TRYING TO UNDERSTAND DISTINCT SOCIETY
John E.Trent, University of Ottawa

The Meech Lake round laid bare a conflict that had haunted but never overwhelmed Canada. This conflict centred on competing visions of the 'true nature' of the country. One vision held that Canada was composed of two 'founding peoples' and that the province of Quebec had a special role to play as the homeland of one of these two peoples. The other vision maintained that all provinces and peoples were equal and that Quebec was a province essentially identical to the other nine.    ...the accord in general, and the 'distinct society' clause in particular, became a lightning-rod for these competing symbolic ideas of the nature of Canada. For Quebeckers, the distinct-society clause became a symbol of belonging. By accepting the description of Quebec as a distinct society, the rest of the country would have signalled an acceptance of the idea of Quebec's particularity within Canada. But, to the opponents of the clause, 'distinct society' became synonymous with 'special status' and an abandonment of a deep conviction in favour of the equality of the provinces and of all Canadians.   The debate over Meech Lake thus brought to the surface these fundamentally contradictory ideas of the nature of the country. Having come into public view, they could no longer be ignored or forgotten. Canadians now seem resigned to the need to arrive at some generally accepted common understanding of the nature of their country -- or else to abandon once and for all the historic experiment commenced in 1987.   Patrick J. Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, pp.5-6.

INTRODUCTION

   "Distinct society deal in works" suggested a Globe and Mail headline of December 9, 1996. The article outlined the Quebec Liberal Party's strategy to persuade six provinces to accept a constitutional amendment recognizing Quebec as a distinct society so it can go into the next Quebec election with a winning federal position.

   "Trudeau blasts distinct-society supporters" blared the headline of the Ottawa Citizen of 10 January 1997. The former Prime Minister is quoted as maintaining that the clause from the Meech Lake Accord would give superiority to one language and privileges to Quebec but still would not placate separatists.

   "Why B.C. won't agree to a 'distinct society' clause" was the title for Vancouver writer, Gordon Gibson's, Globe and Mail column of 24 June 1997. While Gibson in fact never says never, he does point out that British Columbia governments have waged a 20 year campaign for changes to the federation: to boost regional representation in Ottawa, to role back federal intrusions, and to gain greater control over the fishery. But, he states, only Quebec can force real changes in this country and once Quebec gets what it wants, B.C. can forget achieving its goals. "We have to get ours at the same time they get theirs", he concludes.

   More recently, a Globe and Mail title reported, "Klein would carry distinct-society message" (8 July 1997). The Alberta Premier said he would act as a messenger at the next Premiers' meeting to ask them to recognize Quebec as distinct if asked to do so by the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI).

   "Shun distinct society, business group urges" was the title a month ago in the Globe and Mail (31 July 1997) based on a memorandum sent by the BCNI to the premiers. The association of Canada's most important business leaders asked the Premiers to take the lead in a non-constitutional effort to reassure Quebec by talking about the reality of the "unique character" of the French fact in North America which should be recognized in tandem with the equality of citizens and of provinces.

   Together these articles offer a fairly accurate cross section of the state of play in 1997 of the issue of the recognition of the distinctiveness of Quebec within Canada in 1997. It is once again on the table as a crucial corner stone in any renewal package aimed at resolving Canada's three-decade-old federal reform crisis. And it is still supported and opposed by some of the same people for the same reasons.

   The task of this paper is to attempt to shed more light than heat on the distinct society question. Where did it come from? Why has it been a persistent Quebec objective? What does it mean? What are the arguments for and against it? Should we try to get around the term or can we resolve its main contentious problems? The final answers about the use or non-use of the expression distinct society will be based on political judgments. My job here is to explain and elucidate. Essentially, I want to answer the questions what and why: what does the concept 'distinct society' mean, what are the objectives behind its use; why was it developed, where did it come from, why is it considered of such great importance? My belief is that much of our constitutional misunderstanding in Canada is based on a lack of timely information, particularly about why communities want change and what these changes mean. Before trying to answer these questions let us, first of all recall the main elements of the distinct society proposal and, then, try to set it in the context of the philosophy of Canadian federalism.

   The notion of a protective distinct society clause in the Canadian Constitution started to take its present form with the re-election of Robert Bourassa and the Liberal Party of Quebec at the end of 1985.1 The party's Policy Program, Mastering the Future, had announced five main conditions which would enable a Liberal government to accept the Constitutional agreement of 1982:

"... a preamble recognizing Quebec as a distinct society; a constitutional right in the matter of immigration; a stipulation providing for Quebec's participation in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court; limitation of the federal spending power; and a full veto for Quebec, written into the amending formula." (pp.55-56)

   The party's platform specified that there were two inseparable aspects of its view of the evolution of Canadian federalism: protection of Quebec's powers and participation in Canada's future. The program went on to spell out its meaning of distinct society. The objective is to,

"write into the Canadian Constitution an explicit recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, homeland of the francophone element of Canada's duality;" (p.47)

   The program also offered a definition of the meaning of the concept which proposes:

"...explicit constitutional recognition as a distinct society, with its own language, culture, history, institutions and way of life ... and the accompanying political rights and responsibilities" (p.47)

   From this formulation we should note that the Quebec Liberal Party wanted Quebec not only to be able to protect its traditional powers, uniqueness and autonomy but also to play a full roll in the development of Canadian federalism. To achieve this, the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society was part of a more extensive package, but a package which was very limited in scope in comparison to other Quebec demands. In the next section we will trace the evolution of this original proposal as politicians tried to balance pressures from Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC). But first let us see how it fits in with traditional notions about Canadian federalism.

   Let me make the proposition that the key unwritten concept of Canadian political culture is the notion of balance, a balance that is necessary even if it is not always immediately evident. Federalism itself is an equilibrium between unity and diversity. Citizens have to want to live together in one country because they believe in its benefits, at the same time that they recognize and accept that the various units of the country have distinct characteristics which their members wish to protect and preserve. Canada is also an economy in which we have to balance our political institutions with our socio-economic union. Federalism has to continually evolve to accommodate changes in society, economics and technology. Issues of centralization and decentralization are conditioned by the capacity to compete, and to generate and redistribute wealth and investment. But our country is also invented in our heads as a psychological community. Although imprecise, we know our actions must stay within certain parameters, boundaries that are set by the need to keep the trust and confidence of our fellow citizens from other cultures and regions. This also entails a balance in the messages we send each other.

   The notion of a society being able to understand or attain a strict or stable equilibrium was rejected by the social sciences decades ago. It is simply too complex and unknowable if we try to coordinate, over time, all the aspects of economics, culture and politics, each of which is in continual evolution. Rather I am referring to an innate sense of fairness, limits, compromise and give and take which the leaders and citizens of a pluralist federation must have if they are to persist. Each cultural and regional unit must respect its partners, recognize their needs and be prepared to temper its own beliefs and objectives, both for the viability of the whole and to gain the trust of the others. So the balance of which I am speaking is not a given set of political or constitutional conditions or rules but rather a set of attitudes that says I must recognize and trust my partners if I am to achieve my own goals -- and this is better for all of us because it allows us to live in peace and democracy. It is like a tight rope stretching into the future on which each generation must strive to maintain their balance in the face of new vibrations and changing conditions.

   The point I am trying to make is that if balance is Canada's middle name then we must use it as a litmus test for our discussion of distinct society. Is there sufficient proof that Quebec needs the added protection of a distinct society clause to protect its social and constitutional requirements? Can it be squared with the precepts of a viable federalism and a productive economy? Has Canada being over-doing unity at the expense of diversity? Will a distinct society clause engender recognition and trust or is it part of the slippery slope to separation? Does it upset the equilibrium of the constitution? How can it be balanced against the needs of the other partners in confederation? These are the fundamental questions we should be asking ourselves about the viability and utility of including a distinct society clause in the Canadian constitution.

   A second point to be made is that balance is very difficult to achieve, especially in constitutional affairs. People know constitutions are for the long haul and they are willing to work hard to protect their perceived interests. Not only does one have to satisfy federal and provincial interests and cultural and regional power blocs, but also political parties and leaders, business and labour, and all sorts of culturally defined interest groups. And as we have already seen in Canada, the nature of these groupings may change during the period when you are trying to modify your constitution.2 We are not the only ones in this situation. Experience in most other countries tells us it is particularly difficult to change the constitution of an on-going democracy when all the interests and the parties are fully dug in to protect their current advantages and there is no major event or external enemy enticing people to work together. To take but one example, the Americans tried for decades to pass a women's rights amendment to their constitution and were not able to do so.

   This being the case, we should learn several lessons from our supposed failures of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. First, they were very nearly successes. Meech was signed by the 11 first ministers in 1987, enjoyed the support of nearly two-thirds of the decided electors, and was passed, after public hearings by the federal Parliament (all parties concurring) and by the legislatures of eight of the 10 provinces comprising 93 per cent of the Canadian population.

   Second, given the extraordinary efforts at compromise and definition which went into the two accords and the admitted difficulty in making amendments to living democracies, we should stop being so hard on each other for not having fully succeeded so far. A more positive stance would be to say that in a pluralist democracy it is very meet and right that prudent people take their time about making substantial political changes. We could see the 1982 Patriation of the Constitution and the two Accords as test runs and learning experiences. After all, we did manage to give ourselves a new Charter of Rights, itself a fine balance between collective and individual protections, and we did develop an amending formula, insert the Canadian invention of Equalization payments in the Constitution, and protect provincial control of natural resources at the request of the West. Now we have to conclude our unfinished business by balancing the 1982 agreement with conditions satisfactory to Quebec.

   Third, we should neither forget the lessons of Meech and Charlottetown nor completely throw out all there hard-gained substance. For instance, a lot of work went into to defining and balancing the various components of the distinct society clause and the limitation to federal spending. These gains should not be lost. With regard to process, while Charlottetown may have been an unachievable 'mega' project that tried to include absolutely everyone's interests,3 at the other end of the spectrum the limiting of Meech to Quebec's concerns also appeared to have been unacceptable. This suggests that achievable constitutional change must be narrow enough to avoid a fight of all against all and broad enough to allow for the balancing of major interests. It would also appear from the progressively complex participation of the population in the constitutional debates of recent decades, that citizens expect to be actively involved in the process of renewal.4 How do we develop an appropriate combination of private political negotiation, public information, and citizen involvement?

EVOLUTION OF THE DISTINCT SOCIETY CLAUSE

   With these questions and objectives in mind, let us now turn back to analyzing how the original proposal for a distinct society clause evolved over time to satisfy the fundamental nature of the Canadian federal system, the Quebec political parties, and the desires of the federal Government and the rest of Canada.

   Following the election of the Liberal Party in Quebec at the end of 1985, the Bourassa government made its position known by having its Minister of International and Intergovernmental Affairs, Gil Rémillard reiterate the parties five conditions for making the Canadian constitutional agreement of 1982 acceptable to Quebec during an academic conference organized by Queen's University at Mont Gabriel. The media gave these proposals considerable exposure. The only substantive change was that the Policy Programme's proposal for recognition of the distinct society in a preamble to the constitution was replaced by a statement that the recognition must be 'explicit'.

   This was preliminary to Rémillard's subsequent proposal that the clause be in the body of the constitution itself. Opposition Leader Pierre Marc Johnson had pointed out in the National Assembly that being in the preamble would not hold the same legal weight as the two interpretive clauses already contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the Constitution Act of 1982.5 These two clauses oblige the courts when making judgements on the guarantees of the Charter to do so "in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (Art. 27) and so as not to "abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty, or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada ..." (Art. 25). How could Quebec accept anything less?

   The Premiers Conference of August 1986 issued a communiqué which became known as the Edmonton Declaration. It announced they had unanimously agreed their top constitutional priority was to embark immediately on a federal-provincial process using Quebec's five points to start discussions. During the same period, officials from Quebec made two tours of the capitals. In the autumn Rémillard brought with him a working document in the form of a draft constitutional amendment. Aside from placing a reference to the "specific character of Quebec as a distinct society" in the main body of the constitution, Quebec also proposed to recognize the "fundamental duality of the Canadian federation" with Quebec as the "main homeland of Canadian francophones". Quebec was also to be vested with a "special responsibility to protect and promote" its distinct society and Canadian duality. Such was Quebec's opening position.

   But what Quebec was able to negotiate with the other governments was considerably circumscribed in the Meech Lake accord following six months of behind the scenes bargaining and, among others, the dramatic intervention of former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The draft Constitution Amendment, 1987 read as follows.

   The substantive modifications are subtle but significant. The distinct society clause had been given legal teeth by inserting it in the body of the constitution rather than in the preamble. The notion of the recognition of "Quebec as homeland of the francophone element of Canada's duality" was modified to reflect the more careful definition of demographic reality as "...the existence of French-speaking Canadians, centred in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada, ... " Recognition of Quebec's distinct character and "the accompanying political rights and responsibilities" was translated into "the role of the legislature and Government of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct identity of Quebec". Because the other provinces did not want the obligation to promote French, neither the word 'government' nor the term 'promote' were included in their responsibilities.

   Quebec's distinct society was balanced by a reference to the linguistic duality of the country as a whole. The distinct society clause would therefore not effect the rights of linguistic minorities in or outside Quebec. The objectional terms 'English Canada' and 'French Canada' in the original draft from the Meech Lake meeting had been dropped because they smacked of 'two Canadas' rather than 'Canadian duality'. Paragraph 4 assured that Quebec's powers were not altered by the Accord but Quebec's powers over language policy were also not diminished. It was clear the distinct society clause was not intended to alter the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments or confer any special status on Quebec.

   What we should note at this early stage in the development of the concept is the considerable effort and give and take which had gone into creating a balance between Quebec's fundamental desires and the preoccupations of the federal Government and the rest of Canada -- both within an honest description of Canadian and Quebec realities.6

   The next step in the distinct society drama was the 'Canada Round' of the Charlottetown Accord. Charlottetown was intended to build on Meech Lake's successes and redeem its failures. It included all of Quebec's original requests although in a more constrained fashion. It was intended to satisfy not only Quebec but all Canadian communities. Its process was intended to be inclusive and open.

   This time, the distinct society clause found itself in two places in the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was placed along with seven other 'fundamental characteristics', in an interpretive clause, dubbed the 'Canada Clause', and read,

c) Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society, which includes a French- speaking majority, a unique culture and a civil law tradition;
As in Meech, this was balanced by another paragraph, in the Canada clause, which drew attention to linguistic minorities,
d) Canadians and their governments are committed to the vitality and development of official language minority communities throughout Canada;

An additional section of this interpretive clause dealt with the Quebec government, but separately from the 'fundamental characteristics',
2.(2) The role of the legislature and Government of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct society of Quebec is affirmed.
Once again, as in the Meech Accord, additional paragraphs stated that the above provisions had no effect on the powers of the governments, especially with regard to language.

   It is worth noting there was considerable disagreement among Quebec specialists about the impact of the changes from the Meech Accord. Because the duality provision of the linguistic minorities was now just one among seven fundamental characteristics meant that it was no longer the dominant value and its interpretive value could be weakened. Also it was possible, but I think unlikely, that because Canadians and their governments would now be committed to the development of linguistic minorities this could be interpreted to mean that Parliament and legislatures were no longer obliged to protect Canadian duality. Although only Quebec was singled out for protection and promotion by a legislature and government and although this stipulation benefitted from an independent provision, it could be argued that these advantages weighed less than the realities that the Quebec distinct society was now specifically (and some would argue, narrowly) defined and that it had to compete for precedence with seven other fundamental characteristics.7 In the rest of the country, however, for the same reasons people either thought the proposed amendments had better circumscribed and balanced Quebec's distinctness, or they persisted to think the clauses would undo the equality of provinces and citizens.

   Although its treatment of the distinct society was much circumscribed, the Charlottetown Accord was accepted by the Bourassa government because it met its fundamental goals. The essentials of the five conditions of his party's programme were still intact. Quebec's distinct identity within Canada was given symbolic recognition. The Quebec government's rights and responsibilities in preserving and promoting its distinct society, with its own language, culture and system of law was affirmed. Quebec would be able to protect its majority Francophone culture from the depredations of uncontrolled immigration, and from Supreme Court decisions and from institutional transformations dictated unilaterally by the anglophone majority of the rest of the country. At the same time, the negotiators for the rest of Canada and the native peoples had been satisfied. We should remember in the current context that a lot of work has already gone into defining, circumscribing, limiting, legitimising and equilibrating the concept of recognizing Quebec as a distinct society. One of our problems may be that too many Canadians do not know this reality.8

   With the shelving of constitutional discussions after 1992, distinct society was out of sight but not necessarily out of mind. It was pushed further into the background by the election of the Parti Québécois government which maintained it was simply too little too late. However, with the federalist side evidently in difficulty in the last week of the 1995 Quebec referendum, Prime Minister Chrétien promised the Quebec electorate that he would see to it that Quebec was recognized as a distinct society and regained its veto power. During the same week the legislatures of four provinces also passed resolutions as conciliatory gestures.

• "The Legislature and the people of Ontario affirm that we value and cherish Canada, and Quebec's distinctive character within our country." Premier Mike Harris added a personal open letter to Quebec in which he stated, "From them [friends in Quebec] I learned about the pride Quebeckers have about their distinctiveness within the Canadian federation."
• "New Brunswick has always recognized the distinctiveness of Quebec and fervently wishes that this distinctiveness be preserved and promoted as part of Canada."
• "Nova Scotians, with our own proud heritage, recognize Quebec's distinctiveness within the Canadian federation with its unique language, history, culture, system of law ..." (all party resolution).
• Newfoundland and Labrador: "Quebec is acknowledged to be a distinct society by reason of its culture, language, and legal system and the Constitution should be amended to accommodate that distinctiveness;"

   Following the referendum, when the provinces did not all rush to endorse his Chrétien's promises, he moved rapidly to have them endorsed by the federal Parliament. In December 1995 the Liberal majority in the House and Senate caused to be passed a resolution that:
"Whereas the people of Quebec have expressed the desire for recognition of Quebec's distinct society;
(1) the House recognize that Quebec is a distinct society within Canada;
(2) the House recognize that Quebec's distinct society includes its French-speaking majority, unique culture and civil law tradition;
(3) the House undertake to be guided by this reality;
(4) the House encourage all components of the legislative and executive branches of government to take note of this recognition and be guided in their conduct accordingly."

   Let us note at this point that numerous representatives of Western Canada immediately announced their dismay and anger at the precipitous passage of this resolution which they considered to have foreclosed negotiations over senate reform and also indicated additional financial support for Quebec from Ottawa (paragraph 4).9 We should also notice (although it is difficult to attach a degree of significance to the terminology) that only Newfoundland actually mentions the term 'distinct society' (all the others preferring 'distinctiveness'); only New Brunswick talks of the Quebec government's role to 'protect and promote'; and only two provinces decide to include the definition of distinct society, but their definitions differ.

   At the same time, Chrétien also made an effort to rejuvenate his Cabinet's representation from Quebec with two new ministers, naming the young political scientist, Stéphane Dion as Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs. Dion quickly made the acceptance of the distinct society his own personal quest. He kept hammering away at the two themes that distinct society would not create a 'special status' for Quebec or give it any additional powers.10

   Dion did not lack powerful and diverse support. In May of 1996 the 'Group of 22', top academics from across the country, came out in favour of recognizing Quebec as a distinct society. The same month, the 'Confederation 2000' Conference of 100 senior business, academic and political figures, organized by the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), stated in its final report:
"Quebec is unique in the Canadian family in that it is the only predominantly French-speaking province. On the basis of its language, culture and civil law, Quebec has developed a society which is clearly distinctive by its social, cultural, economic and political institutions and its general mode of life.
We embrace longstanding tradition in affirming the unique character of Quebec and the legitimacy of the desire of the governments of Quebec over the years to ensure their capacity to preserve, protect and promote that character."11

   We can see here a subtle first attempt to insert new terminology into the debate: "distinct" has become "unique", "society" has become "character". The term "unique" appears to go back at least as far as the report of the Manitoba Committee on the Constitution in 1991. A not-so-subtle effort was made about the same time by the Quebec wing of the federal Liberal Party which proposed substituting the term "foyer principal/principal homeland". In a rare show of unity, Bouchard, Johnson and Chrétien all agreed the term would have no constitutional clout. By the time of the policy convention of the federal Liberal Party in the autumn, the idea of "foyer principal" had been dropped but party leaders were starting to use the word "unique".12 Nor were the Liberals alone. Jean Charest's Conservatives also reaffirmed their support for Quebec's distinct society but here also, "...Charest has been trying out new formulations such as Quebec's "unique characteristics" and "promoting" the provinces's "French linguistic and cultural identity".13 And the Globe and Mail weighed in with its editorial support for a constitutional recognition of Quebec's distinctness that did not mean:
"the bestowal of any new powers, not the creation of any power asymmetry, not a diminishment to any degree to the rights of English-speakers in Quebec: simply a statement that recognized that, having a French-speaking majority and an English-speaking minority, Quebec is unique among provinces."

   Not all reactions to the Chrétien-Dion renewed push for a distinct society clause were unanimously positive. Opposition came mainly from Reformists, neo-conservatives, Westerners, Anglo-Quebeckers, a former separatist leader, Guy Bertrand, and a renewed attack by Trudeau. Their arguments included affirmations: that recognition of Quebec as a distinct society is only a disguised step toward separatism; that it would divide Canadians into legal categories based on language; that Canada has shown its support for Quebec by constitutional protections ever since the Quebec Act of 1774 and through the policy of bilingualism and subsidies; that French is thriving in Quebec; that it would give Quebec and the French language a special status which would break the equality of provinces and citizens; that it would not placate separatists and is not acceptable in the West; and that it is unacceptably ethnicist in the same way as Premier Parizeau's post-referendum remarks.14 By the end of 1996, the Quebec Liberal Party had signalled its strategy of obtaining legislative resolutions of support for distinct society from the other provinces, as outlined in the opening paragraph. The Party's position of adding an interpretive clause to the Constitution giving the Quebec National Assembly responsibility over the promotion and protection of the French language and culture came from the report of their Committee on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism. Although the party leader, Daniel Johnson, had said that distinct society was non-negotiable, the Committee suggests that while favouring this term the Party should remain open to other formulas, "given that the essence of our demands should prevail over the form..." This is a sentiment with which Thomas d'Aquino of BCNI sees to be in complete agreement. In a speech in February he stated, "If the words "distinct society" get in the way, they should be dropped without hesitation in favour of plain language that all Canadians can readily understand."15 The Quebec Liberal Party Report does not suggest alternate terms but does use such formulas as "unique institutions", "specific character", and, repeatedly, "the Quebec identity".16 Another convert to distinct society appears to have been Alberta Premier, Ralph Klein. Shortly after the Quebec Liberal proposals and later on at a meeting of Dialogue Canada he said, "I've floated it a few times throughout communities in Alberta and that is to preserve and protect what is already there. That is not to give anything more or to take anything away. That's to make sure that what makes Quebec distinctiveness is protected in terms of language, culture, tradition, law."17 As 1997 continued with a distinct lack of action by politicians to respond to the proposals of the Quebec Liberal Party, a private group decided to exert pressure. In June, the BCNI wrote Prime Minister Chrétien chastising his government for "insufficient" efforts to overcome political uncertainty. It called upon him to "intensify efforts to rebalance the Canadian federation" and "for recognition of the unique characteristics that French-speaking people have brought to our federation and of the role that the government of Quebec has played and must continue to play in protecting and promoting their culture within Canada -- recognition in a form that goes significantly beyond a simple parliamentary resolution." They called on him to support worthwhile initiatives that may come from other levels of government.18 Shortly thereafter, the BCNI called on Premier Klein to lead a premiers' movement to recognize Quebec's distinctiveness in their legislatures. Shortly thereafter Klein agreed to act as a "messenger" to the Premiers' meeting at St. Andrew's in early August if the BCNI made a specific proposal to him. In due course, the BCNI did submit a memorandum to the premiers including the wording for a possible declaration the premiers might adopt and submit to their legislatures.19 They asked the premiers what had happened to the agenda for rebalancing the federation but cautioned it must not jeopardize, "a strong framework for joint action..." However the Memorandum centred on an attempt to show that the concepts of the equality of the provinces and citizens and recognition of the contribution of the French speaking people to the country are not irreconcilable. The draft declaration states,
"We believe that just as all citizens share equal rights and responsibilities, all provinces are equal partners under the law within the federation...
We recognize that the National Assembly of Quebec, as the only provincial legislature in Canada elected by a French- speaking majority, has a particular responsibility to exercise the powers within its jurisdiction to preserve and promote the unique character of Quebec's society, as expressed through its language, culture, institutions and civil law tradition."

   The Business Council appears to be under the impression you can square the circle, if you get rid of the code words 'distinct society' and make sure people understand that equality means not that all provinces have to be the same but rather that they have equal powers "under the law" and each province can acts as it sees fit within these powers allocated by the constitution. If one uses plain language to describe the realities of the French fact everyone recognizes, most people will agree, the BCNI thinks.20

   The BCNI's proposals were well received by nine premiers and by politicians as diverse as Quebec Liberal leader, Daniel Johnson, Reform Party leader, Preston Manning, and federal Intergovernmental Affairs Minister, Stéphane Dion. Bernard Landry, Quebec's vice-Premier immediately rejected the proposals as a "pathetic effort" and Le Devoir called them "timid". Although the Premiers did not directly address the BCNI document, it was clearly on the unofficial agenda and they heeded the call to action by stating that the nine Anglophone provinces would hold a special meeting on the unity issue in the autumn of 1997. The unity question and the recognition of Quebec are clearly back on the national agenda.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DISTINCT SOCIETY CONCEPT

   So far, this text has presented the basic elements of the debate over distinct society, traced its recent development and established the current context. But, it would be wrong to leave the impression that the concept of Quebec as a distinct society is some recent creation or simply an invention in the minds of Quebec politicians or of constitutionalists. Before going on to look at Quebec's reasons for wanting recognition as a distinct society and the arguments for and against the clause, let us recall a few illustrative examples of the historical evolution of the concept. It is important to see that the idea of Quebec as a distinct society has deep roots in Quebec traditions and political thinking.

   The Quebec historian Jacques Lacoursière is one of those who have traced the background of Quebec's distinctive personality.21 As long ago as the Ancien régime of Quebec as a French colony, the French authorities referred to the locals as "Les Canadiens" or "les Créoles du Canada", reserving "les Français" for those who came for a short stay. One French officer, Bougainville, was so disgusted on the eve of the Conquest that he wrote, "It seems that we are of different nations, enemies even."

   The Quebec Act of 1774 is in some ways is "the Magna Carta" of Quebec's distinct society. When the French Canadians fought against the American invasion of Canada, the British government reversed the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and accorded its own colony the use of French law, the Catholic religion and the continuation of the Seigneurial land system, as Gérald Beaudoin points out.22 Thus, the British Parliament was the first to recognize the distinctiveness of the Quebec society. This was a totally new departure for European colonialism and it did not go unnoticed. In the parliamentary debate on the law, one opponent, the M.P. John Cavendish, said, "I would consider it essential not to accord the Canadiens their own system of laws; they will maintain perpetual recourse to these laws and customs, which will continue to make of them a distinct people."23

   When he presented the Constitution Act on the 4th of March 1791, which provided for elections and divided Ontario and Quebec (Upper and Lower Canada), the Prime Minister, William Pitt, said, "In Lower Canada, as the residents are mainly Canadiens, their Assembly will be adopted to their customs and to their particular ideas." And that is what happened. Writing about the French Canadians on the 1st of May 1810, the Governor General James Craig declared, "Their habits, their language, their religion have remained as different from ours as before the Conquest. Truthfully, it seems it is their desire to be considered as forming a separate nation."

   The refrain was picked up by Lord Durham when he reported in 1838, "I expected to find a conflict between a government and a people; I found two nations at war in a single state; I found a struggle, not of principles, but of races." When the British Colonial office (once again reversing its position) tried to impose assimilation in the United Canada's, it was the fathers of our reponsible government who showed they had come to understand Canadian dualism and the specificity of Quebec. On the first day of the new Parliament in the capital, Kingston, in 1841, Robert Baldwin resigned his place in the Executive Council, because no French Canadian had been included. He then gave up one of his two seats in Canada West (Ontario) so that the Quebec Reform leader, Louis LaFontaine, could be elected in York! A year later when Baldwin was defeated in Toronto, Lafontaine cleared the way for his election in Rimouski! The two went on to form together the "Great Ministry" of 1848 which laid the grounds for responsible government in Canada. "What was sealed in Kingston was a multi-level pact. English and French reformers came together in an atmosphere of public good superseding personal interest."24

   Eventually, the solution to the "Great Divide" was federalism. While the British North America Act did not specifically mention the two founding peoples, it did acknowledge the distinctiveness of Quebec and French Canada by the creation of autonomous provinces and by recognizing the religious character of the education system, the civil code and marriage ceremony in Quebec, and the bilingualism of the federal Parliament and, in part, of the judicial system. The "French Canadian nationality", as George Etienne Cartier said at the time, was to be given its own margin of manoeuvre in Quebec while being called upon to play a role in a larger political scene. Sir John A. Macdonald clearly signalled his understanding of recognizing this distinctiveness when he wrote Brown Chamberlain on January 21, 1856 in reference to his French-speaking compatriots, explaining, "Treat them as a nation and they will react as a free people generally do -- generously. Call them a faction and they become factious." Sir Wilfred Laurier was equally clear when he spoke to the Quebec Legislative Assembly on 24 November 1871, "It's a historical fact that the federal form was only adopted in order to conserve for Quebec that exceptional and unique position that it occupies on the American continent." (Translations in this section by the author).

   What is striking about this summary is that the distinctiveness of French Canada and Quebec has been both clearly recognized and publicly debated for almost three centuries. This led Lacoursière to conclude,
"From the 17th century to the establishment of the federal system, no one denied the existence of a distinct society on Quebec territory. On the contrary, several persons have denounced this existence and tried to make it disappear by legislative measures. But, in vain...
Today, some affirm that the maintenance of a distinct society in Quebec constitutes a threat to the survival of Canada. History demonstrates the contrary. It was exactly to avoid the breakup of the colony that the British authorities recognized, sometimes by the threat of events, the elements necessary to the survival of Canada...
It is only necessary to recall that, each time Quebec felt its special personality menaced, there was tension throughout Canada."

WHY QUEBEC WANTS RECOGNITION AS A DISTINCT SOCIETY

   If federalism was adopted in Canada in large measure to satisfy Quebec why is it no longer seen as sufficient? Why is it that ever since the 1960s Quebec governments have persistently wanted to change the Canadian constitution? Why is this demand supported by more and more Quebeckers, to the point of threatening to leave Canada? Why do Quebeckers feel their "special personality" is threatened and that only constitutional measures to protect the distinct society can remedy the situation? These are the most important questions in the debate on the renewal of the federation. If people outside Quebec are expected to be understanding and tolerant surely it must be explained to them why Quebeckers are so adamant about being recognized as a distinct society. Unfortunately, we have put the cart before the horse by telling Canadians what needed to be done to the Constitution and not why. The Charlottetown Accord was the worst example when barely two months were left to explain mammoth political changes without any means or materials to do so. No wonder it turned into a dog fight of parties and political personalities. No wonder it "failed".

   The short answer is that Quebeckers no longer feel the current federal Constitution is capable of protecting their unique society and culture from the will of the anglophone majority and the interventions of the central government. But, it will be objected, how can this be true when, in recent decades, the rest of Canada has allowed Quebec to be the only province with assured representation on the Supreme Court, as well as having special controls over immigration, the possibility to opt out of federal programs, and subsidies and bilingualism to boot?

   This is a good place to start to present Quebec's point of view, mainly from a federalist angle.25 To the foregoing assertions a Quebec 'soft' nationalist would likely respond that the Supreme Court Act and the immigration agreements are not ensconced in the Constitution. Neither the opting out provision nor the rules for fiscal reimbursement are constitutionally protected. Over the long term, subsidies are part of the give and take of Canadian federalism. All of these are therefore subject to the shifting political priorities of the rest of Canada, with the federal Government operating as its agent. Bilingualism is all well and good, but it is a perfect example of a federal program being imposed on Quebec, which sees its priority as protecting the French language.

   This latter is one of the most difficult arguments for the rest of Canada to comprehend. Pressured by the Trudeau government and the francophone minorities outside Quebec, anglophones thought they were doing a favour to Quebeckers by supporting bilingualism . Not so, as far as Quebec nationalists, including federal nationalists, are concerned. For them, language and culture are a provincial prerogative and the protection of French in the heartland of Quebec takes precedence over bilingualism elsewhere. Sociological studies show they are not without reason. Language usage is being territorially concentrated everywhere in the world. The only practicable solution for Canada would be both to support bilingualism and to give precedence to French in Quebec.

   However, the story of current demands for distinct society protections (by this I mean constitutionalization not only of a distinct society clause but also of a veto, Supreme Court representation, an immigration agreement, and limits to the federal spending power) really begins with the Constitution Act of 1982. I stress this is the current cause of Quebec's concern, not the fundamental one, as we shall see shortly. There were three major problems. The first was that the bilingualism provisions in the Charter were seen as overriding what the Quebec National Assembly considered to be its areas of competence in language, culture and education.

   Much more basic was that the federal Government and the nine other provinces had thought it was acceptable to go ahead with major political and constitutional changes without the concurrence of Quebec. This confirmed their worst fears. The anglophone majority could transform the face of Canadian politics without the consent of the country's single francophone province representing a quarter of the population. One can argue all one likes that at the time of patriation of the Constitution, Quebec's Parti Québécois separatist government was making unacceptable demands which would block progress and that, in any case, Canada had a prime minister from Quebec who commanded all but two of the Quebec seats in Parliament. But the fact is that political agendas and timetables are man-made and it was a political choice not to wait until agreement could be reached with Quebec. This flew in the face of traditional Quebec theory. It held that, although unwritten, the Canadian federation, as well as being a contract between provinces, was also a social compact between French and English, not to be broken by either. In addition, Quebec, as the homeland of the French, was considered to hold a traditional veto over constitutional changes which affected the province. In the minds of some Quebeckers, by breaking the faith, it was English-speaking Canada which had separated from Quebec. The fact that Quebec could not exert a veto was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court.

   It is for these reasons that Quebec seeks not only to establish its constitutional veto but also to gain recognition as a distinct society to symbolize acceptance before the world of Canada's dual French and English cultures and Quebec's special role in protecting the French one.

   The third problem was that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms appeared to accord considerable precedence to individual over collective rights. Through a distinct society clause, Quebeckers want to reestablish a balance between the two. This is not to derogate from the fundamental significance of individual rights (Quebec had its Charter before Canada did) but to proclaim that they are imbedded in distinct cultural collectivities which provide their contextual nourishment. By the same gesture, Canada would also be signalling to new Canadians that the country is composed of two "welcoming societies and cultures", not just one, to which they can choose to integrate.

   There are several other practical justifications for Quebec's constitutional goals. To show they are a complete part of the country, Quebeckers want an explicit recognition of the Quebec reality that would also be a confirmation of the full acceptance by all of Canada of the diversity which characterizes the federation. They also want the capacity to occupy their full place in the Canadian sun by showing not only Canadian linguistic dualism but also the specificity of Quebec. The fragility of the French fact in North America (2.5 per cent of the total population, much less if one includes Mexico) justifies the key role of the Quebec government and legislature in protecting and enhancing the French culture, institutions and identity.

   However, the fundamental causes of Quebec's constitutional agenda go back to the 1960s. In a strange way they parallel the reasons for Trudeau's long term struggle for a Charter of Rights: basic changes in socio-economic conditions necessitate modifications in the governing institutions of the country. In Quebec's case, there has been a convergence of two parallel trends: a growing fear arising from perceptions of the province's slow decline in influence over the rest of the country and at the same time a gradual increase in self-assurance resulting from a steady growth in francophone control over Quebec's society and economy. These are the two key factors which have incited Quebec to seek additional constitutional protection both for its own culture and for its waning influence in Canada.

   Outside Quebec, one will object that on the contrary, Quebec is always able to blackmail Ottawa into doing its bidding, through the use of its large population, strong position in Cabinet, and Quebec prime ministers. What we are facing here is two sets of perceptions based on two sets of facts. Quebeckers are referring to a long term real shrinking power base due to the decline in its share of the Canadian population, while Westerners, in particular, point to the still potent capacity of Quebec to swing federal policy decisions. Both sets of perceptions have a share of the truth and do motivate behaviour.

   Let us rapidly recall the Quebec perception of the facts. As Quebec's population declined and it grew in Ontario and the West, there was a reduction in Quebec's relative importance in the country. Starting with an overwhelming majority in the 1700s, Quebec became less than a half of the population in the 1800s, only to end up as a quarter of the population at the end of the 1900s. Many Quebec intellectuals blame this on a concerted federal immigration policy in the service of the anglo-majority. This accelerated the reduction in Quebec's power within Parliament, which had been going down since Confederation. At the same time, Canada's economic centre of decision-making moved from Montreal to Toronto. The province's overall importance in the Canadian economy slumped and it had to be propped up by transfer payments. On the cultural front, the French language came under growing pressure from the world-wide domination of Anglo-American cultural industries. It was pointed out that Michael Jackson was more of a threat to Quebec's language and identity than English-speaking Canada.

   At the same time, Francophones were modernizing Quebec's education system and the public service and taking over the leavers of control of the economy. Law 101 assured that instead of a projected decline, the use of French actually increased. French companies were carving an international niche for themselves during the 1980s when the Canadian economy seemed to be in stagnation. There was a great deal of self-confidence at least until the recession of the early 90s. But the underlying change was that the Quiet Revolution not only spawned a modernized Quebec but a pluralist one, which was a source of both pleasure and tension. The upshot was that Quebeckers realized they had another reason for wanting their province to be recognized as a French-speaking society. They wanted it to be evident to new comers that there were not one but two language communities to which one could integrate in Canada -- and one of them was a French society in Quebec.

   Nevertheless, the perception in Quebec from the sixties through the eighties was that Ottawa dominated the political agenda. Through its spending power it was able to intervene in areas of clear provincial jurisdiction to establish national programmes which corresponded to the will of the majority in the rest of Canada. On the other side of the ledger, as a result of the Quiet Revolution and a renovated education system, Quebec rapidly produced francophone personnel who took over an expanded government and public administration as well as building 'Quebec Inc.' with its vital new corporations capable of competing nationally and internationally.

   From such a perspective, it is certainly not surprising and possibly even understandable, that since the 1960s, Quebec's political leaders have sought to use the Constitution as the only authoritative institution available to them to gain public recognition of their unique situation within Canada and to put a brake on the interventionist activities of the anglophone majority. After all, a constitution is not only the fundamental law of the land. According to the constitutionalist, Peter Russell, "Most Canadians have come to believe that their Constitution belongs to the people, and that it should define the people and express their will on how they wish to share a political community."26 To summarize, Quebec leaders want recognition as a distinct society (as a part of a larger package) for both symbolic and practical reasons, and the one blends into the other. The first reason is to make up for what we might call the 'Confederation deficit'. They want Canada to be recognized and accepted as both a federation of provinces and of two linguistic communities. Cultural diversity and a better balance between collective and individual rights need to be explicitly accepted by their fellow Canadians both in terms of linguistic duality and Quebec specificity. This symbolic recognition in the Constitution acts as a national and international bulwark, for now and in the future, against any 'take over' bids by the anglophone majority, such as the patriation of 1982 or interventionism by the central government. Second, they want it as a judicial protection for the specificity of Quebec institutions when the judges will use it as an interpretive clause when they judge the future actions of the Quebec government. Third, they want a French Quebec recognized by immigrants as one of the two "welcoming societies" in Canada. And finally they want it to be seen that it is normal for the government of Quebec to take special measures for the protection of its "French face" and particularly the French institutions which are central to its identity -- within the limits of its powers and of the Constitution and the Charter.

   Finally, we should not close this section without a few words on why the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society within Canada has also been desired by so many leaders outside Quebec. It starts with a simple desire to find words which will equitably describe mutual recognition and the facts of Canadian society in the constitution. There is a recognition that after years of battle over such ethnically tinted and politically explosive terms as 'race', 'nation', and 'people', the very neutral term of 'distinct society' was a viable descriptor in a liberal culture. Months and months of negotiation had also persuaded leaders from the rest of Canada that the distinct society clause had been surrounded with adequate safeguards and compromise terminology. In her book on the trials and tribulations of the Charlottetown Accord, Susan Delacourt poignantly reports, "Though the politicians had learned ... to respect each other, they couldn't seem to make the same leap with the Canadian voting public..."27

   In political terms, there is also the desire to provide Quebec federalists with what they consider to be a viable federal option to counter the causes of separatism. Another political reality in Quebec are the expectations of voters who have been told for a decade that if they are not recognized as a distinct society than they will have been rejected by the rest of Canada. Finally, for many, there is a basic desire to have Canada respond to Macdonald's maxim that if the Francophones are treated generously, they will act generously. If the Francophone community is always looking over its shoulder for the next blow from English-speaking Canadians, we can never become full allies and fellow citizens.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST

   Among the basic claims of those who oppose recognition of Quebec's distinct society one finds the following arguments: 1)the distinct society idea was invented by the separatists; 2)it is part of the slippery slope toward secession; 3)it gives special powers to Quebec; 4)it will not fly in the rest of the country; and 5) from Quebec, it is too little too late.

   By way of a brief introduction to this section let me note that a reading of the opposition to the distinct society clause shows what we might call a 'declaratory tendency'. For the most part the critics make a series of unsupported affirmations. The massiveness of the attack immediately places the promoters of the recognition of Quebec on the defensive by setting up declaratory slogans which become images in the public mind, images which thereafter are very difficult to refute.

   Two examples from leading opponents suffice to make the point. In his 27 May 1987 article in the Toronto Star and La Presse, Pierre Trudeau calls the Meech accord "a total bungle" which would render the Canadian state "totally impotent" because "no one spoke for Canada" in this "sell-out" to Quebec nationalists. Very potent imagery. He states rhetorically, "It follows that the courts will have to interpret the Charter in a way that does not interfere with Quebec's "distinct society" as defined by Quebec laws", without arguing the issue or acknowledging that it is merely an interpretive clause which must compete for the judges' attention with several others in the Charter and the Constitution.28 Later on, after the vote on the Charlottetown referendum, Judy Rebick, leader of the feminist attack on the accord, told her TV audience that she would have liked the politicians to recognize that the No vote was a judgement on their style of politics, not upon the issue they had decided to pursue.29 Even though it means confronting a one-sided battle of public opinion, the objective of this section will be to bring together some of the factual and/or reasoned arguments against the simple affirmations made by critics of the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society within Canada.

1) Invented by separatists:

  We have seen that if anything, the notion of a distinct society is a creation of the Quebec Liberal Party and other nationalist groups and individuals of a federalist orientation. During a decade and a half, the concept fought a long, hard up-hill battle against such rival definitions as 'the Quebec people' and 'the Quebec nation'. 'Distinct society' won out because it was a non-ethnic description of reality in a pluralist, liberal regime.

   To make the claim that the idea comes from separatists, people quote the resolution of the Parti Québécois passed by the National Assembly in December 1981, stating that, "It must be recognized that the two founding peoples of Canada are fundamentally equal and that Quebec, by virtue of its language, culture and institutions, forms a 'distinct society' within the Canadian federal system and has all the attributes of a distinct national community."

   These critics do not seem to realize that when Bourassa quoted this resolution in a television debate in 1992 it was not to accord paternity to the PQ but to embarrass Jacques Parizeau who was claiming the phrase was too weak in the Charlottetown Accord. Nor do they appear to have understood the PQ only used 'distinct society' when including its own notions of 'equal founding peoples' and 'national community'.

2) The slippery slope hypothesis:

  The reason 'distinct society' has won so many federalist adherents is precisely because it reflects a Quebec reality within Canada without the use of the terms 'people' or 'nation'. These other terms could place us on the slippery slope towards the right of self-determination recognized in international law. Contrary to the critics' claims, none of the draft constitutional accords have combined distinct society with the right of the Quebec people to self-determination.

   At the same time, Quebec, and the responsibility of its government for its majoritarily French culture, are highly distinctive within the Anglo-American society of this continent. It is difficult not to recognize this simple fact unless one has ulterior motives.

   In enunciating the concept of "slippery slope", Trudeau presumably was aligning it with his ideas that it would only be a crutch for Quebec, that the nationalists will always ask for more, and that you can never satisfy the separatists. In other words, in Trudeau's thinking, if you designate Quebec as a distinct society you are lending artificial support to the nationalist cause which will go on to make further demands closer and closer to the independentists for whom secession is the only solution.

   This has become one of the main themes of the Trudeau-Chrétien federalists in society' has won so many federalist adherents is precisely because it reflects a Quebec reality within Canada without the use of the terms 'people' or 'nation'. These other terms could place us on the slippery slope towards the right of self-determination recognized in international law. Contrary to the critics' claims, none of the draft constitutional accords have combined distinct society with the right of the Quebec people to self-determination. their fight against the Lévesque-Parizeau-Bouchard separatists. This at first enlightening but now sterile fight to the end between two bitterly opposed Quebec clans has dominated Canadian political debate for much too long. It is time their clan rivalry was gently relegated to the footnotes of history. Squeezed out of sight between these warring clans are the majority of Quebeckers who, time and again have said they think Canada is a fine country (see the Maclean's annual polls) but desperately want to preserve and enhance their distinct society. This was demonstrated by a 1995 Gallop poll (16 November) which asked Quebeckers "What change would make you content to stay in Canada?" On the extremes, 89 respondents replied, "none" and 88 replied, "no changes are necessary". The majority in the middle replied, "decentralization" (140), "jobs" (135), and "distinct society" (135).

   Approximately 75 per cent of Quebeckers affirm that Quebec should be recognized as a distinct society in the constitution (71% in 1991, 80% in 1996, 74% in 1997; polling information from Donna Dasco, Environics). Asked the direct question if they want Quebec to remain a part of Canada, Quebeckers have responded positively in repeated polls in the range of 72 per cent in 1979 to 67 per cent (after distribution of the undecideds)in 1997.30 Even more telling, a poll by Environics has shown that 14 per cent of those choosing sovereigntist options in Quebec would switch back to supporting Canada if Quebec were recognized as a distinct society.31

   Given this state of affairs, it would seem reasonable to ignore the extremist, warring clans and pay heed to the representatives of the 'soft-nationalists' who tell us that recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness is the way to win the next referendum -- or avoid one being held. This is all the more true in view of the fact the distinct society concept was never addressed to the independentists. It was never intended to appease them. And surely Canada's politicians are adult enough to declare during the coming debates, that the "slippery slope" is not part of the deal. If we can come to a good agreement, a generous agreement, it is possible to draw a line in the sand and say, "enough and no more".

3) "Special Status" for Quebec:

  The short answer is that, of the constitutionalists who have written on the subject, a large majority are of the opinion that recognition as a distinct society would not confer any additional powers on Quebec. The idea it would accord a special status appears to be a generally unsupported affirmation, a myth. It is understood that this is so as long as a future constitutionalizing process includes limiting or safeguard paragraphs. Among the clarifications in the Meech and Charlottetown Accords were a recognition of official language minorities; a specific definition that limited the protection of the distinct society to the French language, culture and civil law; and the specification that this did not modify the powers of the Quebec government. This was agreed to by the Quebec negotiators.

   A Legal Opinion given to the Government of Canada by six eminent jurists on 9 June 1990 stated, in part, that the clause relative to duality and to distinct society "does not constitute a negation or a violation of rights or liberties guaranteed by the Charter of Rights..." and "... does not create any new legislative competence...". It was signed by Gérald-A. Beaudoin (University of Ottawa), Jamie Cameron (Osgoode Hall); Robert Edwards (Government of British Colombia, Peter Hogg (Osgoode Hall), Katherine Swinton (University of Toronto), Roger Tassé (lawyer, Ottawa).

   The argument goes as follows.32 The essential function of the distinct society clause in the constitution would be to act as a guide to judges in the future when interpreting the constitution in order to make decisions on challenges to new Quebec laws. Such laws would have to be within limits which are reasonable and for which justification can be shown in a free and democratic society (Article 1 of the Charter).

   While there are some diverse legal opinions on this, we have to assume any such changes would be both necessary to Quebec's distinct society (as defined) and would be minor. A distinct society clause would have to compete with all the other protections and interpretive clauses in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution. These include our democratic traditions, rights of linguistic minorities, the equality of provinces, and protection of native treaties and land claims and our multicultural heritage.

   The distinct society clause would have to compete with these other fundamental attributes of the Canadian society. At present all the other communities are accorded recognition by our Constitution, but not the Quebec distinct society. However, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Rt. Hon. Brian Dickson, has publicly affirmed that the Court already feels obliged to consider in its judgements the distinctive role of Quebec in the protection and promotion of its francophone character, so official recognition in the Constitution would likely not have much new impact.33

   We can also assume that any restraints on the Anglophone minority would have to be within the limits already accorded to the Province of Quebec -- as they are to the seven Anglophone provinces which use their 'distinct' status to protect and promote their English cultures. History has shown us that Quebec has been more generous to its Anglophone minority. This is probably because it serves its purpose to have English institutions which lighten the burden of preparing future elites in English and because Quebec must live and trade in North America.

4) It won't fly "out West":

  Could the district society clause become acceptable in the rest of Canada? At first glance Table I, which summarizes polls on distinct society recognition for Quebec in the rest of Canada conducted by Environics Research, would not appear to be very encouraging. However it is noteworthy that the pressures of the October 1995 referendum managed to double support in comparison with some of the low periods. Also as the Minister Stéphane Dion has pointed out, after redistribution of the undecideds, distinct society enjoys support from nearly 40 per cent of those polled.34 This is a very good base from which to work. Especially in light of the fact there has never been a concerted campaign of information by local groups and leaders -- to whom this paper is dedicated.

   Canadians appear to want to be fair and open-minded on the issue but they want to be informed and they want to be reassured that a distinct society clause will help and not harm the federation. Michael Adams of Environics suggests that as two thirds of ROC voters are willing to accept that "Quebec is different in terms of language and culture", they would be willing to accept "distinct society if this was clearly its meaning and that it was not a code for something else".35

   Some of the opposition comes from people who believe Quebecers would be getting a special deal. Nobody likes this in a period of government restraint and of appeals to supposed citizen equality. I have tried to demonstrate that no special powers or benefits for Quebec are either intended or likely.

   There appears to be particular opposition in the West. This is entirely justifiable. The Federal government often seems to be paying attention mostly to the desires of central Canadians, including Quebeckers. However, the point needs to be made that this opposition appears to stem from desires both for revenge and reform, for getting back at Central Canada and the French and for obtaining justifiable additional representation in Ottawa. If revenge is the main motivation, we are never likely to succeed in pulling together. The papers in the University of Ottawa Colloquium repeatedly make the point that we must cooperate to start to satisfy the requirements of the West, Quebec and the Aboriginals at the same time. First we must understand each others' needs, then we must try to respond to them.

5) Too little too late for Quebec:

  Premier Lucien Bouchard seems to be the chief proponent of this allegation. Recently he exclaimed with regard to distinct society, "no one wants to hear this talked about in English Canada, no one... And us in Quebec, we are tired of these skimpy concepts of distinct society, we don't even want to discuss them, we know they mean nothing."36

   One is tempted to say, "he doth protesteth too much". Clearly he is playing strategy. On the one hand, he wants to use his authority to turn Quebeckers away from the idea of the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society within Canada. On the other hand he wants to reinforce ROC opposition to the concept. In between lies the reality that he fears the potency of the idea will undermine his sovereigntist project.

   Can we satisfy several groups at the same time? Academics, business people, and government experts seem to think so. Last year the Group of 22 political economists and the Business Council on National Issues' Confederation 2000 Conference put forth reasonable solutions. These include assurances of federal fiscal equality and better representation of the West in central institutions in exchange for better protection of Quebec's fragile culture, including the distinct society clause.

   The path toward the future is open to all Canadians, if the citizens can be adequately informed about the issues and politicians can find the political will.

INTERPRETATION: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE PRIORITIES

   While constitution making may be the playground of politicians and political scientists, and terminological debate the plaything of lawyers (or the other way around, if you prefer), the poor benighted citizens must feel they are being led ever-further into a deep, impenetrable jungle of claims and counter claims. If one does not have a magical compass at hand, the only available antidote is a)to analyze our key objectives and b) to locate ourselves in an historical overview of our country's evolution. We need to rise above the endless quagmire of quarrels over verbiage and situate ourselves in the context of where we want to go and where we have been.

   a)Our goal must be to make this country the most comfortable and satisfying place in which to live for the vast majority of its citizens. In terms of the constitution, this means updating it so that those who have been excluded by historical circumstances or left vulnerable by changing conditions can be recognized and protected by our states' fundamental statute. We must aim to repair perceptions of past wrongs or neglects. In part, as we saw in the introduction, this is a major rebalancing act. We have to navigate our way through the major contending forces of yesterday and today.

   As Monahan pointed out so graphically in the opening citation, the primary struggle is between two visions of the country -- founding peoples vs. founding provinces, compact vs. contract -- two visions which of course mask power struggles. Reduced to its bare bones, it is a combat between difference and similarity. But this simplicity itself masks a frightful complexity of relationships between French and English, native and non-native, culture and region, society and economy, collectivity and individual, majority and minority, we and they.

   The French, co-founders of the country, do not find themselves, as such, in the Constitution which turns out to be a legal document joining provinces with equal legal status in a federation. They want recognition and protection within this document. As the last two decades have shown us, the native peoples want the same thing. To complicate matters, Francophones are not only a minority but they are concentrated as a majority, in one province. Quebec naturally becomes for them a bastion for their language, culture and society. Not having a province, the native peoples similarly seek a secure resource base for their society.

   But the other provinces are worried that this is not just cultural protection but a financial and power grab by the French and the Aboriginals. And just as Quebec is majoritarily French, so the other nine provinces are majoritarily English (-speaking always understood). Therefore, Anglophones tend to support the provincial contract theory of Confederation. With the support of the Charter, the economics of free trade, and American assimilationist models, they raise the flag of provincial and citizen 'equality' or, as one says these days, "a level playing field". The struggle, then, is presented as one between demands for constitutional support for cultural distinctiveness vs. homogenizing pressures requiring identical treatment of provinces. This, too, is complicated and reinforced by the desires of the Western provinces for more territorially representative federal institutions, because of their fear of the overwhelming power of the two central provinces and also because of their large non-Eastern Canadian, non-British or French populations.

   These political rivalries spill over into social competition. Forced into the role of minorities, the French and Natives are obliged to defend collective values, while the Anglophone majority cloaks itself in the righteousness of liberal individualism -- even if, in reality, neither is probably any more collectivist or individualist than the other. As regards the constitution, the request for recognition as a distinct society and native self-government is looked at by the majority through the jaundiced eye of 'special status'. Further, under pressure, these two trends become exaggerated into aggressive, nationalist separatism on the one hand, and the law of the jungle where the strong devour the weak, on the other. Pretty soon, the propagandists drag us into a confrontation of 'we' against 'they', of 'les anglais' against 'les français' -- which hardly describes Canadian reality.

   b)Once again purposely painting with broad strokes, we must also try to place our current situation in historical perspective. We know that 'evolution', slow, conservative evolution, is Canada's middle name. It took half a century to overcome the ghost of Sir John A's aphorism, "a British subject I was born, a British subject I will die" and to build a Canadian army, outlaw British titles, and create the Commonwealth to replace the Empire. It took another half century to start to create Canadian symbols, to bring French power to Ottawa and to develop the policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism. Of course, each step in the creation of Canada's own model of society, of mutual recognition, was harshly contested. Change always is. So it is at present as we try to extend our institutions and federal practices to provide greater mutual recognition and representation. We are at another juncture in the evolutionary creation of a Canadian state that fits the ever-evolving Canadian society.

   In this landscape, it seems to me there are two essential features which stand out and point the way to fundamental priorities. First, there are currently three groups of citizens which are not sufficiently under the constitutional umbrella and whose absence there from places the country in serious jeopardy. Quebec lacks recognition for its unique situation in Canada and lacks protection from the will of the majority. The smaller provinces, particulary the Western provinces, lack adequate representation and participation in our federal institutions. The native peoples, until 1982 and even now, were only considered wards of the Crown. The first two can actually hamstring the federation. The condition of the latter is an affront to our sense of social justice.

   Second, our federalism is not functioning properly and, while step-by-step improvements will help, only a limited agenda of constitutional renewal will overcome the deficiencies just mentioned. The nub of our problem is that the twin elements of unity and diversity are out of balance. In recent decades, social tendencies have conspired to reinforce the unity side of the equation, that is to say, the authority of the central government, the levelling demands of big business, and the concept of a similar citizenry. One thinks in particular of the impacts of globalization, free trade, national programmes, federal spending, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, American influences, the world wide predominance of the Anglo-American culture and individual liberalism, and the extended capacities of communications and transportation technologies.

   Because of the subtle but overwhelming influence of the combination of these homogenizing trends, many of us have forgotten how to be tolerant of "the right to be different"37 . We do not take kindly to groups which insist on political recognition of their distinctiveness. Why can't they be like everyone else, we think in our hearts? Why can't they be like me? And yet, without an effective, institutionalized protection of diversity, federalism ceases to have a raison d'être. But this will only come if a sufficient number of us believe that diversity is a worthwhile part of human nature and it is the essence of the "federal spirit".

   Our primary goal, our limited constitutional rebalancing, must be motivated by an acceptance of the right to be different. Of course, this right will be circumscribed by the Canadian federal principles of including everyone partially and satisfying no one completely, that is a return to our tried and true virtues of tolerance and compromise. The limited agenda will include recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness and protection of its autonomy and influence; the increased representation and participation of the East and the West in the institutions of the central government; and the initiation of a conclusive process to recognize the dignity, representation and appropriate level of self-governance of the native peoples. If we are wise, it will also include reform of our electoral system which currently stymies the representation of partisan diversity and unbalances the whole federal system. But, it is possible we will have to handle this separately, outside the constitutional process, so as not to confuse the issues or overburden the renewal project. Issues such as individual rights, a Canada clause, national policy making, the distribution of powers, free trade, linguistic politics and regionalism are, of course important. But in light of the foregoing, other issues, at this time, should be secondary to the constitutional recognition of the right to be different. For once, we Canadians must stick to our key priorities and not be shunted aside.

CAN OTHER TERMINOLOGY REPLACE 'DISTINCT SOCIETY'?

   It is probably not any academic who will decide whether or not the term 'distinct society' has to be dropped in favour of some alternate terminology. All we can do here is try to clarify some of the likely issues. To handle the topic briefly, rather than surveying all the possible terms , let us limit ourselves to the issue at hand: whether to replace "distinct society" by "unique character" and whether to use "preserve and protect" rather than "preserve and promote". These appear to be the two sticking points and the two leading propositions at the time of writing. It will, of course, be the political parties which will finally have to make a judgement based on their polling of public attitudes and their estimation of whether the new terms meet their constitutional and political objectives.

   In considering the issue of alternate terminology, one can see that it impinges on both our rational/logical and poltical/emotive responses. From the calm and collected side of things, one can say, "what's in a name". We have seen that even the Quebec Liberal Party's own federalism report said that the essence of the issue should prevail over the form. Or we might ask, is it worth destroying a country over a few words, let's go with what works. And indeed there does seem to have been an extensive poll by Insight Canada Research that indicates "unique" works. Conducted outside Quebec, it found that distinct society was rejected by 59 per cent and supported by 37 per cent. When asked a question linking equal provinces and distinct society, support rose to 50 per cent with 43 per cent opposed. However, when the question was, "would you support constitutionl recognition of Quebec as a unique province due to its French language, culture and distinct institutions" approval rose to 60 per cent and rejection dropped to 35 per cent, almost the mirror opposite of distinct society all alone.38 But, we must ask ourselves, does this not beg the question? If we ask, what's in a name then why not distinct society? If we want to know what works, why does the answer only come from outside Quebec?

   So we return to the political/emotive side of the issue. What might be some of the difficulties with the use of "unique character"? We have seen that "distinct society" is not some concocted or idly developed concept. Distinctivenes has long roots in Quebec culture. Distinct society was specifically chosen, as a compromise, in preference to 'nation' or 'people'. Quebec thinks it has already made its compromises. Also there are high political expectations in public opinion about recognition by the rest of Canada as a distinct society because Prime Minister Mulroney and Premier Bourassa bombarded the people with the concept for years. We do not yet know whether Bouchard has been able to deflate the distinct society baloon or whether unique character is politically saleable in Quebec.

   It is André Burelle who has defined the attitudinal issue most poignantly in human terms. He asks of English Canadians, how would you feel if someone said, "I want to recognize you as a person with your own special identity but not under your too distinctive name but rather a vaguer name which I will choose?"39 The answer is inescapable and we must be prepared fot this sort of reaction in Quebec public opinion once it gets stirred up.

   We must not forget what I will call "the Victoria illusion". Bourassa thought he had accepted a reasonable package in the Victoria Charter of 1971, only to find that he had to renege on his signature upon returning to Quebec because of the unrelenting public opposition. We have seen the same happened again when the Quebec Liberals thought they could get away with only having the distinct society clause in the preamble to the Constitution. Any new wording will have to be generous enough to attract broad support in Quebec, because we know it will automaticlly come under the fire of the PQ's big guns.

   Which brings up the question of the intrinsic value of the term unique character. Does it have political clout? Will it afford the same degree of constitutional protection? Or is it simply a descriptive term of one element of Quebec's reality which does not carry the impact of being recognized as a society? The value of the distinct society concept is already denigrated by the independentists, would unique character be considered as even weaker? How would judges interpret it? And finally, but from the other end of the spectrum, would unique character not be attacked just as harshly in the rest of Canada by die-hard opponents? Unique could be considered even more offensive than distinct and character more nebulous than society.

   A third type of difficulty we will have to face is whether unique character can acheive the objetives that have been set for recognition of Quebec? It can be argued that it may fly in the rest of Canada but is not strong enough to redress Quebec perceptions of past wrongs or neglects. It will not show a "national committment to the endurance and self-fulfilment" of the French fact in Canada, as even the Trudeau government proposed in draft Bill C-60 in 1980. Therefore we must ask whether it is likely to show the ability of federalism to evolve and thereby act as a counter-weight to independence. Or is this another case of bullying by the Anglo majority determined to have its own way? Could we not work just as hard on changing public opinions in ROC as in Quebec. In the long run, words are important, not in and of themselves, but to the degree they help us to achieve our objectives -- and to communicate.

   If "unique character" can be sold politically in Quebec, and if it can be shown to provide constitutional protection for Quebec, and if it wins accolades in the rest of the country, then it could certainly be an attractive alternative terminology.

   With regard to the role of the Quebec government being to "preserve and promote" its distinct society, the objections are rarely stated publicly. It would seem there is an impression that it is such a pro-active term that it gives the impression of leading to additional powers for Quebec. One also has the sense that the word is harsher in English in its call for direct action, as in 'encouraging a cause' where as it is somewhat less directive in French, as in 'favouring the development' of something. The French synonyms -- accelerate, activate, animate, encourage, favour, support -- would support this impression. In English, we would be expecting the political opposition in Quebec to be alway asking "what action have you taken today to promote French?"

   However, Francophones point out that the word is already used in the Charter in Article 27 to promote Canada's multicultural heritage. A closer reading, however, suggests we really are in a situation of terminological and semantic differences. In English, Article 27 reads, "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." In French it reads, All interpretations of the present Charter must concord with the objective of promoting the maintainance and the enhancement (valorisation) of the multicultural heritage of Canadians (my translation). "Promoting the maintenance and the enhancement" is much more judicious and clear than the simple "promotion" of the distinct society in Lake Meech. For purposes of clarity and symmetry in the constitution, would it not be wise for us to adopt the terms and the phraseology of Article 27 of the Charter for an eventual description of the role of the Government of Quebec in a distinct society clause?

CONCLUSIONS

   It is perhaps salutary to start by putting our conclusions into international perspective by summarizing the implications for the Canadian federation that Ronald Watts drew from his recent comparative study of federations, both failed and successful.40 Watts emphasizes four factors:

• The importance of public acceptance of the basic values of federal systems: explicit recognition of multiple identities and loyalties and an overarching sense of shared purposes and objectives;
• The enormous variety of ways the federal idea can be applied in particualar conditions;
• The need to proceed by pragmatic and incremental adjustments; and
• Rigid and unbending federations which refuse to make the substantial adjustments necessary in changing circumstances are prone to crack and disintegrate.

   Any commentary seems superfluous.

   This paper was written in the context of the overwhelming "need to arrive at some generally accepted common understanding of the nature of this country" (Monahan). Its first objective was to attempt to explain why recognition of Quebec as a distinct society in the Constitution had been developed as a concept and what it means. Secondly, within the parameters of balancing unity and diversity, the aim was to see if there is a need for distinct society recognition due to an imbalance between unity and diversity and if so whether it could be achieved without upsettng the equilibrium of the constitution and in harmony with the desires of other partners.

   To simplify our task we may say that we have four choises with regard to distinct society: accept it; change the wording; refuse it; do nothing. It seems to me that present political circumstances rule out doing nothing, even if it is an age old part of the Canadian political culture. For the rest, the weight of the historical data and the other material brought together in the paper lead me to the following conclusions.

1. The notion of a distinct society is deeply rooted in Quebec history, political culture and current political attitudes.
2. It is already a minimal, compromise description of the majoritarily francophone population and institutions of Quebec.
3. A great deal of effort has already gone into defining, circumscribing, limiting, legitimising and equilibrating the concept.
4. We should see the Meech and Charlottetown accords not as failures but as learning experiences. In particular we should understand the necessity of informing the population and of including in any constitutionalising of the distinct society the appropriate clarifying paragraphs with regard to linguistic minorities, the equality of provinces under the law, and no changes in governmental powers.
5. If the clarifying paragraphs are included there will be no additional powers to Quebec and minorities will be protected.
6. Nevertheless, a distinct society clause will give the diversity of Quebec recognition in Canada, will afford it additional protection vis-a-vis the majority, and will legitimize the role of the Quebec government in protecting and enhancing its francophone culture and institutions. It is understood that a distinct society clause alone will not satisfy Quebec's desires.
7. The distinct society concept has received massive and repeated support over the years from most leaders in Canada.
8. Changes in Quebec's situation in Canada, North America and the world, as well as the patriation exercise of 1982 to which it was not party, have strongly encouraged it to seek additional constitutional recognition and protection.
9. The concept is a proposal clearly arising from Quebec federalists.
10. Most recent trends in Canada have reinforced homogenization. They require a correction in the direction of reinforcing positive attitudes towards diversity, if the fundaments of our federalism are to be preserved.
11. While alternate terminology is possible, at the present time it does not seem that it would meet with broad approval in Quebec. On the other hand it would seem wise to use the terms to "preserve and enhance" with regard to the role of the Quebec government.
12. Given the importance of public opinion on the issue, some way of informing citizens and giving them access to the federal renewal process should be developed.
13. It is understood that Quebec cannot be accorded its wishes regarding distinct society and other reforms without simultaneously satisfying the desires of Western Canadians and initiating a reform process satisfactory to the Native Peoples.
14. Leaders desiring to preserve Canada should accord priority at this time to informing all Canadians of the meaning and limits of the distinct society clause, that it will enhance our federal system, and that it is not incompatible with the equality of provinces, the protection of minorities, or the desires for reform of other federal partners.

NOTES

1 Although the direct lineage of the Policy Commission's Report can be traced to:

• The report of the Tremblay Commission pointing out Quebec's uniqueness,1956
• A policy speech by Premier Jean Lesage to the Canadian Club in June 1965;
• The 'blue pages' of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1967;
• The federal Government's proposed Constitutional Amendment Bill C-60, 1978;
• "A Future Together", Report of the Pepin-Robarts Task-Force on Canadian Unity, 1979;
• "A New Canadian Federation", (The Beige Book), Report of the Constitutional Commission of the Quebec Liberal Party, 1980;
• The federal Government proposed amendment of 1980;
• The "best efforts draft" proposed to the First Ministers' Conference, Sept.1980

2 We may recall that, as a result of elections, three new provincial governments decided to renege on their previous premiers signature of the Meech Lake Accord, Clyde Wells of Newfoundland being one of these. But the one thing that is certain about change is that it keeps changing. The following letter appeared in the July 21, 1997 issue of Maclean's. "Brian Mulroney will eventually be regarded as one of Canada's great prime ministers. Here in Newfoundland, he is responsible for the Atlantic Accord in 1984, ending generations of squabbling. The Hibernia project would never have happened without him and we now regard the Meech Lake accord as quite a bargain as we consider the alternatives. Fred R. Stagg, Stephenville." While the intention is not necessarily to eulogize Mulroney, in the present context the last sentence is perhaps revealing.

3 Peter H. Russell

4 Peter H. Russell, Conclusion, Constitutional Odyssey, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1992, "Most Canadians have come to believe that their constitution belongs to the people, and that it should define the people and express their will on how they wish to share a political community." p.191.

5 Patrick J. Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, p.67. Monahan appears to have provided one of the most informed and balanced appraisals of the Meech Lake process.

6 This point is made by Monahan op. cit. in his detailed chapters on the making of the Meech Lake Accord and its rendition into a legal form at the Langevin meeting. pp.63-136 and 8-13.

7 André Tremblay, La réforme de la Constitution au Canada, Montréal, Thémis, 1995, p.159. José Woehrling, La Constitution canadienne et l'évolution des rapports entre le Quebec et le Canada anglais de 1867 à nos jours, Edmonton, University of Alberta, Centre for Studies on the Constitution, 1993, p.133.

8 The Dominion Institute reminded us that history is not a great strength of Canadians when it released the results of its test of 1,104 students aged 18 to 24 who came up with an average score of 34 per cent. The Ottawa Citizen, 30 June 1997. It may also be recalled that after years of debate over Meech and Charlottetown, nearly a third of Canadians admitted to pollsters that they did not understand the two accords.

9 Roger Gibbins, "Western Canada Post 1995" in J. Trent, R. Young, G. Lachapelle (eds.), Québec-Canada: What is the Path Ahead? Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1996, pp. 255-263

10 Stéphane Dion, "Distinct status for Quebec still has merit", The Ottawa Citizen, 24 July 1996. Canada, Hon. Stéphane Dion, "Canadian Diversity and the Recognition of Quebec", Ottawa, Privy Council Office, 26 November 1996.

11 Confederation 2000 Conference, "Today and Tomorrow: An Agenda for Action", Ottawa, Business Council on National Issues, 3-4 May 1996, pp. 13-14.

12 "PLQ et PLC se rapprochent: concordance sur la société distincte", Le Droit, 12 Octobre 1996.

13 Jeffrey Simpson, "Conservatives are a party in search of a reason for being", The Globe and Mail, 29 January 1997.

14 Peter Menzies, "Unity minister sings familiar refrain", Calgary Herald, 11 July 1996.
Stephen Harper, " 'Myth-breaker' Dion peddles own propaganda", Calgary Herald, 27 July 1996.
Brent Tyler, "Distinct society idea doomed", Ottawa Citizen, 26 August 1996.
Andrew Coyne, "Both sides cling to divisive dogma of a distinct society", Ottawa Citizen, 31 October 1996.
"Distinct society would be fatal, court told" (Guy Bertrand), Ottawa Citizen, 19 December 1996.
"Trudeau blasts distinct society supporters", Ottawa Citizen, 10 January 1997.
Cité Libre, "Entretien avec Pierre Elliott Trudeau", I and II, Vol XXV, 1 & 2, January and March 1997.

15 Thomas d'Aquino, "The Case for Canada", Ottawa, Business Council on National Issues, February 1997, p.7.

16 Quebec Liberal Party, Recognition and Interdependence: Quebec's Identity and Canadian Federalism, Montreal, December 1996, p.45.

17 "Distinct society proposal gets thumbs up from Klein", Globe and Mail, 19 December 1996.

18 "Memorandum for the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa, Business Council on National Issues, 20 June 1997.

19 "Memorandum for the Honourable Frank McKenna, Premier of New Brunswick and Chairman-Designate, Council of Premiers", Ottawa, Business Council on National Issues, July 15, 1997. The memorandum was also send to the media and was available to the public.

20 "We believe", indicated Mr. d'Aquino, "that the words 'distinct society' should be abandoned in favour of a frank and realistic discussion on the French fact in Canada and why it is unique."(author's translation) "Les patrons invitent les premiers ministres à reconnaître le caractère 'unique' du Québec", La Presse, 31 juillet, 1997. "Shun distinct society, business group urges", Globe and Mail, 31 July 1997.

21 Jacques Mathieu et Jacques Lacoursière, Les Mémoires québécoises, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1991 Jacques Lacoursière et Claude Bouchard, Notre Histoire: Québec-Canada, Montréal, Éditions Format, 1972. Jacques Lacoursière, unpublished text.

22 Gérald-A. Beaudoin, La Constitution du Canada, Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1990, p.817.

23 op.cit., Notre histoire, p.322.

24 John Ralston Saul, "Across the Great Divide", Queen's Quarterly, 104/1 (Spring) 1997, pp.9-12.

25 For further details see:

• André Burelle, Le mal canadien: Essai de diagnostic et esquisse d'une thérapie, Montreal, Fides, 1995.
  
• Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict, Toronto, Macmillan, 1972
  
• "Mastering the Future", Report of the Policy Commission, Montreal, Quebec Liberal Party, 1985.
  
• Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, rev.ed., Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1980
  
• "A New Canadian Federation", Report of the Constitutional Commission, Montreal, Quebec Liberal Party, 1980.
  
• "Recognition and Interdependence", Report of the Committee on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism, Quebec Liberal Party, 1996.
  
• Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values", in R. Watts and D. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991.
  
• André Tremblay, La réforme de la Constitution au Canada, Montreal, Thémis, 1995.

26 Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1992, p.191.

27 Susan Delacourt, United We Fall, Toronto, Penguin Books, 1994, p. 19.

28 Patrick J. Monahan, Meech Lake, op.cit. pp.113-116

29 Susan Delacourt, United We Fall, op.cit.,p.21.

30 Maurice Pinard, "Les Québécois veulent-ils demeurer au sein du Canada? La réponse est très claire...", La Presse, 28 June 1997, p.B3.

31 "Distinct society could shift votes: poll", The Globe and Mail, 16 November 1996, p.A4.

32 See, for instance: Gérald-A. Beaudoin, La Constitution of Canada, Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1990, pp. 816-823. Peter Hogg, The Lake Meech Constitutional Accord: Annotated Text, Toronto, Carswell, 1988, pp. 12-15.

33 Brian Dickson, "Two Modest Observations on Quebec" Globe and Mail, 5 July 1996.

34 "Ottawa optimistic on distinct society", The Globe and Mail, 19 Nov.1996

35 Opinion Canada, Montreal, Council for Canadian Unity, 14(3)June 1996,p.4

36 "Bouchard ridiculise le projet de Klein et Dion", le Devoir, 7 July 1997, translation by the author.

37 André Burelle, op. cit. pp.63-119

38 David Stewart-Patterson, "The French resolution: Canadians know Quebec is distinct. The trick is to get it in writing.", The Ottawa Citizen, 14 April 1997, p.A13.

39 André Burelle, "Un bref aperçu du colloque: Assessing Access: A symposium on Tom Courchene's paper, Queen's University, 31 octobre 1996.

40 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996, pp.109-115.