REPLY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
TO WRITTEN RESPONSES OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
REPLY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
TO WRITTEN RESPONSES OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
IN THE MATTER OF Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, Chap. S-26;
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain questions relating to the secession of Quebec from Canada, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497, dated the 30th day of September, 1996.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. At the close of oral arguments by the Attorney General of Canada, the interveners and the amicus curiae in the Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada convened the parties to appear on Thursday, February 19, 1998 to respond to questions from the Court. Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada and the amicus curiae were also granted the permission to provide definitive written responses to the questions asked respectively of them within fifteen days after the hearing. These written responses were filed by the Attorney General of Canada and by the amicus curiae on Friday, March 6, 1998.
2. As well, during the oral proceedings on February 19, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada sought and was granted permission to reply in writing to the written responses of the amicus curiae. What follows is the Attorney General of Canada’s reply. It focuses on areas of particular concern to the Attorney General of Canada arising from the written responses provided by the amicus curiae. The reply is organized under substantive headings, with specific references to the written responses of the amicus curiae.
II. JURISDICTION OVER REFERENCES
3. With respect to the amicus curiae’s responses to the questions of the Court regarding jurisdiction over references (tabs 1-4 of the amicus curiae’s written responses), the Attorney General of Canada makes the following observations.
4. The Attorney General of Canada takes note of the admission of the amicus curiae that the reference legislation in all provinces would be affected by a finding that the Court of Appeal Reference Act of Quebec is constitutionally invalid. This buttresses the Attorney General of Canada’s submission, in para. 7 of her reply factum and in oral argument on February 16, 1998, that jurisdictional issues of this character can only be raised in compliance with the requirements set out in the Rules of this Court.
5. The exercise of the power to make references — whether the power of the Government of Canada under the Supreme Court Act, or the similar power of the Government of Quebec under the Court of Appeal Reference Act — does not, as the amicus curiae contends in his response to the first question, deprive the superior courts of their jurisdiction over cases before them. When a reference is made to an appellate court in relation to a subject that has been a matter pending before a superior court, the usual practice is for the superior court to exercise its discretion and adjourn the proceedings before it until the reference opinion has been rendered. (This is what happened, after the present Reference was taken, in the original Bertrand case and in the Singh case, which form part of the context in which this Reference has arisen.) This is done on the basis of the principles of judicial comity, efficient use of court time and resources, and the better administration of justice.
6. In law, when a reference is made, a superior court that is seized with a given case still retains jurisdiction over the matter before it. After the reference opinion is pronounced by the appellate court, the parties may desist from further proceedings if they consider the issue to be settled, or they may resume the case if litigious questions remain. For instance, as the Chief Justice stated recently, in a reference "the fact that this Court’s opinion is only advisory does not leave the parties without a remedy. They can seek a declaration [from the superior court of the province], and this Court’s opinion will be of highly persuasive weight." The assertion of the amicus curiae that the reference power allows the executive to deprive superior courts of their jurisdiction is thus incorrect.
Provincial Court Judges Case, judgment on rehearing, February 10, 1998, at p. 9, para. 10 (per Lamer C. J. for the Court).
7. The argument of the amicus curiae in his response to the second question (tab 2) is that an advisory opinion in a reference is not a judgment and that the rendering of such an opinion is not a judicial function. This overstates and misconstrues such a distinction, especially in the modern context.
The assumption that advisory proceedings are qualitatively distinct from adjudicative proceedings is incorrect. The distinction is one of degree. [...]
Admission of evidence, use of factums, and loosening of standing requirements all reveal adjustments intended to respond to the traditional arguments against advisory opinions.
J.L. Huffman and M. Saathoff, "Advisory Opinions and Canadian Constitutional Development: The Supreme Court’s Reference Jurisdiction" (1990) 74 Minnesota L. Rev. 1251 at 1308 and 1263, respectively.
See also J. McEvoy, "Separation of Powers and the Reference Power: Is There a Right to Refuse?" (1988) 10 Supreme Court L.R. 429 at 467.
8. Therefore, the remarks of Taschereau J. cited by the amicus curiae on the nature of reference proceedings in the Union Colliery decision of this Court in 1897 are, it is respectfully submitted, no longer apposite. Moreover, the thrust of Taschereau J.’s point was that the province lacked the constitutional capacity to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to hear appeals from provincial references. In 1922, Parliament amended the Supreme Court Act to ensure that henceforth, provinces could appeal reference decisions from their respective courts of appeal to the Supreme Court.
9. In his response to the fourth question (at tab 4), the amicus curiae maintains that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is not a court of law; or at least, that it has not been a court of law in exercising its reference jurisdiction (which was granted by statute in 1833). Therefore, he reasons, the reference power could not be validly extended, under the Constitution Act, 1867 and Canadian law, to Canadian courts, because it was a power unknown to the courts of England. This is an excessively artificial proposition, and it was recognized as such by the Judicial Committee in Reference re References in 1912:
It appears that the idea of questions being put by the Executive Government to the Supreme Court of Canada was suggested [by the British statute enacted in 1833] [...] This analogy, no doubt, has some value, inasmuch as this Committee, exercising most important judicial functions, is undoubtedly liable to be asked questions of any kind by the authority of the Crown [...] Upon the whole, it does seem strange that a Court, for such in effect this is, should have been for three-quarters of a century liable to answer questions put by the Crown, and should have done it without the least suggestion of inconvenience or impropriety, if the same thing when attempted in Canada deserves to be stigmatized as subversive of judicial functions.
A. G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada, [1912] A.C. 571 at 585 (emphasis added).
This Court has also recognized that in the context of constitutional interpretation, it would be "overly technical" to treat bodies which perform judicial functions as distinct from courts of law, whether they are courts in name or not.
Blaikie v. A. G. Quebec, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 at 1029.
10. Finally, in reply to the amicus curiae’s insistence throughout his responses to these questions that there is a fundamental principle of separation of powers that precludes the reference jurisdiction, it is important to note that the weight of authority is clearly against that proposition.
There is no general "separation of powers" in the Constitution Act, 1867. The Act does not separate the legislative, executive and judicial functions and insist that each branch of government exercise only "its own" function. [...] As between the judicial and the two political branches, there is likewise no general separation of powers. [...]
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Loose-leaf ed., vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at 7-24,7-25.
The [Judicial Committee of the Privy Council] relied on the compatibility of the reference procedure with judicial functions in a constitutional system not hampered by a strict division of executive, legislative and judicial powers.
McEvoy, supra, at 459.
[...] the least persuasive from the outset of the Canadian federation was the separation of powers concern. [...] The model was Westminster, not Washington, meaning the judiciary could advise the executive and parliament without sacrificing its independence.
Huffman and Saathoff, supra, at 1308; and see 1320.
11. This is borne out in the decisions of this Court, which, while recognizing that there is a separation of powers amongst the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government in Canada, has underlined that there is no general separation of powers doctrine under the Constitution, that non-judicial bodies may be vested with judicial functions, and that courts may be vested with non-judicial functions.
In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, no general separation of powers doctrine is spelled out in the Constitution Act, 1867.
R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601 at 620, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.
I am well aware that this Court has held that the separation of powers under the Canadian Constitution is not strict, in that judicial functions, including the interpretation of law, may be vested in non-judicial bodies such as tribunals, and that conversely the judiciary may be vested with non-judicial functions [...]
Cooper v. Canada (HRC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 at 871, per Lamer C.J. (emphasis in original).
III. SELF-DETERMINATION, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVITY
12. With respect to the amicus curiae’s responses to the questions of the Court regarding self-determination, territorial integrity and effectivity (tabs 8, 9, 10, and 20), the Attorney General of Canada makes the following observations.
13. In relation to the question on the safeguard clause concerning territorial integrity contained in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, the amicus curiae suggests that the clause applies only to relations between states, not to the relations between a state and "l’un des peuples vivant sur son territoire", and in any event is neutralized by the principle of self-determination (tab 8).
14. First, it is useful to recall that, outside the context of colonies and possibly peoples under alien domination or subject to gross oppression, the right of self-determination does not involve a right of secession (factum of Attorney General of Canada, paras. 122-125; reply, paras. 88-89; oral argument) and that international law in fact defers to the domestic jurisdiction of states regarding efforts at secession (reply, paras. 72-73; oral argument). Indeed, the right of self-determination has always been limited by the territorial integrity of states (Attorney General of Canada, factum, para. 146). Consequently, in no way can it be argued, in relation to Quebec, that international law provides that "le droit à l’autodétermination peut s’exercer de manière à choisir librement la sécession", as the amicus curiae contends in tab 8, p. 3, lines 23-24 of his written response.
15. Secondly, the language of international instruments governing self-determination is not addressed exclusively to states. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, as well as other instruments, rule out reliance on self-determination as the basis for any action that would impair the territorial integrity of states (text set out at para. 150 of the factum of the Attorney General of Canada). See the Attorney General of Canada’s factum, paras. 150-155, and her reply, paras. 92-94, and oral argument.
16. Thirdly, to set off self-determination and territorial integrity against each other and to take the position that they neutralize each other (tab 8, p. 4, lines 24-28 of the written response of the amicus curiae) is to misconstrue seriously the application of the law. To accept such an argument leads to the conclusion that there is no right to self-determination since it has been neutralized by the principle of territorial integrity. The issue of which peoples enjoy a right of self-determination is of relevance here as well. It is dealt with in the comments of the Attorney General of Canada on the amicus curiae’s response in tab 21, under the heading "Peoples and the Right of Self-Determination".
17. The amicus curiae never answers the question concerning the precise point at which federal authorities would be "obliged" to withdraw from Quebec territory, although he says that the sovereignty claims of both Canada and Quebec would find their respective support on the international scene (tab 10). It is the position of the Attorney General of Canada that, since there is no right to unilateral secession under international law in the case of Quebec, international law would not oblige Canada to withdraw at any point in the face of an attempted unilateral secession (factum of the Attorney General of Canada, para. 125). To the contrary, it would defer to the Government of Canada in maintaining its effective presence throughout its territory.
18. The amicus curiae contends in para. 79 of his factum that a secession would be legal if it became an effective political reality. In his written answers (tabs 9 & 20), the amicus curiae shifts his argument from the fact of effectivity to asserting its legitimacy through the principle of democracy. This argument turns the international legal principle of self-determination on its head. The Attorney General of Canada has noted (reply paras. 76-87; oral argument) that a fact that may ultimately be taken account of by law does not amount to a recognized legal right. As the Attorney General of Canada has argued, the main instruments dealing with the principle of self-determination provide that it cannot be construed as authorizing the dismemberment or impairment of the territorial integrity or political unity of states that are "possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind" (1993 Vienna Declaration). Contrary to what the amicus curiae argues, international law provides no basis for an argument that democracy can legitimize secession from a democratic state. It would be exceedingly odd if the safeguard against impairment of territorial integrity, by which international law expressly limits the principle of self-determination, could be overridden simply by associating the principle of democracy with effectivity. To argue this undermines and ignores the right of self-determination of the whole people belonging to the territory of a state.
IV. PEOPLES AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
19. The amicus curiae reaffirms the existence of a Quebec people but questions the existence of a Canadian people (see tab 21). In both his written and oral arguments, the amicus curiae has relied on the notion of "effectivity" which has led him to ignore important distinctions relating to the right of self-determination. These distinctions, it is argued, are essential to the understanding of the concept of "people" and the exercise of the right of self-determination.
PEOPLE UNDER CANADIAN LAW
20. The amicus curiae’s contention that there are Aboriginal peoples, a Quebec people, an English-Canadian people, and an Acadian people — but no Canadian people — flies in the face of logic, Canadian law and Canada’s social reality. It ignores the fact that under the Constitution, the Parliament of Canada represents the whole of the people of Canada. It ignores the existence of French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec (other than the Acadians) who have constitutional rights that protect their language and culture. It ignores the fact that most English-speaking Canadians are not "English Canadians" in terms of their origin. It ignores the contribution to Canada of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. And it ignores the very meaning and purpose inherent in Canadian citizenship, which grants, to each individual Canadian, membership and participation in a people and in a polity the whole of which is greater than the sum of its parts.
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 17, 91, 91(25), 133.
Manitoba Act, 1870, s. 23.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 6, 15, 16-20, 23, 27.
Official Languages Act, R.S., 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.), preamble, ss. 2, 39, 41.
Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S, 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.), preamble, s. 3.
Citizenship Act, R.S, 1985, c. 24, (4th Supp.), s. 3, s. 6.
21. There is no conflict in possessing a shared identity, both as a member of a distinctive people, society or community within Canada, and as a member of the Canadian people as a whole. Indeed, these multiple characteristics enhance the Canadian identity, rather than diminish it. As one of the experts chosen by the amicus curiae, Professor Lambert, demonstrates, while there are various ways to categorize populations within a state, "there are many compelling communal and structural reasons" to affirm the existence of a Canadian people.
R. Lambert, "Does a Canadian People Exist?" (tab 21, written response of amicus curiae).
22. A significant number of Canadian statutes refer expressly to the "people of Canada" or the "Canadian people" ("le peuple du Canada" or "le peuple canadien"). This Court has, as well, referred expressly to the "people of Canada", "the Canadian people", or "le peuple canadien" in more than forty of its decisions. It would be excessive to list them, but it is clear that this Court has effectively taken judicial notice of the existence of the Canadian people.
With respect to federal statutes, see, for example:
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S., 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.), ss. 2, 9.
Department of Health Act, S.C. 1996, c. 8, s. 4.
National Capital Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-4, s. 10.
National Parks Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-14, s. 4.
National Day of Remembrance Act, S.C. 1991, c. 36, preamble.
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
23. The Attorney General of Canada reiterates the importance of the distinction between the internal and external aspects of the right of self-determination, which distinction has an impact on the exercise of this right by peoples as stated in paras. 122 to 125 of her factum. In both his written and oral arguments, the amicus curiae has ignored this distinction and as a result, in the opinion of the Attorney General of Canada, has created confusion in relation to the exercise of the right of self-determination.
24. As argued at para. 122 of her factum, in para. 90 of her reply and in oral argument, the Attorney General of Canada respectfully submits that the right of self-determination does not involve a right to effect unilateral secession from an independent state. With the exception of colonies and perhaps people under alien domination or subject to gross oppression, "the right of external self-determination can only be exercised by the entire people of a state. In independent states, the external aspect of the right of self-determination is the right of the people of the state to determine, without external interference, their form of government and international status. This right is exercised fully by all Canadians, including Quebecers, within Canada" (para. 123 of the factum.)" It follows that there clearly exists a Canadian people corresponding to the entire population of Canada as is the case for other existing States. (See para. 173 of the Attorney General of Canada’s factum).
25. The amicus curiae ignores the distinction between the external and internal aspects of the right of self-determination when, in fact, Quebecers, like all Canadians, exercise the internal right of self-determination as they "participate fully in their governmental institutions, federal and provincial, on a basis of full equality" (para. 124 of the Attorney General of Canada’s factum; oral argument).
26. As pointed out in the Attorney General of Canada’s factum at para. 127, international law distinguishes between law as it is ("lex lata") and law in the making ("lex ferenda"). Many dimensions of the internal aspect of the right of self-determination are still law in the making, as outlined below.
27. There is a marked tendency in international law toward a broader conception of "peoples" but this is restricted to the context of the internal aspect of self-determination. Paragraphs 175 and 90 of the Attorney General of Canada’s factum and reply respectively summarize the position of the Attorney General of Canada in this respect.
28. It is in the sense of this broader conception of "peoples" that the Attorney General of Canada has stated (reply, para. 91) that "[c]learly there is a Quebec people in a sociological, historical and political sense, as there may also be other groups, living in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, that constitute a people in that sense. [...] Quebecers exercise the right of self-determination in its internal aspect within the Canadian federation [...]".
29. The amicus curiae suggests that there exist several different peoples within Canada who have the right of self-determination "in parallel". To the extent that there are various other peoples in Canada who have the right of self-determination in its internal aspect, they overlap with the Canadian people. The Canadian people is the only one with an external right of self-determination.
V. MINORITIES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
30. With respect to the amicus curiae’s responses to the questions regarding minorities, aboriginal peoples and the right of self-determination (tabs 11-15), the Attorney General of Canada does not believe it is necessary to comment on these responses. No specific issue emerges from those responses to warrant a separate reply. Issues relating to "peoples" and the right of self-determination were addressed above in the comment on "Peoples and the Right of Self-Determination".
31. The position of the Attorney General on the rights of aboriginal peoples is set out in para. 44 of her reply and in paras. 54 and 60 to 67 of her written response to questions from the Court.
VI. SELF-DETERMINATION: CUSTOMARY OR CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW? CONSEQUENCES FOR JURISDICTION
32. In response to this question, the amicus curiae submits (tabs 5-7) that the right of self-determination is part of both customary and treaty-based international law. He submits that the Court lacks jurisdiction on this question because it is a matter related solely to public international law.
33. The Attorney General of Canada’s response to this question was filed in Court on March 6, 1998. At paras. 5 to 10 of her written response, the Attorney General of Canada submits that the Canadian courts unquestionably have jurisdiction to apply the principles of customary international law relating to the right of self-determination.
VII. PRECEDENCE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS OVER INTERESTS OF OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT-HOLDERS
34. In responding to the Court’s question concerning the legal basis on which a democratic "right" to effect secession unilaterally would prevail over other rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as those conferred by the Charter and the rights of aboriginal peoples, the amicus curiae repeats his basic arguments concerning the "principe d’effectivité". (See written response, tab 9.)
35. The Attorney General of Canada has already responded in detail to the general arguments of the amicus curiae concerning the "principe d’effectivité" under both domestic and international law. (See, in particular, reply, paras. 55, 57-67, 76-87; written response, para. 24.) The Attorney General of Canada has also addressed the potential impact of secession on the interests of other constitutional rights-holders, including those of aboriginal peoples (reply, para. 44; written response, paras. 54, 60-67) and of other citizens, under the Charter (reply, para. 45; written response, paras. 54-56, 59). All these issues were addressed as well by her counsel in oral argument. The Attorney General of Canada simply reaffirms her position on these issues.
VIII. SUFFICIENCY OF A MAJORITY VOTE
36. One of the questions posed by the Court to the amicus curiae was whether a majority vote would be sufficient to establish the legitimacy of an act of secession according to democratic principles, or whether the rights of affected provinces, groups or individuals would have to be taken into consideration. A number of aspects of the amicus curiae’s response (found at tabs 16-19 of his written response) call for a reply.
37. The amicus curiae refers to the holdings of this Court in Libman (Libman v. P.G. Québec, (October 9, 1997) (S.C.C.) [unreported]) and Haig (Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995) as supporting the proposition that a majority vote is necessary and sufficient to establish the legitimacy and legality of a decision, whether by referendum or election, that might eventually lead to the secession of Quebec (written response of amicus curiae, tab 16, p. 2, lines 15-17). The Attorney General of Canada finds no such support for this proposition in either the Haig or Libman decisions.
38. While these cases do suggest that the same democratic principles generally underlie both electoral and referendum legislation, and that both systems are "designed to ensure that the majority principle is adopted" (Libman, para. 46), neither Haig nor Libman in any way address the question of the sufficiency of a majority vote. Still less can these cases be read as defining the majority principle itself or democratic principles more generally solely in terms of the rule of a simple majority, let alone as sanctioning the sufficiency of a simple majority vote as a springboard to secession.
39. It is worth noting that in both the Haig and Libman cases, the Court, while recognizing the many similarities between the electoral and referendum contexts, also emphasized the essential difference between the two processes. In Haig, L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for the majority, stated the following (at 1032):
A referendum [...] is basically a consultative process for the gathering of opinions. Voting in a referendum differs significantly from voting in an election. First, unless it legislatively binds itself to do so, a government is under no obligation to consult its citizens through the mechanism of a referendum. It may [...] bind itself to conduct a specific referendum, but in the absence of such legislation, there is no obligation to hold this type of consultation. Second, though a referendum may carry great political weight and a government may choose to act on the basis of the results obtained, such results are non-binding in the absence of legislation requiring a government to act on the basis of the results obtained.
(See comments to similar effect in Libman at para. 46 of the judgment.)
40. The amicus curiae asserts that a majority vote — which he seems to define as a simple majority — would be sufficient to establish the legality and legitimacy of a decision leading eventually to secession. If this proposition is intended to suggest that a referendum vote could, in and of itself, be legally sufficient to bring about secession, it is completely unfounded in law. As the Attorney General of Canada has stated in her factum (para. 77) and reply (paras. 53-54), and restated in her written response to the Court’s questions (para. 45), the legal reality in Canada is that a referendum is not a prescribed mechanism for legal or constitutional change. For this reason, a referendum vote in favour of secession would not be a self-executing trigger to independence, nor would it have any other automatic or immediate legal effect.
41. In addressing a statement of Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé during the oral proceedings to the effect that a referendum is not decisive, the amicus curiae responds (tab 19), citing Haig, that the results of a referendum may be made binding on a government. It is true that the passage from Haig reproduced above does contemplate the possibility of legislative measures binding a government to hold a referendum or to comply with the results obtained. However, this in no way alters the long-established case law that a referendum is not and cannot be made into a direct mechanism for legal or constitutional change. For example, no legislation could validly purport to substitute a referendum for the legislative or executive institutions provided for by the Constitution: In Re the Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935. In sum, while Haig suggests that legislative attempts to make referendum results legally binding on governments may be possible, this does not mean that referendums can be made to be "decisive" in the sense of being legally self-executing or sufficient, in and of themselves.
42. The Attorney General of Canada also points out that the amicus curiae fails to deal adequately with the second aspect of the Court’s question concerning whether the rights of affected provinces, groups or individuals would also have to be taken into consideration. It is not a sufficient answer to say that voters are entitled to take into consideration whatever they choose in casting their ballot. Rather, this question raises the issue of the potential impact of secession on the interests of other constitutional rights-holders. This might include, for example, the interests of the various constitutional actors under Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, the rights guaranteed to Canadian citizens under the Charter, and the constitutional rights and interests of aboriginal peoples. Such rights-holders might, of course, include those in Quebec who had voted to remain in Canada.
43. Concerning Charter rights and the rights of aboriginal peoples, the Attorney General of Canada has addressed this point above under the heading "Precedence of Democratic Rights Over Interests of Other Constitutional Rights-Holders". Concerning the role of Part V actors, the Attorney General of Canada reasserts her basic position that any secession would have to take place in accordance with Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that Part V itself embodies the democratic principle and provides for its harmonization with other fundamental constitutional principles such as federalism and the rule of law. (See factum, paras. 63, 74, 81, 109; reply, para. 67; written response, paras. 30, 74-76.)
44. The federal principle is of particular relevance in the present context in considering the sufficiency of a majority vote as a basis for effecting secession. As noted in the Attorney General of Canada’s written response to the ninth question posed to her by the Court (written response, para. 74), assertions or claims made in the name of the majority raise questions as to which part of the population of Quebec or Canada is the relevant majority. It is fundamental to the idea of a federal state such as Canada that sovereignty is divided between two orders of government, each with its own jurisdiction and electorate. In a federation, it is not for a provincial majority to claim for itself the exclusive right to decide issues relating to the future of the federation as a whole.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
DATED at Ottawa, this 13th day of March, 1998.