CD HOWE PAPER
Looking into the Abyss: The Need for a Plan C
by Alan C. Cairns
CD HOWE PAPER
Looking into the Abyss: The Need for a Plan C
by Alan C. Cairns
In the event that Quebecers vote yes in another referendum, Canadians and their governments outside Quebec would be completely unprepared for the breakup of Canada. So far, only two strategies have been debated to forestall such an event. Plan A, the renewal of federalism, is a modest affair and its attractions may be insufficient to keep Quebec in Canada. Plan B combines deterrents to secession in the form of "tough talk" with contingency plans to establish the ground rules that would govern a secession attempt; while its purpose is clear, as a coherent, detailed plan it is still in its infancy, and even in its most complete form, Plan B ignores the fundamental question of the future of Canada without Quebec.
What is clearly in order is a Plan C, a contingency strategy that the rest of Canada (ROC) could follow should Quebecers vote to secede. A yes victory and Quebec’s subsequent departure likely would trigger panic, fear, and insecurity in the ROC. For Canadians outside Quebec to decide on their appropriate constitutional future in the context of such a crisis would give chance and accident an inappropriate influence on what becomes of them. Plan C would continue with the traditional constitutional framework, with Quebec excised, for a transition period of three to five years, during which Canadians would establish a constitutional renewal process for the ROC. Given the temporary status of the transitional regime and the accompanying uncertainty, only very limited, unavoidable arrangements - such as the division of the debt - would be made with an independent Quebec. All major partnership arrangements that presupposed the identity and continuity of Canada without Quebec should be put on hold while the future of the territories and peoples that straddle Quebec are worked out. If Canadians and their governments outside Quebec could agree in advance of the next referendum that the constitutional status quo was a viable interim arrangement in the event of Quebec’s exit, they would greatly reduce the harm that ignorance and unpreparedness would otherwise inflict.
Press Release from CD HOWE - September 30, 1997
Canada needs contingency plan for aftermath of Quebec secession, says C.D. Howe Institute study
Canada needs a contingency plan to deal with the immediate aftermath of a Quebec secession, a possibility for which Canadians and their governments outside Quebec are completely unprepared, says a C.D. Howe Institute Commentary released today.
The study, entitled Looking into the Abyss: The Need for a Plan C, was written by Alan C. Cairns, a law professor at the University of Saskatchewan.
Cairns argues that a "Plan C" is needed that would maintain the existing constitutional framework and relationships among Canada’s nine provinces, with Quebec removed, for a period of, say, three to five years, during which Canadians would establish a constitutional renewal process for Canada without Quebec. The plan would thus buy time while Canadians examine rival proposals for their constitutional future.
Cairns says that Plan A, the renewal of federalism, is a modest affair and may be insufficient to keep Quebec in Canada; Plan B, which combines "tough talk" deterrents to secession with attempts to establish the ground rules governing a secession attempt, is not yet well formed and ignores the fundamental question of the future of Canada without Quebec.
In Cairns’ view, predictions of what would happen following a yes vote in another Quebec referendum are discordant and contradictory, and Canadians face this possible future in a state of overwhelming ignorance. What is likely, however, is that a yes victory and Quebec’s subsequent departure would trigger panic, fear, and insecurity in the rest of Canada. For Canadians outside Quebec to try to decide on their appropriate constitutional future in the midst of such a crisis would give chance and accident an inappropriate influence on what becomes of them.
Under Plan C, Cairns says, the temporary status of the transitional regime and the accompanying uncertainty would mean that only limited, unavoidable arrangements - such as the division of the debt - would be made with an independent Quebec. All major arrangements with Quebec that presupposed the identity and continuity of the rest of Canada would have to be put on hold while the future of the territories and peoples that straddle Quebec were worked out.
Cairns argues that if Canadians and their governments outside Quebec could agree in advance of the next referendum on the viability of the constitutional status quo as an interim arrangement in the event of Quebec’s exit, they would greatly reduce the harm that ignorance and lack of preparation would otherwise inflict.
This publication continues the C.D. Howe Institute’s postreferendum research agenda, which comprises two Commentary series. One series, of which the paper by Cairns is a part, is called "The Secession Papers," examining issues relating to the terms and conditions of a possible future referendumon Quebec sovereignty; the circumstances which the country might confront after a yes vote and the processes by which the secession of Quebec might be addressed; and the means by which a new Canada without Quebec might be established, should Quebec leave Confederation.
"The Secession Papers" are guided by respect for democratic norms and the rule of law; the need for an authoritative decision and a stable outcome; and the need to minimize the social and economic costs of any transition. In the light of the results of the 1995 Quebec referendum, "The Secession Papers" aim to assist Canadians to think about the unthinkable. The first in this series was Coming to Terms with Plan B: Ten Principles Governing Secession, by Patrick J. Monahan and Michael J. Bryant with Nancy C. Coté.
Complementing this effort is another Commentary series called "The Canadian Union Papers," focusing on ways to enhance Canada’s political, economic, and social union. Papers already published in this series are: Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Legal and Constitutional Options for the Federal Government, by Robert Howse; Drawing on Our Inner Strength: Canada’s Economic Citizenship in an Era of Evolving Federalism, by Daniel Schwanen; Language Matters: Ensuring That the Sugar Not Dissolve in the Coffee, by John Richards; Time Out: Assessing Incremental Strategies for Enhancing the Canadian Political Union, by Roger Gibbins; and Citizen Engagement in Conflict Resolution: Lessons for Canada in International Experience, by Janice Gross Stein, David R. Cameron, and Richard Simeon, with Alan Alexandroff.
Both series are being published under the supervision of David Cameron, a political scientist at the University of Toronto.
Main Findings of the Commentary
- Canadians and their governments outside Quebec are unprepared for the possible breakup of Canada and ignorant about the consequences of such a future.
- Plan A, the renewal of federalism, is a modest affair and its attractions may be insufficient to keep Quebec in Canada.
- Since the October 1995 Quebec referendum, Plan B has emerged, combining tough talk deterrents to secession with contingency plans to establish the ground rules that would govern a secession attempt. While its purpose is clear, as a coherent,detailed plan it is still in its infancy. And even in its most complete form, Plan B ignores the fundamental question of the future of Canada without Quebec. Some preparation for that possible future, Plan C, is clearly in order.
- Predictions of what would happen following a yes vote in another referendum are discordant and contradictory, but such a result and Quebec’s subsequent departure would likely trigger panic, fear, and insecurity in the rest of Canada (ROC). For Canadians outside Quebec to decide on their appropriate constitutional future in the midst of such a crisis would give chance and accident an inappropriate influence on what becomes of them.
- A more sensible response, Plan C, would be to maintain the established constitutional framework, with Quebec excised, for a transition period of three to five years, during which Canadians would formulate a constitutional renewal process for Canada without Quebec.
- The transitional regime would not be a panacea but a holding arrangement. Its life would be ambiguous, representing both the past and the emerging reality of rival proposals for a different constitutional future. All the alternatives, however, are inferior.
- Among the advantages of pursuing interim continuity are that: it is simply the easiest approach; it would provide stability in the face of widespread uncertainty; it would make it easier for the ROC to bargain with Quebec during the negotiations over sovereignty; and it would give the ROC time to learn more about its new neighbor.
- The temporary status of the transitional regime and the accompanying uncertainty would necessarily mean that only very limited, unavoidable arrangements - such as the division of the federal debt - would be made with an independent Quebec. All major arrangements with Quebec that presupposed the identity and continuity of the rest of Canada would have to be put on hold while the future of the territories and peoples that straddle Quebec were worked out.
- If Canadians and their governments outside Quebec were to agree in advance of the next referendum that the constitutional status quo was a viable interim arrangement in the event of Quebec’s exit, they would greatly reduce the harm that ignorance and lack of preparation would otherwise inflict.
Full text of the paper, (in .pdf format), or hard copies, may be obtained from the CD HOWE INSTITUTE