A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 1995 QUEBEC REFERENDUM
John E. Trent
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 1995 QUEBEC REFERENDUM
John E. Trent
1. INTRODUCTION
To understand the complexity of the Quebec referendum we need to piece together its vital elements to gain a reasonably accurate overview of the entire process. Such is the objective of this article. I call it mapping a political event. Who are the principal actors, what are their major strategies and what are the key influences orienting their actions. Or, to paraphrase an old political science definition, who is doing what to whom, why and how?
Of course, one of the influences is the weight of past events. We will see this come out in the attitudes and memories of the population and how the discourse of the political actors tries to play on public sentiments. The major prior event is the referendum of 1980 and the analogies people make with it. Nevertheless, we should recall that history does not repeat itself exactly. The Canadian political scene has changed significantly since the last Quebec referendum. The separatist 1 Bloc Québécois now holds two thirds of the Quebec seats in Ottawa so the Ottawa Liberals no longer occupy the moral high ground of speaking for Quebec. At the same time, the BQ feeds back continuous streams of negative images of federalism into the Quebec collective psyche. In addition, Canada has suffered the double defeats of the Meech and Charlottetown constitutional accords, the first of which many Quebecers took as a personal rejection by the rest of Canada.
In Quebec, moreover, many of the grievances which pricked the everyday nationalism of ordinary Québécois have gradually been reduced. The French language is more and more dominant thanks to Law 101; francophones own more than 60 per cent of the businesses; and there are a lot fewer anglophones around -- and the majority of them are bilingual. The Parti Québécois is an aging party while the youth of Quebec now feels much more culturally secure. On the international scene, while there are clearly many more ethno-nationalist movements, the feedback from them is mostly negative, ranging from tribal warfare and horrible rape and blood shed to the practices of ethnic cleansing and enormous economic loss. Few Canadians can be unconscious of the heavy costs imposed by radical nationalism. In addition, because of the impact of globalization, it is now much more difficult to claim that political independence adds a great deal to a society's capacity for solitary decision making in an interdependent world. As Ted Newall, chairman of the Business Council on National issues has said speaking of Canada's constitutional debates, "The external forces are making a whole hell of a lot more happen in this area than these endless internal debates within Canada ever will or ever have." (Maclean's 24 April'95) In a word, the whole sovereignty argument has been devalued.
A third type of change is an erroneous interpretation that has grown up around the 1980 referendum. It is often suggested that the referendum was "won" mainly by the federalist forces from Ottawa and by Pierre Trudeau's speeches and his promises of constitutional reform. While there is no doubt a modicum of truth in this type of assertion, it is largely a re- writing of history for ideological purposes. For the most part, the federalist campaign was fought in Quebec by the forces marshalled by the Quebec Liberal Party and its new and highly respected leader, Claude Ryan. It must be remembered that since the PQ's election victory in 1976, one could hardly pronounce the words `federal' and `Canada' in Quebec. It was Ryan and his team who wrote the books, developed the constitutional position, rebuilt the party, and developed the No campaign which gave a new credibility to federalism in Quebec. Chrétien and Trudeau largely rode on the back of this campaign which had reversed the opinion polls in the federalist's favour before Trudeau made his now famous promises.
The first series of factors above, relating more to the general Canadian scene, indicate to us that the political forces in place are not the same as in 1980 so we should not simply expect a repeat performance of the last referendum. Their are many more constraints on the federalist forces. On the other hand, the second series of influences, pertaining more specifically to the conditions in Quebec, alert us to the great difficulties likely to be experienced by the sovereignist forces as they try to mobilize broad-based support. The third factor, the erroneous interpretation, suggests a successful federalist campaign must be perceived to be lead for the most part by credible federal forces located in Quebec rather than in Ottawa.
2. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE 1995 REFERENDUM
References to the 1980 referendum help give us a sense of perspective for the planned referendum in 1995. They also teach us we must focus on the strategies of the opposing camps of the Oui and the Non, which we will certainly do. But is this all we must consider in mapping the referendum campaign? It is here that it is helpful to turn to a little technique we use in social science to help us straighten out our thoughts. The first question we ask ourselves, and usually the most difficult one, is what exactly is the question for which we are trying to find an answer, what is the exact problem we are trying to solve?
Our general problem is to understand what is going on in Quebec during the referendum year. But to make this manageable we must be more specific and ask: what are the influences that will have an impact on how the Quebec electors make up their minds to vote Oui or Non in the referendum? In social science we would call that defining our dependent variable (voting intentions) and our independent variables (factors that will influence voting intentions). Of course, although scholars may do it more specifically, we are not alone in thinking in this manner: the politicians also are trying to figure out how to influence the Quebec voter. Their strategies are based on the answers they give to this fundamental question.
It would be pleasant to be able to claim we have one nice, neat model of how people make up their minds. But that would be gilding the lily, especially as referendums on secession are qualitatively different from ordinary elections and we do not have much experience with referendums. In referendums the issues are much more crucial and emotional, there are only two options and every vote (or its absence) counts because they are calculated for the whole province and not isolated in each riding. This makes for more intense campaigns. Just the same, we can usefully borrow several basic ideas from election studies. One is referred to as the "funnel of causality". The wide end represents the voters' intentions at the beginning of the campaign when one pays attention to a potentially large array of influences but begins to focus ideas toward the voting day when probably only a small number of crucial factors will make up our minds for us.
The second set of ideas from electoral studies is that we know that electors pay attention to several major factors including: the leaders, the issues, and the parties or organizations which are behind the campaign. So we will have to keep these three groups in mind. (Crete)
All this naturally leads to two further questions. What are all the factors (or variables) which are likely to influence the outcome of the referendum? And, can we not define the Quebec electorate a little more closely so as to have an idea about what sort of reasons are likely to have an impact on particular categories of voters?
To answer these questions, as well as analysing the last referendum, I have been tracking the politicians, the media and the commentators since the beginning of the Quebec election in the summer of 1994. It seems to me the following are going to be the major influences on the referendum. While each category of influences could easily be subdivided, these 10 groupings will provide us with both focus and sufficient complexity.
First, there are what we might call the `players': the nationalists (the Oui camp), the federalists (the Non camp), the rest of Canada (ROC), international or external influences, and a catchall of unknowns we can dub the `unexpected'. Second, there are the procedural conditions that determine the process within which the players operate, consisting of: the referendum process, major issues, information availability, and the media. Each one of these categories of influences interacts with all the others to produce the referendum campaign. For the sake of clarity these are presented in Figure 1. Of course, the players and processes do not operate in a vacuum. Their effect will be to push a majority of Quebec voters to vote Yes or No.
2a. Categorizing the Quebec Electorate
So how can we categorize our dependent variable, the collection of voters which will be targeted by the various camps? How can we describe Quebec public opinion? (Cloutier et al; Globe & Mail, 15 Sept.'94) It is helpful to divide it into three categories: ethnic, political and social. Ethnic is the clearest and most opinionated. The 1991 census showed that 81 per cent of the Quebec population has French as its mother tongue, almost 9 per cent English, 7.5 per cent other languages (allophones), and 2.5 per cent multiple languages.(Moniere) It also showed the number of people of British ancestry in Quebec had fallen from 640,000 in 1971 to 286,000 in 1991 while the number from neither French nor British backgrounds had risen from 628,000 to 1,446,000 in the same 20 year period. However, on a fairly consistent basis, less than 10 per cent of the anglophones and allophones support sovereignty, no matter how it is worded, and despite years of P.Q. wooing. So the nationalists have to forget about approximately 16 per cent of the vote in a referendum. The francophone population is equally consistently divided 50-50 on sovereignty. The francophone voters,then, are the first target of the Oui camp. (Macpherson, Montreal Gazette, 13 Dec,'94)
The political category can be divided either by political party support or by support for the separatist or federalist option. Because party support does not correlate with approval of independence, it is not very helpful to us except for indicating hard core support for one of the referendum options. While support for sovereignty varies over time and will continue being volatile right up to the referendum, we can make several generalizations. (Le Droit, 17 Dec.'94) Recently (the last six months of 1994) public opinion support in polls has been running around 35 per cent in favour of sovereignty, 48 per cent against and 17 per cent undecided. By the beginning of 1995, sovereignty support had grown to between 40 and 46 per cent of poll respondents. Over the past five years approval ratings for sovereignty have ranged from about 65 per cent following the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord to about 35 to 40 per cent. It is estimated that hardcore support for the nationalists is in the 25 to 35 per cent range. There has been a steady rise in approval of the Parti Québécois (P.Q.) since it was elected the government of Quebec in the September 1994 election, but more modestly for its sovereignty option.
`Soft nationalists' are the real target of the P.Q.(Ottawa Citizen, 24 Dec.'94) Perhaps there are 25 to 35 per cent of them (the difference between the hardcore support and the highest opinion poll showing following Lake Meech). These are the people who are worried about a potential decline in their standard of living. They would like to have their own country and get upset by signs of rejection or confrontation with the rest of Canada. But they prefer more secure powers for Quebec and constitutional recognition for its distinctiveness to the idea of separation whose consequences they fear. Bloc Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard has said that fear of change is the biggest obstacle facing the Yes team and called on Quebecers to be prepared to take the risk of becoming a sovereign nation.(Ottawa Citizen 23 March'95) Often one finds the soft nationalists supporting Mario Dumont's Parti d'action democratique (PAD), a breakaway group from the Liberals, because they liked the Allaire report which essentially proposed stripping Ottawa of most of its powers. By the summer of 1995, polls showed that PAD's support had increased from its 6.6 per cent at election time to between 11 and 15 per cent.
In between the nationalists and the federalists are the `undecideds`. Their numbers appear to have increased from around 12 per cent in the summer of 1994 to between 17 and 20 per cent, with most of the defections coming from the nationalist (soft) Liberals who, it is suggested, are concerned by Chrétien and Johnson reaffirming that there would be no new constitutional offers prior to the referendum. In other words they would have to vote for what the separatists call the `status quo'. Experts generally concede that as voting day approaches the undecideds tend to opt more for the federalists because, basically, they prefer stability to change. Because they literally hold the balance of power, the undecideds are a primary target of both camps. (O'Neil, Le Devoir, 14 Dec.'94)
The federalists, who generally received between 40 to 45 per cent in the polls in the pre-referendum period, are reputed to have a hardcore of from 35 to 40 per cent of the electorate. However, the Liberal Party of Quebec declined from its election level of 44.3 per cent to around 38 per cent, partly a result of being out of the news, partly because of the P.Q. honeymoon. Aside from anglos and allophones, the federalists include those who have worked within the federal system and those who believe Canada maximizes Quebec's opportunities.
The `soft federalists' or Liberal nationalists, representing between 10 and 15 per cent of the habitual support for this option, swing between the federalist and undecided orientations. As the Montreal Gazette has correctly proposed, the strategy for both camps in the referendum campaign is to "swing the soft vote, collar the undecideds" (Dec.18). They want to be reassured either that independence will not lead to radical change or that federalism is flexible enough to accommodate Quebec's demands for the security of its culture.
If we wish to simplify a bit, we can say the Quebec electorate is divided into three categories. Some 30 per cent are federalists, 27 per cent are sovereignists, and in between are a group of approximately 40 per cent of floating voters -- which accounts for the considerable but varying number of undecideds in most polls. (L'Actualité 15 March'95)
Social categories of the population also create targets for the Yes and No camps. The separatists tend to be in the 35-44 age range (brought up during the emotions of the Quiet Revolution), are relatively well off ($35 to $70,000 annual revenue range), and have some higher education. They are also more likely to live outside Montreal (where non-French represent 30 per cent of the urban population), and outside the Outaouais (attachment to the federal government). One poll (SOM/Createc/CROP Jan. 1995) showed 43 per cent of Montrealers ( who make up 45 per cent of the Quebec population) approve of Parizeau's sovereignty question, whereas the figures range about 10 per cent more for the rest of Quebec. Federalists tend to be younger or older (over 45), have low or quite high incomes and levels of education, and include a greater proportion of women (14 per cent more), although this latter distinction was declining in the year preceding the referendum.
The Pequistes therefore will be according more priority in their strategy to francophones living outside Montreal, who are undecided or swing supporters of sovereignty, and are male and modestly well off, while addressing the concerns of those who are nationalists but have worries about change that may be damaging. These swing nationalists generally accord little credit to the federal system and want to reduce the power of the anglophone majority while showing their displeasure over the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the refusal of all gains to Quebec after 30 years of constitutional negotiations.
Two final points on public opinion. Maurice Pinard, a McGill sociologist who studied 14 years of Quebec opinion polls, found that support for the sovereignist option goes up when Quebeckers have a reason to believe that the French culture or their sense of belonging and identity or Quebec's distinctiveness are being placed under stress by the rest of Canada. Hence the desire of federalists to keep a damper on the reactions of the rest of Canada (ROC) to PQ provocations. Pinard also found that the sovereignty option does best when it is just a general idea floating in the air, but the more it is specified, the more it comes down to earth and the sovereignist vote with it. This is why the curve of sovereignist support usually goes up at the beginning of nationalist campaigns but declines as the federalists provide more information that raises fears about the likely results of separatism. Hence also, the importance of the information battle in the referendum campaign. (Le Devoir, 11 Dec.'94)
Secondly, it will be noted that so far most references have been made to the `sovereignist' rather than to, say, the `separatist' option, which is exactly the way Mr. Parizeau would have it. Actually the word itself has become an important factor in the referendum campaign and the information battle. (see Note 1)Sovereignty is a `soft' word used to confuse people. For instance, the usual definition of federalism specifies that each order of government, the federal and provincial, is `sovereign' within its own jurisdiction. Thus, `sovereignty' can mean varying degrees of political autonomy and that is exactly why the nationalists use it rather than `independence' or `separation' (and that is why the terms will be used indifferently in this text to try to indicate a certain neutrality).
Opinion polls indicate that some 53 per cent of those who say they support sovereignty think it does not mean separating from Canada. Approximately 5 per cent more people will accept `sovereignty' rather than `independence' if both options are offered in the same poll. If the question is reversed and respondents are asked if they want to stay in Canada 59 per cent say `yes'. Even more astoundingly, a June 1994 poll by Léger and Léger found 71 per cent of sovereignists wanted to stay in the federation. This sort of confusion was confirmed again by an Actualité study (15 March `95) which discovered that while 49 per cent intended to vote for sovereignty, 78 per cent hoped to "remain Canadians in a sovereign Quebec" and that 17 per cent of those who intended to vote Oui did not believe this gave Quebec a mandate to separate.
The most imposing poll to date (SOM/Createc/CROP in January) carried out for the federalists and questioning 10,000 Quecbecers (most polls are in the 1,200 range) found that in response to Parizeau's question on sovereignty the respondents were 46 per cent in favour and 54 per cent opposed. But when asked, "Do you want Quebec to separate from Canada and become an independent country?" the gap increased to 40 per cent in favour and 60 per cent against. We can see why Parizeau has labelled his bill and the referendum question `sovereignty' - and why Chrétien has stated that this falsifies the process and may just be keeping in his hip pocket a follow-up federal referendum question on "do you want to separate from Canada?"
2b. The referendum process
The referendum process sets the conditions within which the actors develop their strategies. If a player can also create part of the rules of the game this should provide a double advantage. The total process has seven components including: the bill unilaterally declaring Quebec independent; the consultation process by the Parti Québécois government; the referendum question and its wording; the referendum and electoral laws of Quebec which set the rules for participation; the timing of the referendum; the nature of the majority required for legitimate independence; and post-referendum planning. The spending estimates of the Quebec government tabled in March placed the cost of the referendum at $70 million, exclusive of the actual campaign expenditures by the two political camps.
In December,1995, Premier Parizeau announced his boldest measure to capture the referendum process. The National Assembly would pass a sovereignty law using the PQ's majority. During several months the population would be consulted on the bill in regional commissions and would be able to fill in the blank pages to be used for a preamble announcing the basic values and objectives of the new state. The intention of the law is to have Quebec "make its own laws, raise its own taxes, and conclude its own treaties", the terms the PQ prefers in its attempt to lessen anxieties, but which in essence means to separate completely from the Canadian federation and create an independent state. Following the passage of the bill, the people of Quebec would be asked to approve it and , according to Parizeau's original plan, this would become the referendum question, "are you in favour of the Act passed by the National Assembly declaring the sovereignty of Quebec? YES OR NO."
However, this was considered by some sovereignists to be a tactically inept `hard' question which not only alienates soft nationalists but also allows the federalists to get away with a `hard' response based on the proclaimed benefits of `status quo' federalism. Immediately on his return from convalescence, Lucien Bouchard, the charismatic leader of the Bloc Québécois (BQ) opposition in Ottawa announced his desire for another type of question that would assure the people of an offer of association with the rest of Canada after independence. (Le Devoir 23 Feb.'95) A little later he went so far as to state publicly that he might not campaign for a pure sovereignty question. This was soon reinforced by PQ deputy premier, Bernard Landry who said, "Our troops don't want to be led to the slaughterhouse" when it became clear that the roving commissions had not mobilized momentum for sovereignty and nor had Bouchard's return to public life nor the PQ's fierce attack on the federal budget. (Ottawa Citizen 28 March'95) Mario Dumont, whose Parti d'action democratique claims to represent moderate nationalists, went one step further with regard to the question in insisting that it include the notion of establishing firm political ties between a sovereign Quebec and Canada. (Globe and Mail 13 April'95) By May 1995, Parizeau had acceded to all these wishes in order to create a new coalition or "partnership" with the BQ and PAD.
Thus, the final form of the question was announced in September barely two months before the proposed referendum on October 30 (Lévesque had given four months notice in 1980). The question reads: "Do you agree that Quebec becomes sovereign after having made a formel offer to Canada of a new economic and political partnership within the context of the Bill on the future of Quebec and the agreement signed on June 12,1995." Parizeau immediately claimed his question was clearer and shorter than the one posed in the 1980 referendum.
However, it did not take long for Non leaders and advertisements to hammer away that: a Yes would lead to independence regardless of the outcome of the negotiations; there would be no second referendum, so it is different from Rene Lévesque's proposition; the word `country' as in sovereign country is purposely left out and so is the text of the `partnership' in order to confuse the voters. (Le Droit, 16 Sept.'95) It is also quite possible that the uniformed voter could think the `partnership' between Canada and Quebec has already been accepted in the`agreement signed on June 12'. Earlier, Chrétien had been at pains to point out, "It's a mirage. It is still a proposition for separation, but they don't have the guts to say they are separatists." (SouthamStar Network 13 June'95) The tone of the language tells us the form of the question is considered crucial in a referendum.
The problem could well be more profound. Parizeau may have shot himself in the foot. In desperately seeking the formula for a winning question, he may have given his adversaries the means for contesting a close Yes vote. A poll for the September number of L'Actualité showed that using a question very close to the official one, 55 per cent of the respondents (after distribution of the undecideds and no answers) said they would vote Oui and 45 per cent Non. But, when the question was modified to ask, "Would you vote Yes or No for Quebec to become a sovereign state?", the same respondents reversed themselves to vote 54 per cent Non. With such a clear demonstration of the confusion in the public mind (even with a soft word like `sovereign') it is quite possible that the Federal government and the international community might say that the democratic process and outcome of a close Yes vote are not sufficiently convincing and that a clearer expression of the popular will would be required.
The content of the original draft bill on sovereignty (the Quebec government tabled a new draft law on the "future of Quebec", the one referred to in the question in September, but does not expect it to be voted on before the referendum) helps us detect the strategy -- and the worries -- of the Quebec government. It had 17 clauses, the first of which declares that Quebec is a sovereign country. In essence, the rest of the bill tries to reassure various categories of Quebecers that separation will be relatively painless, that is that there will be little change and current situations will be maintained. A new constitution will have a charter of human rights including guarantees for the English-speaking community and the Aboriginal nations. Quebec, it is maintained, will keep its present boundaries and control maritime areas. Canadian laws, permits and pensions will remain in force and courts and judges will maintain their present authority, and to carry this out, priority will be given to hiring federal public servants living in Quebec.
The bill goes on to make seven promises which will require the cooperation of other states. Economic association will be negotiated with Canada. Quebecers may jointly hold Canadian citizenship. Quebec will use the Canadian dollar, assume its part of all Canadian treaties, and conclude agreements on its part of Canada's debt and assets. It will also take steps to join the UN, the North American Free Trade Agreement, NATO, NORAD and GATT (or the World Trade Organization).
The new draft law submitted in September is very similar but somewhat longer because it includes reference to the offer of `Partnership' to be made by the government of Quebec to the government of Canada (neither entity being very certain) as well as new clauses to reassure the people of the Outaouais and to respond to the demands made during the itinerant Commissions, with regard to drafting a new constitution and the protection and development of the French language, for example.
Looking briefly now at the referendum law in Quebec (created by the Lévesque government prior to the 1980 referendum), it stipulates that all participation and funding for the referendum must be grouped under two umbrella organizations, one for the Yes and one for the No. It worked fairly successfully in the 1980 campaign, with equal moaning by both sides that the other had received undue advantage. Closely related to the referendum law is the Quebec electoral law. The fact it has been dragged into the referendum debate shows the crucial impact of process on outcome. The Liberals accuse the PQ government of having mixed motives in wanting to pass at all costs their Law 40 which amends the electoral act. While the stated reason is to create a more efficient, permanently updated, electoral list, the Liberals fear that the real goal is to use stricter enumerating procedures to keep as many as 250,000 neo-Canadians from voting in the referendum. Of course the PQ would appear to be perfectly within its rights to only want legally authorized persons on the voting lists. (Le Devoir 16 June'95)
The timing for the referendum was in doubt to the last minute, although Parizeau had always maintained it would be held in 1995. He has been under considerable pressure from the Bloc Québécois to hold the vote only when it appears the separatists can win. Again they are supported by the PQ deputy premier, Bernard Landry. There are serious nationalist forces which believe that another referendum defeat would not only be highly demoralizing but would disastrously weaken Quebec's power and credibility for negotiating constitutional change or even distinct society status with the rest of Canada. Four political scientists, reputedly of sovereignist persuasion, published an appeal to the PQ to put off the referendum stating their research indicated it was impossible for the nationalists to win. However, it would appear the internal polling done for the Yes camp during the summer indicated to them that their new three party agreement and the projected offer of economic and political `partnership' would allow them to win.
What size of majority? Although the very right of Quebec to secede from the the Canadian federation has been challenged, (Citizen 13 Sept.'94) the Parti Québécois maintains it only needs 50 per cent plus one to move ahead with separation. Party spokespersons claim this is the current practice used by 30 republics which have become independent in Eastern Europe recently and also for the countries which vote to join the European Union. The PQ also claims this practice was understood to be the basis of the 1980 referendum but Canadian governments rarely accept referenda as binding on themselves.
A poll in March `94 for the Conseil du patronat suggested that 61 per cent of Quebecers reject a simple majority as separation rule. (Canadian Press 13 March 95) There is an other problem. In real democracies, radical change in the way people are accustomed to live can only be accomplished by considerable majorities, something like two thirds. This is so in order to eliminate any situation of uncertainty which could lead to political and economic instability. For instance, a vote of 52 to 48 per cent in the referendum, for either option, could be interpreted as being an abuse of the Francophone majority or as having been manipulated by the referendum process. (Canadian Press 30 Jan.'95) The former editor of the Montreal Gazette has suggested that a wise compromise might be 50 per cent of the electors on the voting list rather than simply half of those voting. (Webster, Le Devoir, 22 Feb.'95)
The extent of the majority, which is the cream on the cake that gives legitimacy and bargaining power to the winning team, is closely linked to what will happen after the referendum. The PQ's sovereignty bill says that if half the voters (50 per cent plus one) vote Oui, then Quebec will automatically become sovereign within one year if it is perceived that the offer of partnership with Canada is not going anywhere. It will immediately start drafting a new constitution and may also negotiate the sharing of the debt and assets with the government of Canada. Although he had previously claimed he did not want to govern "a simple province", just before the election Parizeau announced his party would stay on for a full mandate even if the referendum failed. He also said he would not try to change the referendum law which forbids holding two referendums on the same subject during one legislature.
The federal government has not said what it would do if the yes won except that Chrétien has stated that even with a `yes' vote separation would be illegal and non- constitutional. Certainly there is nothing in the Canadian constitution which permits a province to separate but international law is ambiguous, supporting both the integrity of states and the right of peoples to self-determination under specific circumstances. Chrétien went on to say he has no mandate to discuss Quebec's separation. (Montreal Gazette 20 Dec.'94) With whom would Quebec negotiate? Who would represent the rest of Canada? This is a terrible quandary which could seriously hamper the PQ's one year timetable.
A report in early 1995 by Patrick Monahan for the C.D. Howe Institute (Cooler Heads Shall Prevail) pointed out that the triple problem of a weak majority, no viable spokesperson for Canada, and rival jurisdictional claims could lead to a period of terrible rivalry and instability. On the other hand, the political scientist Robert Young (The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada) believes there would be a deal quite quickly and that rationality would be enforced by the market place and mutual intersts. An American law firm hired by the Quebec government reported there should be no rupture in economic relations with the United States.
Whether the vote be for or against Quebec's separation it is clear there will be a number of very unhappy people. There is a likelihood of ethnic bitterness, and the possibility of economic decline as well as of jurisdictional disputes. The problem is that neither Quebec nor Ottawa can publicly discuss its plans for such contingencies for fear of giving credibility to its opponents. And yet for the Canadian society to proceed blindly without any wise analysis of post-referendum scenarios is highly dangerous. It is like driving along a cliff without a functioning steering wheel. The point here is simply that these potential difficulties would be heightened by an unclear question and/or a slim majority that could be challenged.
2c. Comments on the process
The PQ has claimed that their referendum process is thoroughly democratic. Their sovereignty law, they claim, lays out for all to see the type of independence they are proposing along with the process they will follow both internally and externally should they succeed. In addition, they have allowed for a consultation process with full possibility for public participation. Indeed, while most participants in the travelling commissions claimed they were sovereignists, to almost everyone's astonishment, the democratic, fragmented hearings discussed almost everything but sovereignty. Parizeau had called his plan "astute" but, once given its head, the public did just what it wanted.
His opponents point out that astute means not only shrewd but also tricky. They claim the unilateral declaration of sovereignty is unconstitutional and the whole process is deceitful, a scheme to bamboozle Quebecers. The draft law, they say, proposes an unrealistic image of sovereignty and relations with neighbouring states. Once passed by the PQ's automatic majority in the National Assembly, it drapes independence in a pseudo-official mantle. The proposed `Partnership', the federalists say, is inapplicable between two foreign countries. It is pure illusion. The question is intended to cleverly mask Parizeau's true intention which is to separate definitively and irreversibly from Canada. (Le Droit, 15 Sept.'95)
Because the consultation was limited to the draft law on sovereignty and most commissioners would be sovereignists, the Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ) saw it as locking out effective federalist participation and refused to participate in what it considered to be a charade. They likened the consultation to a series of local PQ conventions_at $5 million of tax- payers' expense. They act as a one-sided trial run for the referendum with the government mailing out all the Yes side's publicity for it. This has become a standard criticism of the PQ's tactics -- that they have used millions of taxpayer's dollars to distribute what amounts to separatist dogma under the guise of government documentation, prior to the legal referendum campaign limits. The PQ will respond that it is only to balance the external funding of the federal government which has the constitutional right to spend where it will.
When all the rhetoric is set aside, the nationalists have clearly tried to use the referendum process to maximize their strategic advantages. Although it does not appear to have succeeded, it aimed to create a sense of momentum and to develop a wave of emotion and commitment which had been missing. The sovereignty declaration was calculated to provoke angry ROC reaction by "waving a red flag at the English bull."
Even so the draft law does hold the PQ's plans up for criticism and effectively opens them to federalist attack. The process and the question are so `astute' that an impartial international community may decide they do not represent a fair democratic test of Quebec opinions about independent status. Or, as one journalist has written, if Quebecers reject sovereignty after all this priming it will mean they really do not want it. Therefore, further efforts by separatists would be wholly illegitimate. In other words, the process is a two edged sword and to the degree it is not perceived to be fair and even- handed, it can be used by either side to reject the results.
2d. The role of the media and opinion polls
Everyone from every side in the debate will be criticizing the biases in the coverage of the referendum by press, radio and TV. We should all be vigilantly protecting against media bias and calling them to task when there is. And there will be. It is well known there are federalist leaning and pro- sovereignty media and journalists. Parizeau has already gotten his party to pass a resolution calling for an inquiry into media ownership concentration, particularly the 10 daily newspapers owned by three businesses which Parizeau accuses of federalist bias. On the other hand, the federalists do not appreciate the outspoken nationalism of Le Devoir or what they perceive to be the sovereignist slant of the journalists in Radio Canada or Radio Quebec, or the fact the PQ has multiplied ten fold the government's advertizing in Quebec's weeklies. (Citizen 29 May'95)
But if we can judge by the past, the bias will be relatively minimal and it will tend to balance itself out. That is to say, there are myriad, often contradictory, pressures within each type of media (journalists, editors, advertisers and owners). In addition, various writers, newspapers, magazines and radio and TV programmes have their own particular orientation. Thus, viewed as a whole, the multiple sources of information, the journalists' professionalism, and the scepticism of the consumer will tend to equalize the media's overall impact on the referendum. Secondly, although most people will not believe this, on the whole the media will provide us with more information in more different ways than most of us can pay attention to or absorb.
There is, however, another side of the story. In Canada, analysts have clearly shown the media have four sorts of collective failures when dealing with specific political issues. The media: 1)spread a sense of negativism by always being hypercritical; 2) confuse sensationalism with newsworthiness; 3)project and reinforce standardized images (even stereotypes) of individuals and groups; and 4) especially on radio and TV (from which 60-70 per cent of people now say they get their news), provide very brief, simplistic and incomplete information. This is how the media effects the process. As McLuhan told us, "The medium is the message." So it is especially these four misrepresentations that the players must try to counteract.
Opinion polls too can be said to effect the process. While there does not seem to be any clear body of proof that they systematically push opinion in one direction or the other, they do have certain perverse impacts that must be recognized. First, many people over-estimate the significance of opinion polls, not realizing they are only a snapshot of opinion at one point in time that often reflects current news, events and opinion leaders. When that point in time is well before the event, people are making hypothetical choices without hearing the final arguments or being aware of all of the facts or responding to the mobilization efforts of the players. Nor have they been confronted with the necessity of arriving at a final, irrevocable choice. So, opinions change over time and polls must not be taken literally.
The polls are only as good as their questions and the interpretations which individual pollsters give to the answers. Some polling houses and their sponsors have a distinct political leaning and give their questions a particular twist. While it has not been entirely proven that polls can create a bandwagon effect, it is clear they can have a very demoralizing effect on the camp which is lagging behind and an over-confidence effect on the campaign which is ahead. (La presse canadienne, 18 Feb.'95) The extraordinary triumphalism of the federalists and the fragmentation of the sovereignist camp by the February CROP- Environics-Radio Canada poll (which indicated that public opinion did not seem to have shifted very much from the 60-40 sovereignty defeat in 1980) is a prime example of this phenomenon.
Political scientists offer the following warnings (Cobb, Citizen, 9 Sept.'95):
- pollsters have generally over-estimated separatist support;
- more voters are refusing to take part in polls. With as many as 40 per cent refusing to participate it is difficult to get a good reading of the state of opinion;
- background questions such as how proud Quebeckers feel to be Canadians may be more revealing than intentions of voting;
- newspapers should accurately report the questions asked, sample size, margin of error, the response rate, and the number of undecideds.
2e. The battle of ideas
The most important battle of the referendum will be for the minds and spirits of the Quebec voters. The main weapons are ideas which can be divided into two categories: facts (i.e. various sorts of information) and images, including attitudes and beliefs. (Jackson and Jackson, chap.3) While scholars can go into great depth on the distinctions between the various categories, we must satisfy ourselves with saying that information tends to have a more undebatable factual base to it; images are based on our values, that is feelings about whether people or things are good or bad, liked or disliked, trustworthy or not, valuable or not. Images can be formed on a more day-to- day basis whereas attitudes are more firmly anchored in our community and our believes express relatively stable values. Because the referendum battle is over a hypothetical situation (whether or not Quebec should be independent) and because the facts are so complex that they are open to debate (the costs and benefits of sovereignty) and because nationalist emotions are involved, most of the strategies are aimed toward influencing popular images.
Federalists want to provide facts about the high cost of separation and the dangers of instability and ethnic conflict while nationalists wish to muddy them. (Council for Canadian Unity) The federalists want to force the PQ into defending the need and utility of an independent state. The roles are reversed with regard to the costs of federalism such as duplication of programmes and invasion of provincial jurisdictions. The federalists particularly want to get across the fact the referendum really is about separation from Canada and not about such soft concepts as sovereignty or association. (Citizen 13 June `95)
The nationalists want to give credibility to the idea that ROC will never recognize Quebec's distinctiveness. This is why the Bloc welcomed the candidature of Ann Meggs, a former federal constitutionalist, in the by-election in Westmount- St.Henri because she spreads this very idea. (Citizen 7 May'95) The separatists also want to dredge up facts about the unworkability of federalism and its supposed harms to Quebec as can be clearly seen in the new draft preamble to an eventual Quebec constitution.
The nationalists are trying to get across such images as peaceful, easy separation and the inevitability of Quebec becoming a "normal" nation-state. The federalists, for their part, have produced the response that no, Canada is not a normal country, it is an exceptional one.
One idea dominated nationalist image making strategy during 1995. As we have seen, half the draft law on sovereignty is aimed at reassuring the fearful nationalists that life would go along normally in a sovereign Quebec -- just like before, including Canadian citizenship. When PQ advisor, Pierre Bourgault warned of a "dangerous situation" if anglophone votes blocked the will of a French majority for independence, he was immediately sacked by the party because his threat of ethnic conflict went against the desired image of a peaceful referendum.
There is something very ironical here. The nationalists want to project an image that sovereignty is just business as usual so they try to be very low key in their Quebec campaigning while hoping that brutal reactions from the rest of Canada will carry out the second half of their image strategy by whipping up nationalist fervour. The federalists, on the other hand, want to give the impression of business as usual in Ottawa and respectful tranquillity from ROC while at the same time predicting separatism as the end of the world in their Quebec campaigning.
The weakest point for the federalists is the slogan of the nationalists that "a vote for the Non is a vote for the status quo". The Liberals are trying to reverse this image problem by projecting the concept of `flexible federalism' that can and has adjusted Canada to many redefinitions without resorting to constitutional amendments. (Johnson) Slowly being added to this theme is an updating of the age old Canadian political maxim of Mackenzie King, "Constitutional change if necessary but not necessarily constitutional change". Chrétien now says at the end of his press conferences that if some of the changes to federal processes need to be constitutionalized then so be it. Obviously, this will only be in response to a ground swell of public demand. Nevertheless, their is a nervousness within the federalist camp that the more the sovereignists turn toward a `soft' question that appears to attract wavering nationalists and the undecided, the more the federalists will have to come up with a strategy which assures some accommodation of Quebec's desires following a Non vote. (Maclean's 24 April'95)
The two main difficulties for the nationalists are dealing with the potential costs of separation and explaining why it would be a benefit. They tried to reverse the process of the last referendum by getting the rational problems about financial scares out of the way at the beginning of the referendum debate. Then they can stir up nationalist emotions at the end by stressing the arguments of becoming a majority, controlling the only French jurisdiction in North America, and now or never, we are capable of being independent. (Bernard St. Laurent, The House, CBC 25 March'95) The Montreal Commission on the Future of Quebec unanimously recommended in its report that the the draft law on sovereignty should include a vision of the major values of an independent Quebec (a 'projet de société') that would answer the question "What use is it to modify Quebec's political status if nothing is going to change?" (Le Devoir 17 March `95) This the Quebec government has tried to do in its draft constitutional preamble. The problem is, the more the nationalists are explicit the more they are open to divisions and attacks. The more they propose radical change, the more they can lose the weak-of- heart.
Because the issues in the campaign are closely related to the battle of ideas and because they are described throughout other portions of the text, there is no need for a separate section. Many of the key issues are noted in Figure I.
3. MAPPING THE STRATEGIES
3a. The nationalist strategy
At the outset of any campaign, the nationalists have a number of advantages. Their attention has been focused on just one issue with single-minded concentration; as a combined mass party and social movement they have momentum; many of their members are true believers who give unstintingly of their time and effort. Knowing that these very trump cards can turn against him later in the game, Parizeau aimed from the outset: to strike an image of calm, non-confrontational rationality; develop an attitude of inevitableness through rapid, non-stop action; attract allies from like-minded groups to try and demonstrate Quebec consensus rather than the PQ being isolated extremists; and to put his legions immediately to work mobilizing nationalists to participate in the consultation commissions and organize the campaign so as to have the jump on the Liberals. To avoid what he considered to be the traps of the last referendum, Parizeau wanted to move early while he still had a honeymoon with the population and he wanted to offer a clear choice to avoid accusations of duplicity.
The PQ's overall goal is to win a majority of votes in an eventual referendum by: reinforcing, stimulating, reassuring, consolidating and capturing all the potential nationalist supporters. At the same time they will denigrate federalism and try to goad the rest of Canadians into anti-Quebec statements or actions. While the primary goal is independence, a secondary, long term aim of the nationalists is to achieve greater equality, a one- on-one position between French and English in renewed institutions with the rest of Canada. This second goal is as fundamental to nationalists as the idea of separation.
The nationalists want, first of all, to reinforce and stimulate their hardcore support by taking rapid action (the law, consultation), by gaining in the polls, winning victories (visits to Paris), and by giving opportunities for participation and the development of emotions (fill in the blank pages), and by attacking the federalists at every opportunity (St Jean Military College, costs of the Charlottetown referendum, duplication of services).
Second, Parizeau and Bouchard aim to consolidate wayward and wavering nationalists such as former Conservative leaders (Masse, Vezina, Lasalle) by welcoming them with high profile positions in the commissions, which also helps to show `non- partisan' consensus, while at the same time attempting to side-line such `loose canons' as Pierre Bourgault and Guy Bertrand.
Third, the Quebec government desperately wants to reassure `soft nationalists' who fear sovereignty may threaten their standard of living. Sovereignty is to be portrayed as normal and natural. Independence will hopefully be supported by politicians and business in France. Americans hopefully will not oppose it and will accept Quebec into NAFTA and other treaties. Landry and Parizeau have given these reassurances on every possible occasion. They are also included in the draft law on sovereignty which, as we have seen, gives the impression of guaranteeing rights, pensions, stable laws, and economic association in order to suspend all fears. Studies on `restructuring' are being carried out by the Minister Le Hir, a former leader of the Manufacturer's Association, a personality who, along with Finance Minister Campeau is meant to reassure the business community. The campaign will be carried out in a steady, non- confrontational manner to attract presumably neutral community leaders like Antoine Gregoire in the Outouais, again to demonstrate consensus.
Fourth, attempts are being made to capture Liberal nationalist swing voters like the Quebec City mayor L'Allier by offering them the political lime light and by consenting to certain non-constraining conditions proposed by Mario Dumont whose Parti d'action democratique appears to be growing in strength. Aside from the reassurances mentioned above, the PQ wants to appear reasonable on process and tactics while giving special attention to themes of interest to youth, women, and the elderly so as to coopt any potential opposition.
Discrediting federalism and federalist leaders also helps to reinforce nationalist base support. Aside from refusing to participate in federal activities (which will eventually backfire), the Parti Québécois grasps all potential contentious issues while in Ottawa, according to its party programme, the Bloc Québécois, will do all in its power to show federalism and the central government in a bad light. (Bouchard)
The nationalists will tell Quebecers that their differences with the rest of Canada are irreconcilable. They will tell them the patriation and reform of the constitution in 1982 without the consent of Quebec represented a rupture of the Canadian social contract by `English Canada'. (Parizeau) They will remind them that even after that when Quebec nationalists joined with Mulroney in the "beau risque" of the Meech Lake Accord it failed as did the attempt at constitutional reform in the Charlottetown Accord. They will say that English nationalists preferred provincial equality to recognizing the distinctiveness of Quebec. And they will recall the high degree of assimilation rates by the French outside of Quebec and the humiliation of being a minority. Imitating their great successes during the constitutional referendum and the Quebec election, the PQ will use leaked documents and personal attacks to besmirch the reputations of Francophone defenders of federalism. Chrétien will be their prime target. (Le Droit, 21 Aug.'95)
In an attempt to stiffen the resolve of nationalists, the PQ also intends to make gestures that will exploit anti- Quebec sentiments in ROC so as to illicit insults and treats against Quebec and French Canadians. As Parizeau said in December in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, "Get me half a dozen Ontariens who put their feet to the Quebec flag and I've got it."
When it was discovered in the early spring of 1995 that this strategy was still not having its desired effects, an open debate took place between the hardliners led by Parizeau and the moderates led by Bouchard. Both have the same objective of independent statehood but differ over the best tactics. Once the smoke had cleared, Bouchard had won and had become the popular figurehead for the sovereignists, while Dumont has formally joined the separatist camp. The referendum question will specify that the rest of Canada will have a year to negotiate a partnership with Quebec, including a co-equal council of ministers, a delegated parliament, and a tribunal to handle trade disputes, all modeled somewhat on the European Union. (Citizen 10 June'95)
The final element of the nationalist's strategy is an immense effort in the field of organization and mobilization. The Parti Québécois and Bloc Québécois organizations have been fused together in all the regions and regional delegates have been named to coordinate the local activities. Their particular task is to recruit local leaders and organizations. A great deal of emphasis is being placed on using the superior numbers of committed nationalist workers to do door to door campaigning and coffee groups to try to win over the undecided. (Le Droit, 16 Sept.'95) The regional commissions were also intended to "out flank" critical media and business groups. Government grants are also being put to good use, for instance, $1 million to bolster community media and $1.4 million and access to Quebec government services to help neutralize the usual opposition of the Francophones outside Quebec.
The second string to the organizational bow is the `Partners' group which was the beginning of the `yes' structure. It includes the three largest federations of unions, the associations for college and university students, the Quebec public service union, several other unions, Rural Solidarity, and the Saint Jean Baptiste Society of Montreal. It is being coordinated by the Mouvement National des Québécois. The `Partners' will look after popular mobilization and the government will handle the referendum process, while the PQ and the BQ sees to the promotion of sovereignty and riding by riding organization. The month of May saw the founding of the Sovereignty Council of Quebec by Yves Duhaime, a former PQ finance minister. It is to replicate the role the Council for Canadian Unity plays for the federalist side, principally in acting as a conduit for money and for advertising and promotion in the private sector. (Le Devoir 16 June'95)
3b. The federalist strategy
Almost all of the nationalist's initial advantages were early deficits for the federalist forces. Rather than attacking, they must defend existing institutions. They have to respond to sovereignist initiatives and organize from scratch. At the same time as they work to keep Quebec, the federalists must also assure their proposals are acceptable to the rest of Canada. And during it all they must govern effectively for the whole country and to maintain international confidence.
Perhaps this is the reason the federalist's attempts to produce a cohesive strategy have been called, `laborious' and `distressingly vague'. Even now no official strategy has been publicly announced so we must do a little divining.
The federalist forces will be led by Daniel Johnson and his Quebec Liberal Party(PLQ) and will include Jean Chrétien's Liberal Party of Canada(LPC), Jean Charest's Progressive Conservative Party (PC), the Council for Canadian Unity (CCU), all of which, along with others, will eventually be grouped under the Committee for the `Non'. Most of the early part of the debate appears to have been masterminded from Ottawa.
Their aims and targets are similar but opposite to those of the nationalists. They want to get a majority of Quebecers to vote No to Parizeau's sovereignty proposal while at the same time maintaining the good favour of Canadian and international public opinion. In fact, they want to get the largest possible No vote in order to pull the teeth of the separatist dragon and let Canada get on with its normal evolution. The targets include reinforcing core federalists, keeping the Liberal nationalists in the fold, going after the `butterflies' (the swing voters who like but are afraid of sovereignty) and not alienating other Canadians and thoduce a cohesive strategy have been called, `laborious' and `distressingly vague'. Even now no official strategy has been e business community.
The addendum (maintaining Canadian and international favour) to the federalist's main goal limits their arguments and tactics. The federalists cannot afford to be single-minded. But this is only the obvious weakness. Like the nationalists, the federalists have fallen into the trap of draining all their energy into `winning the referendum'. Little, or at least insufficient, effort is invested in imagining and selling a federal Canada that will attract non-separatist nationalists as well as other disgruntled Canadians.
As far as we can see at the present the essential federalist strategy is: to stay calm and not rise to the separatist's bait; to put `the burden of proof' on the sovereignists by attacking their vision of a separate state; to show that `flexible federalism' can respond to Quebecers' needs without necessarily requiring constitutional change; to govern well in order to reinforce core federalists; and to tag nationalist sovereignty as an out-of-date policy of another generation.
First of all, federalist leaders are encouraging all and sundry, especially premiers and other leading ROC spokespersons to make measured, moderate responses to provocations from the Pequists. (Morton, Citizen, 27 July `94) The federalists seem to be heeding Charles Taylor's warning that Canada has been like a marriage of neurotics in which English and French unconsciously create fear in each other, thereby setting up a never ending cycle of mutual aggressiveness because each spouse feels hurt and rejected. So far, keeping calm and not offering a target appears to be working. With no visible adversaries and little media resonance, it is very difficult for the PQ to make a one- sided war of words.
At the same time, this tactic of silence puts media focus on nationalist errors and divisions while also allowing the federalists to occasionaly go on the attack. Chrétien accuses the PQ of "contempt for democracy" because of its cynical, misleading question about economic and political association. He said the separatists' plan is clear_make unrealistic offers of association to the rest of Canada and when "their proposals are criticized as unworkable, they will say the rest of Canada has rejected Quebec" . He then goes on to say the Parti Québécois government, by insisting on its separatist agenda, is "ignoring the impoverishment of its citizens" which, at 17.6 per cent, is the highest provincial level. (Citizen 1 & 4 May'95) Parizeau responded like a gored bull saying Chrétien was in effect a traitor, an Uncle Tom carrying out the anglophones dirty work -- which only helped to destroy his attempt to show cool rationality. (Globe and Mail 5 May'95)
Second, the shape of the attack on the Pequistes' sovereignty scenario has as its general objective to put the `burden of proof' of separatism squarely on the backs of the nationalists. The nature of the tactic can be seen in a publication of the Council for Canadian Unity, called `31 Arguments in Favour of Canada' which outlines federalist arguments.
It claims the Quebec territory and coastal waters are not integral and can be contested by regionally based minorities or native populations and must be constitutionally approved by Canada as well as Quebec. Secession will inevitably have very high costs for Quebec when one considers: the addition of Quebec's portion of the federal debt to its present deficit; the effect of political instability which will reduce investment and increase unemployment; a necessary reduction in health and welfare programmes; the loss of equalization and other transfer payments; and the fact Quebec is more dependent on interprovincial trade than any other province.
Third, the federalists want to demonstrate conclusively that the federal system is capable of reforming itself in directions which would attract many of the Quebec nationalist swing voters. The aim is to demonstrate that the charge of `status quo' is nonsense because Canada and federalism are in constant evolution.(Le Droit, 18 Feb.'95) Ottawa's `Programme Review' is aimed not only at budget cutting but also at being in tune with public opinion by rationalizing programmes or handing over to the private sector and the provinces those which can be better run by them. The `Government Renewal' exercise aimed to eliminate duplication and overlap with the provincial governments and has managed to sign 60 deals with them in the first year to reduce waste and prove Canada works.
International comparisons will be made to show Canada is already one of the two most decentralized countries in the world and that federations, by their very nature, evolve much more flexibly than unitary states. To make this point hit home and, in effect, to cut the grass out from under the separatists' feet, the federal 1995 budget moved Ottawa almost completely out of provincial jurisdictions in health and social programmes and post- secondary education -- one of Quebec's traditional bones of contention about domination by the majority. The policy also gives the appearance of fitting in with deficit cutting and efficient governance.
Even so, Daniel Johnson has clearly recognized the danger of being tagged with the negative image of the status quo. A PLQ party commission was set up to outline general directions for constitutional change but it will not report until after the referendum. Even Johnson's timid attempts to outline such traditional Liberal principles as recognition of Quebec as a distinct society and its right to a veto received little resonance in Ottawa. (Le Droit, 16 Aug.'95) However, he appears to agree with Chrétien that they must not be taken in the trap of specific promises of constitutional reform which would allow their opponents to mock them with Trudeau's unfulfilled promises following the 1980 referendum. Although the federalists cannot make improbable constitutional promises which would implicitly suggest the status quo is indiffensible, they could develop ideas for the improved management and coordination of the federal system via political accords, administrative agreements, a real common market, and techniques for dialogue and arbitrating disputes. (Adam, La Presse, 23 June `95)
Still, the nationalists' insistence on denigrating the concept of the "status quo" may backfire. Forced into the corner, the federalists are finding that the achievements of Canada are not such a bad record to have to defend. A writer from the magazine L'Actualité pointed out that Canada is the only place in the world where the French culture has actually expanded since the Second World War. (Chartrand, L'Actualité, 15 Sept.'94, p.6) Another commentator in the Ottawa Citizen has noted that in 1960, when Quebec started asking for a greater share of the income tax, the provinces only received five per cent of it. Today they pull in almost 40 per cent. Other government transfers have doubled since 1961. (MacQueen, Citizen, 2 Feb.'95) Quebec is the only province to administer its pension plan and student loan programme. In an article in the March issue of Canadian Business Economics, two Calgary economists say Quebec has been the biggest net winner from confederation during the past 30 years, receiving $168 million more in federal spending than it contributed while Alberta paid $139 billion more than it got back.
The federalist goal is to show that saying No to sovereignty is in fact a positive act of saying Yes to Canada. Quebec in Canada was quite capable of declaring French its only official language in 1974 and Quebec spends 34 per cent of federal immigration funds but only has to handle 19 per cent of the immigrants. The former Commissioner of Official Languages, D'Iberville Fortier, recalls that flexible federalism made possible the Quebec Pension Plan with its Caisse de depots et de placements, one of the key levers of the modern Quebec economy; it also lent considerable support to francophone and Acadian communities and to the international cooperation of the Canadian and Quebec governments in the creation of La Francophonie. (Le Devoir 15 March `95) In a new book, Claude Ryan claims the Canadian constitution and Charter of Rights work well for Quebecers and there is far less overlap in governmental services than nationalists claim. (Canadian Press, 30 May'95) It appears some federalists have decided to make Quebec's achievements within federalism one of their main referendum weapons. If the referendum can be won on the basis of things as they are it does not bode well for much needed changes.
A fourth objective is to simply manage the economy and govern well and attempt to show Canadians they have one of the best countries in the world. (Masse, Le Droit, 18 Feb.'95) The Prime Minister stresses financial management and compares his government's efforts to bring in $10 billion of contracts from Asia and Latin America while Parizeau was in Paris chasing symbolic recognition from France. Such tactics produced majority support for Chrétien in Quebec polls by the beginning of 1995.
Fifth, because a good portion of young Québécois are less concerned than their elders about identity and more concerned about jobs, the federalists can be expected to emphasize the advanced years of the Pequistes and both the harms that ethnic nationalism is causing throughout the world and the degree it is out-of-step with the frontier eradication trends of economic globalization. In Quebec, the Group of 100 young business, professional and academic personnel (more like 400 at the start of the referendum campaign) stressed that conditions in the province were no longer what they were in the 1960s when the current wave of nationalism got its impetus. How can the outside world take Quebec secession seriously from a democratic country where the prime minister is French, the new Governor General is French and he is sworn in by a French Supreme Court judge?
As regards leadership and organization, while the federalists are somewhat behind the nationalists, a lot more has been going on behind the scenes than meets the eye. Chrétien's handlers have cloaked him in the mantle of a practical, international statesman which appears to be playing well in Quebec. Jean Charest, who is second in popularity to Lucien Bouchard, will be brought out to be his rival.
For those who have been wondering, "what the hell Chrétien has been doing" it is safe to assume that some fine hand has been guiding federal preparations. It is almost as though a game of chess was being plotted with the first step to place all one's pawns on the board. The new Governor General, Romeo LeBlanc, symbolizes the achievements of the Acadian people who do not even have the benefit of governing their own province. Aside from being confronted by the young and dynamic Daniel Johnson, Parizeau is also challenged by head of the Liberal referendum committee, Michel Belanger, another economist who has been successful in both the public and private sectors. As a result of the strategically called by-elections (which were planned to steal the thunder from Parizeau's travelling commissions), the federal Liberal's now have three more Francophones in their caucus, including Lucienne Robillard (new federal Minister of Labour and Responsible for the Referendum) to seek the women's vote against a nationalist team notably lacking in effective female leadership.
Planning and programming has been going on in the Quebec Liberal Party, the `Non' coordinating committee , and the Council for Canadian Unity, with the cooperation of the Prime Minister's office in Ottawa and the Privy Council Office where a budget of $6 million and a team of 40 persons has been built since the Quebec election. (Maclean's 27 Feb.'95)
The QLP and the embryonic `no' committee have been recruiting a team in each Quebec riding and arranging for training sessions, fund raising and the ad campaign. The aim, it was reported, was be totally ready by late March. Although not a party of full-time activists, it is a party which adores mobilizing for a good political fight. The promotional and organizational activities have been handed over to the `private sector', in the form of the Montreal-based Council for Canadian Unity. It too has about 40 full-time and contractual employees and a budget of $6 million, half of it from corporate donations. The CCU is responsible for coordinating the private sector and funnelling money to collaborative groups such as Generation 18- 35, Young Quebecers for Canada, which it created last summer to recruit young federalists. It has also published a book of federalist arguments and prepares people to participate in public forums such as the Commissions on the Future of Quebec.
The weaknesses that can be seen are of three sorts. First, there is a potential division between Quebec and Ottawa federalists on how to reassure voters about future structural change in Canada. Flexible federalism' does not fully respond to the challenge of the `status quo'. Secondly, while Johnson has demonstrated his capacity for authoritative management of a corporation, a government and a party, he has not yet shown a talent for mobilizing a movement. One has the impression the federalists still think the referendum is like fighting an ordinary election campaign with out sufficiently recognizing the need to prepare and excite their troops. (Le Droit, 16 Sept.'95) There have been no alternatives to Parizeau's travelling commissions, no rallying cries to the federalist forces. Thirdly, as several editorialists have pointed out, Chrétien's dislike and disdain for Quebec nationalists and especially separatists still shows through on occasion and distracts from the statesman-like image he is trying to project.
4. OTHER INFLUENCES ON THE REFERENDUM
Among the influences on the referendum other than those of the two major adversaries, the most important are the impact: of the international community, of the rest of Canada, of the rest of Quebec including the native peoples, and of a last catch all category we can call `the unexpected'. While each of these could have a determining influence, normally it is one that is filtered through the actual players in the referendum. Here we can only provide a short, summary review in order to highlight their potential significance.
4a. The International Impact
Both sides in the referendum recognize the strong effect of the international milieux's actual and potential reactions to Quebec's possible secession from Canada. Just the threat of the referendum is sufficient to create uncertainty, retard investment, inflate the costs of borrowing money, and drive down the value of the Canadian dollar. Therefore both the nationalists and the federalists are seeking ways to shape and to use outside pressures. The main targets of their hopes and worries are the United States, France and the international financial markets, but consideration is also given to the European Union, Mexico, the United Nations and, indeed the indirect effects of economic globalization.
Also, the demonstration effect of other cases of separation or unity serve as examples to which the two combatants like to refer. The federalists point to the uniting of Europe on the one hand and the costly ethnic divorces in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka on the other. Nationalists like to remember Norway and Sweden's `peaceful' divorce and stress the greater national control of European institutions and the`velvet separation' which occurred in Czechoslovakia. Their case, however was not improved by President Lech Walesa of Poland standing beside Jean Chrétien and saying, "The world is uniting not dividing. Canada should stay free and united." (La Presse, 15 Sept.'94) Nor has it been aided by recent analysis of the decline in Slovakia's economy or the authoritarianism of its government.
The official American position, as expressed by Ambassador James Blanchard and President Clinton during the president's February 1995 visit to Ottawa, is that Washington enjoys excellent relations with a united Canada, but Canada's future is for Canadians to decide. However, they subtly echo Chrétien in emphasizing the jobs and investment that are generated by their trade with Canada. "To say most Americans feel very lucky to have lived next door to a country like Canada, which they do, one could argue is a strong, subtle message, but it is what we see as true" says Blanchard. (Citizen, 16 Feb.'95)
The Americans do not want to get mixed up in the referendum so, if Clinton met with Bouchard he also met with Manning and refused any photo opportunities. Nevertheless, he also continued the American policy of obliquely favouring federalism by quoting from President Truman's visit to Canada in 1947, "Canada's notable achievement of national unity and progress through accommodation, moderation and forbearance can be studied with profit by sister nations."
Clinton then stepped somewhat out of the American tradition by adding in his House of Commons speech, "In a world darkened by ethnic conflicts that literally tear nations apart, Canada has stood for all of us as a model of how people of different cultures can live and work together in peace, prosperity and respect." Later, in a toast at a gala Clinton responded to General de Gaulle with, "Long live Canada_Vive le Canada."
The American government watches Canadian politics very closely and with considerable understanding. (Lemco) In general, it is understood they wish to avoid the instability and complications of separation. But, their foreign policy style is not to have a preconceived position on the possibility of secession although they are likely to react very rapidly. For its part, Quebec works hard to get the American administration at least to remain impartial until after the referendum then to open their doors to the newly sovereign state. (La Presse, 8 Aug.'95) Its counsellor in New York, Anne Legare, hired three prominent lobby firms in Washington at a cost of $375,000 to mount an educational campaign to counter negative publicity about Quebec. (Ottawa Sun 11 May'95)
Parizeau's red carpet visit to France netted him implicit promises to rapidly recognize an independent Quebec from Prime Minister Balladur, presidential candidate (now President) Jacques Chirac, and speaker of the National Assembly, Edgar Faure. However, France's foreign policy position is limited: by its membership in the European Union; its own constitution which forbids a referendum on secession by any part of the French territory; the precedent it would set for French overseas territories; and the friendships Canada's aid programmes have built up with other countries in the Francophonie community. However, the French people, to the degree they pay attention to Canadian affairs, appear to be spontaneously and sentimentally sympathetic to Quebec's independence. But, life is complicated. At the G7 conference in Halifax in June 1995, Ovide Mercredi, Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, asked of President Chirac whether he would also recognize the right of Canada's native peoples to self-determination? (Le Devoir 16 June'95)
Another thorny problem is the issue of an independent Quebec being admitted into the North American Free Trade Agreement, free trade now being central to Quebec's access to the continent's markets. Quebec's Minister of International Affairs originally tried to convince his troops that the province would automatically adhere to all of Canada's treaties as a `successor' state. Later he was obliged to admit that this may not always be the case for breakaway states and that in the case of NAFTA, as the Mexican and American ambassadors had warned, Quebec's admission could be complex and long_or in Chrétien's words, Quebec might have to "line up behind Chile and others". (Le Devoir 26 Jan.'95)
The last and perhaps the most formidable battle ground is the international financial market, consisting of bond rating services, stock market investment trends, exchange rate speculators (or `terrorists'as they have been called), and consequent interest rate reactions. In the short run both Quebec and Ottawa have to keep a weather eye on what they say or do, so as not to upset the money people. The point was clearly made by the momentary panic caused by Finance Minister Jean Campeau hinting that Quebec might not pay its share of Canada's national debt. In the long term, the nationalists are desperate to convince the swing voters that Quebec will not lose investments and markets, and that people will not lose jobs and pensions. Ironically, such dependence on financial markets could even force a cash-strapped independent Quebec seeking entrance to NAFTA to abandon its `statist' policies which are the emblem of social solidarity that so many sovereignists desire.(Blohm, Globe & Mail, 9 Aug.'94).
4b. Quebec's Native Peoples
Although the native peoples number only 60,000 out of a total Quebec population of over seven million, they offer a considerable threat to sovereignist aspirations. People in Ottawa have taken to calling Matthew Coon-Come, Grand Chief of the Cree, "the spoiler" because of his outbursts in Washington against the "racist" Quebec nation. However, in reality, Ottawa and Quebec are very similar in their dealings with the natives.
The aboriginals of Quebec are divided into 10 nations and 41 communities including the Cree, Mohawk, Huron and Montagnais and Attikamek, in addition to the Inuit from Ungava and the Innu from Labrador. The tone of their response to the referendum process differs according to whether they are French or English- speaking and whether or not they are about to enter into negotiations with the Quebec government.(Michel Venne, Le Devoir, 14 Dec.'95) Parizeau's main strategy originally was to be able to brandish at least one or two agreements with specific native communities such as the francophone Montagnais or the Huron, prior to the referendum. He was therefore accused of wanting to divide and conquer as he used the high-low tactics of offering ownership of property while David Cliche (his parliamentary assistant for native affairs) threatened that if the Indians did not accept Parizeau's offers, other states, tired of native demands, would support Quebec and isolate the natives in their own backyard.(Globe & Mail,16 Oct.'94) However, after the refusal of Quebec's offer of territory, payments and self- government by several bands, Cliche announced it was unlikely there would be any general agreements before the referendum. The Indians were wary about the extinguishment of their ancestral claims and their links with Ottawa while the Quebec government was having difficulty getting non-natives to accept co-management of resources and bringing natives to agree to pay for their services once they had their autonomy. (Le Devoir 10 May'95)
The main inconvenience of native intervention is with regard to American, European, and international public opinion upon which an independent Quebec would have to count for diplomatic recognition. When Coon-Come goes to the United States to proclaim: that "The nationalism of Quebec separatists is an ethnic nationalism founded on race and language" while accusing Parizeau of racist attitudes against the Cree; that his people are averse to exchanging federalism with its balance of powers against "a precarious relationship with a unitary state"; and that if separatists give themselves rights of territorial integrity and of secession but refuse the same rights to the natives, then this represents a "racist double-standard"; all this cannot but have a very harmful impact on long term attitudes toward Quebec. (Le Devoir 18 Nov.'94).
Although Quebecers justifiably claim their arrangements with natives are better than in other provinces and that the PQ's offers of land ownership go beyond what the federal government is prepared to put on the table, still the aboriginals are not very disposed to listen. They were particularly angry with Article 4 of the original draft law which declared the present Quebec boundaries are untouchable, and Article 3 which only recognized aboriginal self-government on land over which they have full ownership. Quebec Grand Chief Ghislain Picard responds that no Indian nation has received recognition of property. And Grand Chief Ovide Mercredi adds that if Canada is divisible, so is Quebec.
For its part, Ottawa too is rushing to show that it can get agreement with the aboriginal peoples prior to the referendum to reinforce the idea that the best place for natives is within Canada. In the autumn of 1994 the federal government signed a trial agreement with the tribes of Manitoba for more autonomous self-government. In the spring, a leaked draft Cabinet document showed the federal government is ready to amend the Indian Act and to go beyond the Charlottetown agreement in transferring povers to the Indians. Ottawa was consulting the chiefs and the provinces with the hopes of holding a federal- provincial conference and having a final policy before cabinet by the summer. Grand Chief Ovide Mercredi accused Indian Affairs Minister, Ron Irwin, of grand standing and trying to do an end run around the Assembly of First Nations, which wants elimination of the Indian Act, not its amendment. Quebec said it would not attend any federal-provincial meeting. Business as usual. (Citizen, 6 May'95) Meanwhile, just as it had after years of constitutional haggling with Quebec, popular support for the rights of native peoples has started to decline in opinion polls, with approval of self-government down from 70 per cent in 1993 to 53 per cent in 1995. (Citizen 1 June'95)
Like everyone else, the native leadership clearly wants to use the referendum as an opportunity for their own ends by exploiting white rifts and using the separatist threat to get constitutional discussions going again. Even so they have been particularly hard on the sovereignists: unanimously branding their programme an illegal threat to aboriginal rights and thus refusing to participate in the consultation process on the sovereignty bill. The Assembly of First Nations intends to send a delegation to the United Nations to lobby against possible recognition of a sovereign Quebec. The Inuit intend to hold their own referendum if the Quebec referendum passes and the Cree are talking about associate-statehood with Canada and Quebec.
4c. The Rest of Canada and the Rest of Quebec
The other performers in the referendum drama who come from the rest of Quebec and the rest of Canada are cast more in the role of supporting actors than major players. This is perhaps strange as one might normally expect those trying to hold their country together to be as vociferous as those pulling it apart. However, it appears to be the Canadian way to expect Quebecers to make the right democratic decision without undue external interference. Nevertheless, the voice of these forces will make themselves heard through the major actors.
While the English mother tongue population of Quebec is down about a third since the 1970s to around 600,000 (still more than the population of PEI or Newfoundland and comparable to that of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick or Nova Scotia), they along with the Allophones and people of mixed parentage still represent 20 per cent of the population of the province. In the September election only 4 per cent voted for the PQ. Statisticians estimate that if the nationalists received 60 per cent of the francophone vote it would still require 6 per cent of the non-French vote to win the referendum.
For the most part, anglophone organizations such as Alliance Quebec will mobilize behind the Liberal Party and the Non campaign and help with the organization in each riding. Most followed the lead of Johnson and boycotted the PQ travelling commissions on the future of Quebec. Although a small number of French speaking neo-Canadians go along with the sovereignist option, for the most part they have wanted to settle in peace in a country free of conflicts and political divisions so they are scared by ethnic nationalism and by the notion of separation from Canada. Nor can they be very enthusiastic about Bernard Landry's attack on the federal multiculturalism policy. He said that an independent Quebec would never pick up the $5 million Ottawa pays to ethnic groups because it does not believe in subsidizing differences, preferring instead a "policy of cultural convergence". (Le Devoir 24 Feb.'95) This position of the Quebec government was reinforced by the "Declaration of Independence" submitted to the National Commission on the Future of Quebec by the Societe Saint-Jean-Baptiste. It also opposed multiculturalism and stated, "The existence of the Quebec people, and the necessity to make it sovereign, are directly linked to its language, its customs, and its history." (Le Devoir 20 March'95)
We see here one of the most fascinating conundrums of the referendum and indeed of modern Quebec society. Quebec's nationalism and its quest for independence is essentially founded on ethnicity, that is, the historical, cultural and linguistic integrity of the French community. However, the territory to which the nationalists wish to apply their desires for sovereignty is increasingly pluralist in its composition, both in terms of race and ethnic perspective. The tensions between these two realities are played out in the draft preamble of a future constitution. It continually switches back and forth between appeals to the traditional French nation and its guarantees of respect for Quebec's modern multicultural society. (Le Droit, 12 & 13 Sept.'95)
The business community, lead by Le Conseil du Patronat and the Business Council on National Issues, thinks there is a critically important role for corporate leaders as the referendum campaign unfolds. BCNI president Thomas d'Aquino claims their most constructive activity is to develop an appreciation of the economic advantages of unity by making the case that, "a united rather than a fragmented Canada will be a much more powerful economic force nationally and globally." (Ottawa Citizen 11 Feb.'95) Judging by past experience, they will make there point through funds and personnel, public presentations and possibly an advertising campaign. While a growing number of francophone business people in Quebec flirted with sovereignty after the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, most have now returned to the federalist fold for fear of economic instability. Le Groupe des Cents has gone even further by rallying to a Manifesto outlining the obsolescence and irrelevance of the PQ sovereignty option. (Citizen 7 May'95)
The position of the Reform Party is more difficult to fathom. According to their 1990 Green Book platform, Canada is one, single nation in which all the regions must be treated equally, and freedom of speech is the corner stone of language policy -- all positions which make a frontal attack on Quebec's aspirations. If Quebec cannot respect these principles it should get out. By 1994, Preston Manning was announcing three new principles to a press conference. The Reform Party will create a "new federalism"; the prime minister should announce that secession will not come without pain and only after agreement on disputed points such as territory, minority rights, distribution of assets and debt, and the free trade agreements; should there be a Yes vote, Chrétien would no longer have a mandate and should call an election.
The former research director of the Reform Party, Prof. Tom Flanagan says, however, that renewed federalism has never been discussed by the Party and no one now knows whether the Party's position is that of the Green Book or of Mr. Manning. He explains the slippage between the two policies as a result of two things. First Manning's tactic of appearing like a pacifier and an agitator by offering both renewed federalism and the spectre of conflicts over separation. Second, Manning wants to offer both sorts of propositions to maximize his chances of becoming prime minister either of a united Canada or of a future English Canada.(La Presse, 17 Dec.'94, & Flanagan) He doesn't appear to care which. His proposal to hold a referendum on the sovereignists' offer of economic association was rejected as simplistic and idiotic by Chrétien and editorialists because it would fall into Parizeau's trap by unleashing an unsympathetic `English Canada'. (Citizen 26 April'95)
Other Western Canadian leaders have learned to hold their peace. This is the most spectacular change in Canadian political culture in recent years. Canadians are learning not to rise to the debate so easily, not to respond threateningly to every provocation, event or nut cake they do not like.
Ralph Klein, after being harshly slapped by companion federalists for threatening during the last Quebec election to withdraw Alberta's Quebec investments, set up an advisory council on Quebec and has had nothing but nice things to say. He plans to allow Albertan's to express their opinions during the Quebec referendum either through a series of forums or a 1-800 number or some such technique.
The other premiers are generally back to the old high-low technique. Rae and Romanow explain in press scrums and on TV just how hard and harmful separation will be. Wells, Harris and Filmon go along with Daniel Johnson by supporting more decentralized federalism and by saying the status quo is not adequate and that the country must get back to the constitutional table after a No vote in the referendum. New Brunswick Premier McKenna reinforces Johnson by asking him to be the first outsider to address his province's legislature, netting national news coverage.
With the exception of a goodwill youth group called `Together Canadians' and an exchange between Toronto and Montreal citizens dubbed `Lets Be Neighbours', there have not been many signs of private gestures during the referendum from a `fatigued' rest of Canada.
Public opinion in ROC is still hard to read as it receives relatively little information. Responses also differ according to the questions asked. Thus a poll ordered by Parizeau in January predictably found that 80 per cent were opposed to a special status for Quebec and 77 per cent foresee constitutional status quo in the eventuality of a No vote. But an Environics poll found about a third in favour of a renewed constitution. Almost half of the people outside Quebec appear to favour (or oppose) recognizing an independent Quebec or of maintaining economic ties. Parizeau sees this as boding well (Citizen,8 Feb.'95), but one could equally see it as a bad omen if a split were actually to come about. Perhaps the most representative appraisal of ROC opinion came in a Toronto Star analysis (19 Sept.'95) which showed people had come around to accepting the reality of trade arrangements with an independent Quebec but preferred they did not have Canadian citizenship or use the Canadian dollar.
4d. The Unexpected
The category of unexpected influences is much more of a caution than a specific prediction for players and observers in a referendum where each, single vote counts (unlike in territorially divided election counting). To make the point, one needs only recall how a slighting comment about women ("Yvettes") by a PQ minister turned out to be one of the most dynamic mobilizers of women for federalism in the 1980 referendum. Imprudent words and actions and ill-perceived policies can have devastating effects. So can changes in leadership, actions by foreign governments and markets, possible renegades and converts to the cause, and even isolated initiatives by individuals and groups. For instance, Lucien Bouchard's health could influence may voters, even if most analysts say Quebecers will vote more according to issues than personalities.
Among the most unexpected events of the pre- referendum campaign were first, the public statements by well known independentist Guy Bertrand, a Quebec city lawyer, to the effect that the referendum should be dropped because it could not be won by the sovereignists and would likely harm everyone. Later, to the distress of sovereignists, he pleaded his cause in court. The judge agreed that unilateral independence was illegal, but recognized the courts could not stop the referendum. (Globe & Mail, 9 Sept.'95) Secondly, there were the statements by PQ advisor Pierre Bourgault that the non-French voters in Quebec should bow out of the referendum for fear of a backlash if the francophones lost by a small margin. Although Bourgault was immediately fired, his idea has been picked up as a refrain in other presentations to the consultative commissions with proposals being made that only the "pure French" should participate in the referendum. (Citizen, 28 Feb.'95) This sort of ethnic division even before Quebec becomes independent could easily scare off the middle-of-the-road nationalists, to say nothing of other North Americans.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTSIn an article which surveyed federalist reactions to separatist infighting during the spring of 1995, Maclean's magazine gloomily concluded, "The depressing reality, however, is that the issue of Quebec's place within or outside of Canada will continue regardless of the referendum result_or even whether one is held or not." (24 April'95) However, such a conclusion is based partially on the assumption that the referendum would simply oppose the status quo (or what the federalists call flexible federalism) to support for the law declaring Quebec a sovereign state - in other words a `hard' answer to a `hard' question.
However, many polls had found that this was not what the people wanted. For instance, the prominent Quebec magazine, L'Actualité, announced in March that its survey of the motivations of Quebecers showed that the strategy of the status quo was an error. They are the two words most rejected by Quebecers (only 8 per cent of respondents found the current constitutional status of Quebec completely acceptable).
If another option, a third way opened up, even a narrow one, it would win hands down, claims L'Actualité. Fully 63 per cent hoped for new federalist proposals. Concludes Jean Pare of L'Actualité, "It's the rejection of the present constitution which seems to feed the independence movement, rather than the desire to leave Canada."(p.52) Moreover, 73 per cent of respondents (the highest categorical response to any of the questions) said they felt an economic association with Canada would be essential to the success of a sovereign Quebec - along with the Canadian dollar and passport.
The sovereignists heard the message. This led to the argument between Bouchard and Parizeau and the subsequent agreement in June between the three sovereignist parties that the referendum will include an offer from an independent Quebec of economic and political association with Canada. As we have seen the political offer includes a council of ministers, a parliamentary type institution, and a trade tribunal. This is the sovereignists' `third option'_even if it makes a tremendous number of assumptions including the continued existence of Canada and the relative lack of an ethnic backlash. In fact it does show a certain opening in that the Quebec politicians, having been told no by their public, have had to try to come to grips with reformed institutions just the way federalists have since the 1980s. Perhaps we are seeing the start of a convergence. In any case, the sovereignists believe they have their act together and that this was confirmed by an almost 10 per cent increase in support for their option in polls during June.
There are at least three major problems. First, even federalists who are very sympathetic to Quebec see the offer by the sovereignist as simply a devious manoeuvre. After convincing Quebecers to vote Yes, the offer is calculated to fail because it adds yet another level of government, would be based on an unworkable mutual veto, and would be representationaly unfair. (Norman Webster, Le Devoir 14 June'95) Second, the sovereignist plans depend on a certain "openness of mind" on the part of other Canadians. But, innumerable studies and reports have warned that Canadians do not consider Canada just an `economic space' but rather their country and if it is ripped apart by Quebecers then the ROC will feel too bitter to carry out pleasant negotiations for along time to come. Third, the offer is based on independence first, and once the federalist drums start beating the tune that separation is separation, it is unlikely Quebecers will long consider the referendum proposition to be a credible guarantee of economic and political association.
So, is there a federalist `third option' to counteract the revised referendum stance of the sovereignists? Officially perhaps not, but in the wings of the federalist camp, there is one. It is signed by André Burelle (Le mal canadien, Fides) and by Gordon Gibson (Thirty Million Musketeers, Key Porter), one from Quebec, one from British Columbia, both arriving independently at very similar conclusions. Essentially the idea is to marry considerable decentralization to the provinces with a new method of managing the federal economic and social union and the recognition of the distinctiveness of the country's cultural communities. They aim to reconcile Quebec and Aboriginal needs for cultural security with the demands of westerners for economic and administrative reforms and the continuing requirements for national standards and programs.
One finds in their proposals that (1) a clearer decentralization with (2) increased concurrency of powers and (3) limits to the spending power are wedded to (4) a strengthened role for MPs and (5) a new Council of First Ministers (Burelle) or a Federal Council (Gibson) with variable decision-making rules, inspired in part by the successful European experience but adapted to Canadian circumstances. The whole, balanced package is based on a modernization that respects Canadian values and institutions and can be accomplished through uncomplicated administrative agreements (a pact signed by the partners of the federation, ratified by the legislatures, and tried out for five or ten years), pending a better moment to tackle the constitutional parts of the agreement.
Again there are several problems. Would the guarantees be sufficient to satisfy Quebecers and the native peoples? Is there any package short of being a majority in a sovereign state which would be acceptable to Quebec nationalists? The polls seem to suggest that for many of them there is a third way, but have Burelle and Gibson come up with an acceptable compromise that, for instance, the PQ would agree to negotiate? And even if they have, is the Liberal government, comfortably ensconced in Ottawa, ready to undertake any commitments to promote much needed improvements in the federal system following a Non in the referendum?
One thing is certain. People are aware, as Maclean's stated, that if there is no attempt, not just to win the referendum, but to reconcile the Canadian partners, then, referendum or not, nothing will have been done to settle the Quebec issue or the problems of governing Canada for the 21stst century. The markets will not react kindly to the prospects of three or four more years of sterile confrontation between the Federal government, the Quebec government and the regionalized opposition parties in Ottawa. As Maclean's went on to say, the federalists are well aware that delays, "Affect the entire country by prolonging uncertainty, which, in turn, depresses the value of the dollar on international markets." In fact, because of this problem and the federal deficit, the Finance Minister, Paul Martin, held meetings with senior business and labour representatives to encourage them to push for greater decentralization in such fields as worker training, health and the environment. (Vastel, Le Droit, 11 Sept.'95)
Perhaps the flattening of the economic recovery and the prospect of three of four more years of political confrontation and economic stagnation (the PQ and the Bloc will still be in their positions of power) will convince our politicians that it is something neither the country nor their electors can afford. Such a conclusion might inspire them to consider a legitimate third option.
Kirks Ferry, Quebec, September, 1995.
1.
A brief note on terminology. As this text proceeds we will see at various points that the terms we use in the referendum debate have great importance both with regard to their meaning and to their use as political weapons to influence the outcome of the referendum. This is particularly true of the words used to refer to one or other of the opposing camps. Those who want Quebec to become an independent state are variously referred to as separatists, secessionists, independentists, sovereignists and nationalists. Those who wish to maintain the unity of Canada are called English Canada, English-speaking Canada, the rest of Canada (ROC) and federalists. Obviously, I am leaving out some of the more nasty name-calling.In this text, I have chosen to use the two terms `nationalists' and `federalists' to refer to the two opposing camps in the Quebec referendum. Although I suppose it could be disputed, I find these two terms to be the most technically correct, the least derogatory, and fairly unpoliticized.
Because my aim is to be as neutral as possible in this presentation while at the same time trying to render a dry topic fairly readable, I will also use the other terms interchangeably to provide a little variety and to replicate the actual debate.
The terminological problem is one of infinite complexity. First, there is the question of levels of consciousness or of motivation. Politicians have a malignant tendency to use labels in order to score points. The prime minister of Canada talks about "separatists" because he knows most Quebecers are fearful of leaving Canada. The premier of Quebec likes to speak about "English Canada" because he knows it inspires minority reflexes in Quebecers and gives them a supposedly unified target from which to secede. The ordinary citizens, as we shall see, are often blissfully unaware of the meanings or nuances hidden behind the terms used by the politicians_even to the point of thinking Quebec sovereignty does not mean leaving Canada.
Second, in the modern world, definitions are extremely fluid. Meanings change under political and intellectual pressures. There are those in Quebec who, like Guy Laforest and Daniel Latouche, would make of it a territorially- based, pluralistic nation-state rather than an ethnic nation, which has a tendency to put all nationalist terminology in limbo. Immigration reinforces this trend. This tendency reflects a century old battle about whether a nation is a state or a people. We are not now more advanced because the two terms are still used interchangeably.
Third, there are the sentiments of individuals. Many of us evolve; few have only one ideological string to their bow; hardly any one likes to be branded a narrow bigot. Our attitudes and loyalties are multiple and, thus, relative and changing, so we hate being labelled. No wonder pollsters have so much trouble saying who thinks what. So there is some justification for using all the terms at once, just to be fair.
While there is a definite ambiguity and fluidity in the terminology, there is also considerable agreement among specialists on the uses toward which the words can be put.
Here, `nationalists' will be those who place more emphasis on the importance of the French culture finding its home in its own independent state whereas `federalists' accord their relative priority to the politics of economic integration in Canada as the best support for a flourishing francophone society. We will see there are people on the margins of both categories, such as `Liberal nationalists' who place great emphasis on the protection and promotion of the French culture but still think it can be best achieved in a federal economy, while there are `soft sovereignists' who are nervous about the economics of separation but are still ready to vote Yes because they are fed up with the French minority status. Consistent use of the terms `separatist' or `secessionist' would place emphasis on the negative aspect of nation-making which also has its positive attributes. Just using `sovereignist' underplays the clear intent to create a separate state. Use of `les anglais', or `English Canada' sets up false dichotomies, ignores federalist Quebecers, and gives prior credence to the idea of two distinct units. The rest of Canada (ROC) is preferable when speaking of the rest of the country outside Quebec.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
These books are cited for those who want to go into greater depth on Quebec and Canadian politics or the methodology of the Social Sciences.
- Bouchard, Lucien, (1994), On the Record, Toronto, Stoddart.
- Burelle, André, (1995), Le mal canadien, Montréal, Fides.
- Cloutier, Edouard, Jean H. Guay, Daniel Latouche, (1992), Le virage: l'évolution de l'opinion publique au Québec depuis 1960 , Montréal, Québec-Amérique.
- Crête, Jean, (1984), (ed.), Comportement électoral au Québec, Chicoutimi, Gætan Morin.
- Council for Canadian Unity, (1995), 31 Arguments in Favour of Canada, Montreal.
- Flanagan, Tom, (1995), Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning , Toronto, Stoddart.
- Gauthier, Benoit, (1992), (ed.), Recherche sociale : de la problématique à la collecte des données , 2e édition, Montréal, Presses de l'Université du Québec.
- Gibbon, Gordon, (1995), Thirty Million Musketeers, Institut Fraser, Toronto, Key Porter.
- Jackson, Robert et Doreen Jackson, (1994), Politics in Canada, Scarborough, Prentice Hall, 3e edition, chap. 3, La culture politique:71-123.
- Johnson, Daniel, (1995), "The Case for a United Canada", Foreign Policy, 99, été: 78-88.
- Lemco, Jonathan, (1994), The Quebec Sovereignty Movement and Its Implications for Canada, the United States University Press.
- Monahan, Patrick, (1994), Cooler Heads Shall Prevail: Assessing the Costs and Consequences of Quebec Separation, Toronto, C.D. Howe Institute.
- Moniere, Denis, (ed.), (1994), L'année politique au Québec, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal.
- Parizeau, Jacques, (1995), "The Case for a Sovereign Quebec", Foreign Policy, 99, summer:69-76.
- Parti Québécois, (1995), Souveraineté: réponses à vos questions, Montréal.
- Taras, David, (1990), The Newsmakers: The Medias Influence on Canadian Politics, Scarborough, Nelson.
- Young, Robert A., (1995), The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press.