expo '67 before accepting Johnson's invitation.

Scalded by Quebec's budding incursions into international affairs in the early 1960s, the federal government had established strict rules by which foreign heads of state first had to land in Ottawa before going on to Montreal.

De Gaulle circumvented that requirement by announcing he'd arrive by sea, up the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the proud new flagship of the French Atlantic fleet, le Colbert.

Before his departure, he scattered plenty of clues for historians that what was to come was carefully premeditated.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it that afternoon.

De Gaulle n'a pas improvisé

Le mardi 22 juillet 1997

Jean Chartier, Le Devoir

Contrairement à une opinion répandue, la déclaration historique du général de Gaulle, le 24 juillet 1967, n'avait rien d'improvisé; elle résultait à la fois d'un contact «physique» avec la foule sur le chemin du Roy et à Montréal, où un million de personnes se réunirent à son passage, et d'une attention soutenue à tout ce qui touchait la question du Québec depuis le début de la Révolution tranquille.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it En 1963, il reçut Jean Lesage à l'Élysée une deuxième fois, et lors de son entretien hebdomadaire avec Alain Peyrefitte, le général lui confia: «Le Canada français doit devenir un État français d'Amérique.»

L'ancien ministre, qui préside le directoire du Figaro en plus de siéger à l'Académie française, indique dans sa revue historique que la semaine suivante, au conseil des ministres, Pierre Messmer, qui avait assisté au conseil de l'OTAN à Ottawa, déclarait: «Il n'y a pas si longtemps, quand les Canadiens français pensaient à la France, c'était celle du XVIIe siècle. Aujourd'hui, ils pensent à la France de De Gaulle.» Pierre Messmer sera à Québec le 23 juillet pour inaugurer la statue du général à titre d'ex-président de l'Institut Charles de Gaulle.

Le 23 octobre 1963, André Malraux rendit compte de la visite qu'il venait de faire à Montréal pour inaugurer une exposition sur la France moderne. Le ministre de la Culture, le compagnon de la Libération, déclara au général: «L'immense enthousiasme qui entoure cette exposition n'est pas tout à fait naturel. Il y a au twice before in 1944 and 1960, had pointedly avoided any precise response to ``Canadian'' invitations to Expo '67 before accepting Johnson's invitation.

Scalded by Quebec's budding incursions into international affairs in the early 1960s, the federal government had established strict rules by which foreign heads of state first had to land in Ottawa before going on to Montreal.

De Gaulle circumvented that requirement by announcing he'd arrive by sea, up the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the proud new flagship of the French Atlantic fleet, le Colbert.

Before his departure, he scattered plenty of clues for historians that what was to come was carefully premeditated.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it Canada un seul problème: l'autonomisme québécois. La réalité de l'autonomisme empoigne toute la vie politique. L'état d'esprit des Canadiens français est celui d'une minorité qui veut cesser de l'être. Leur colère est si grande qu'ils ont maintenant la volonté d'être autre chose que des hommes en colère.»

Alain Peyrefitte commente cette intervention de cette manière: «Malraux poursuit de sa voix caverneuse et heurtée. De Gaulle l'écoute avec intensité.» L'historien poursuit cette analyse par Malraux de la situation du Québec: «Les autonomistes purs ne sont pas anti-américains. La population non plus. Ce dont ils rêvent, c'est que, chez eux, leurs gratte-ciels américains appartiennent à un État canadien-français.»

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it s: «Toutes les fédérations que fabriquent les Anglais ratent les unes après les autres. Fédération d'Aden, Fédération de l'Inde, Fédération de Rhodésie, Fédération de Malaisie, Fédération d'Afrique orientale, Fédération de Chypre, Fédération de la République arabe unie... Au Canada, la Fédération ne va pas mieux. Mais non! Un jour ou l'autre, il faudra qu'elle éclate. L'avenir du Canada français, c'est l'indépendance. Il y aura une République française du Canada.»

Alain Peyrefitte montre la constance du général et l'approfondissement de sa pensée à chacune des années de la décennie sur la question du Québec. En 1966, de Gaulle déclara au secrétaire d'État à la Coopération: «Il n'y a pas seulement les Africains! Il y a les Canadiens français, et d'une façon générale, la francophonie, qui doit être une de nos grandes entreprises.»

Peyrefitte a ce mot sur le geste du général à l'été 1967: «"Vive le Québec libre!» ne fut pas plus improvisé que l'appel du 18 juin 1940. L'appel à la liberté, le 24 juillet, n'eut rien de fortuit.»

Scalded by Quebec's budding incursions into international affairs in the early 1960s, the federal government had established strict rules by which foreign heads of state first had to land in Ottawa before going on to Montreal.

De Gaulle circumvented that requirement by announcing he'd arrive by sea, up the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the proud new flagship of the French Atlantic fleet, le Colbert.

Before his departure, he scattered plenty of clues for historians that what was to come was carefully premeditated.

In a study on de Gaulle and Quebec, Canadian political scientist Dale C. Thomson lists a number of these clues. Thomson said that de Gaulle, before accepting the invitation, said to two of his closest advisers: ``If I go there, the chances are it T>

On constate en effet que de Gaulle mûrit la question pendant toute la Révolution tranquille. Toutefois, à son retour de Montréal, Edgar Faure refusa de venir à Orly pour marquer sa désapprobation après le discours du général au balcon de l'hôtel de ville. Peyrefitte ajoute qu'il n'était pas le seul à bouder: «Pompidou ne cachait pas qu'à ses yeux, l'engouement du général pour le Québec était une sorte de folie gratuite.»

Mais le général de Gaulle persiste et signe dès la fin de juillet 1967. Le ministre proche du président de la République rapporte en effet la réaction de De Gaulle écrite de sa main sur le télégramme qu'il reçut de son ambassadeur à Ottawa le 28 juillet 1967: «La question n'est pas que la blessure de M. Lester Pearson soit cicatrisée. La question est que le peuple français du Canada ait la pleine disposition de lui-même.»

L'homme politique et écrivain Peyrefitte rappelle que le général avait auparavant proclamé le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux mêmes à Brazzaville en 1 twice before in 1944 and 1960, had pointedly avoided any precise response to ``Canadian'' invitations to Expo '67 before accepting Johnson's invitation.

Scalded by Quebec's budding incursions into international affairs in the early 1960s, the federal government had established strict rules by which foreign heads of state first had to land in Ottawa before going on to Montreal.

De Gaulle circumvented that requirement by announcing he'd arrive by sea, up the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the proud new flagship of the French Atlantic fleet, le Colbert.

Before his departure, he scattered plenty of clues for historians that what was to come was carefully premeditated.