CD HOWE PAPER
Canada-Quebec Relations in a Postsecession Era
by Richard Simeon

Many Quebec sovereignists seek independence combined with partnership with Canada. Where does this claim originate? Would the Canada that remained after a yes vote in a Quebec referendum be interested in negotiating that sort of relationship? If not, what sorts of relations would be possible?

The author explores a variety of forms that a relationship might take, the reasons partnership resonates so much more in Quebec than in the rest of the country, and the cases for and against it in various regions and sectors. He also examines the political and economic dynamics that would attend secession and the negotiation of a new relationship.

His conclusion is that a broad partnership -- one based on a single treaty and involving a set of ongoing institutions em-powered to make collective decisions on matters going well beyond economic issues -- would be unacceptable in the rest of Canada and in Quebec and would, in any case, be virtually impossible to negotiate or to operate.

More practicable would be a limited free trade agreement plus an incremental set of flexible, ad hoc agreements developed where common need dictated. But such tenuous linkages would not be the partnership that many Quebecers desire or expect, nor would they suffice to manage the Canadian economic union.

Press Release from CD HOWE - April 8, 1998

A broad postsecession partnership between Canada and a sovereign Quebec, as the Parti Québécois has proposed, would be virtually impossible to negotiate or to operate and would be unacceptable to both parties, concludes a C.D. Howe Institute Commentary released today.

More practicable, the author says, would be a limited free trade agreement plus an incremental set of flexible, ad hoc agreements developed where common need dictated. But such tenuous linkages would not be the partnership that many Quebecers, sovereignists and federalists alike, desire or expect, nor would they suffice to manage the Canadian economic union.

The study, Limits to Partnership: Canada-Quebec Relations in a Postsecession Era, was written by Richard Simeon, currently William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies at Harvard University and an Adjunct Scholar of the C.D. Howe Institute. He is on leave as Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto.

Simeon explains that, in addition to the usual relations between any two independent states (subject only to the rules of multilateral organizations to which both belonged), the relationship between a sovereign Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC) could follow one or a combination of several models:

• A confederal relationship with ongoing institutions empowered to make decisions on economic and other matters. This model, patterned on the European Union, is the one sovereignist advocates of partnership describe.
• A more limited treaty relationship, like the North American Free Trade Agreement, based on a single agreement focusing on economic matters with limited dispute-settlement mechanisms.
• Multiple linkages -- an incremental variety of issue-specific arrangements, created ad hoc when useful to the parties (which could include provinces, rather than Ottawa). Institutional structures and decision-rules could vary from agreement to agreement. The myriad agreements between Canadian and US jurisdictions reflect such a model. This is the most plausible model, but even it would be very difficult to achieve.

Simeon suggests that association and partnership have particular resonance among Quebecers, who have long seen themselves as participating in a confederation of two language groups. This explains the paradox that many Quebecers desire both independence and strong links with Canada. They seek sovereignty not as a fundamental break but as one step along a continuum.

To most Canadians in the rest of the country, however, a yes vote in another Quebec referendum would be the crossing of a Rubicon, profoundly changing the country. Their first pre-occupation would be their own immediate self-interests and the re-organization of what was left of the country. In the face of a yes, Simeon says, sovereignists expect the ROC to reply as a monolith. But reactions, including the reactions to a proposed partnership, would vary widely across regions, provinces, and business sectors.

Simeon argues that, even if it is desired in principle, a two-unit confederation, as partnership suggests, would be difficult if not impossible to operate, and that a ten- or even a five-unit federation might be more congenial.

This publication concludes the C.D. Howe Institute’s postreferendum research agenda, which comprised two Commentary series. One series was The Secession Papers, which, in the light of the results of the 1995 Quebec referendum, aimed to assist Canadians to "think about the unthinkable." Papers in this series were Coming to Terms with Plan B: Ten Principles Governing Secession, by Patrick J. Monahan and Michael J. Bryant with Nancy C. Coté; Looking into the Abyss: The Need for a Plan C, by Alan C. Cairns; Ratifying a Postreferendum Agreement on Quebec Sovereignty, by Peter Russell and Bruce Ryder; Walking the Tightrope: Canada’s Financial System between a Yes Vote and Quebec Secession, by David Laidler and William B.P. Robson; and this paper by Richard Simeon.

Complementing this effort was another series, The Canadian Union Papers, which focused on ways to enhance Canada’s political, economic, and social union. Papers in this series were: Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Legal and Constitutional Options for the Federal Government, by Robert Howse; Drawing on Our Inner Strength: Canada’s Economic Citizenship in an Era of Evolving Federalism, by Daniel Schwanen; Language Matters: Ensuring That the Sugar Not Dissolve in the Coffee, by John Richards; Time Out: Assessing Incremental Strategies for Enhancing the Canadian Political Union, by Roger Gibbins; and Citizen Engagement in Conflict Resolution: Lessons for Canada in International Experience, by Janice Gross Stein, David R. Cameron, and Richard Simeon, with Alan Alexandroff.

Both series were published under the supervision of David Cameron, a political scientist at the University of Toronto.

---

Main Findings of the Commentary

• The possibility of partnership between Canada and a sovereign Quebec deserves open, frank discussion because:
  • Even after a Quebec secession, the two entities would be so intermeshed that they would have to relate to each other.
  • In considering their voting decisions, Quebecers need a realistic assessment of the partnership their leaders say is possible.
  • Non-Quebecers need to explore their interests well before the confusion that would inevitably follow a yes vote.
• In theory, the relationship between a sovereign Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC) could follow one of several models:
  • The usual relations between any two independent states, subject only to the rules of multilateral organizations to which both belonged.
  • A treaty relationship, like the North American Free Trade Agreement, based on a single agreement focusing on economic matters with limited dispute-settlement mechanisms.
  • Multiple linkages -- an incremental variety of issue-specific arrangements, created ad hoc when useful to the parties (which could include provinces, rather than Ottawa). Institutional structures and decision-rules could vary from agreement to agreement. The myriad agreements between Canadian and US jurisdictions reflect such a model.
  • A confederal relationship with ongoing institutions empowered to make decisions on economic and other matters. This model, patterned on the European Union, is the one sovereignist advocates of partnership describe.
• Association and partnership have particular resonance among Quebecers, who have long seen themselves as participating in a confederation of two language groups. This explains the paradox that many Quebecers desire both independence and strong links with Canada. They seek sovereignty not as a fundamental break but as one step along a continuum.
• To most of the ROC, however, a yes vote would be the crossing of a Rubicon, profoundly changing the country. Their first preoccupation would be their own immediate self-interests and reorganization of what was left of the country.
• In the face of a yes, sovereignists expect the ROC to reply as a monolith. In fact, reactions, including the reactions to a proposed partnership, would vary widely across regions, provinces, and business sectors.
• Even if it is desired in principle, operating a two-unit confederation, as partnership suggests, would be difficult if not impossible. A ten- or even a five-unit federation might be more congenial.
• Partnership in the broad sense proposed by the Parti Québécois is not possible. The more limited arrangements that might be feasible would fall short not only of what Quebecers have been promised but also of what is required to manage a relationship of two jurisdictions so interlinked as Quebec and Canada.

Full text of the paper, (in .pdf format), or hard copies, may be obtained from the CD HOWE INSTITUTE