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DANIEL TURP ON THE REFERENCE
Don't buy Stéphane Dion's response to the secession ruling
August 19, 1999
Exactly one year ago, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its opinion on the secession of Quebec. Ever since, the federal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stéphane Dion, like one of those itinerant teachers of rhetoric in ancient Greece, has been trying to defend Canada's interests by giving his discourse the appearance of objectivity and rigour. Mr. Dion, who has become a modern sophist, has set himself to instruct the Premier of Quebec and the leaders of the independence movement on how they should respect the Supreme Court's opinion - in particular, the requirement to be clear about what constitutes a majority in any secession referendum, and the wording of the referendum question.
1. A clear majority. According to the Supreme Court, the other provinces and the federal government cannot deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession, should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal. Yet, for the past year, Mr. Dion has been saying that it would be irresponsible to enter into negotiations on secession on the basis of a slim majority, of a Quebec split in two.
The core of his argument rests on a set of comparisons that excludes the most relevant ones: Quebec and Canadian referendums. In 1980, 1992 and 1995, the rule of the simple majority (50 per cent plus one) was never questioned. The same was true of Newfoundland, where a slim majority of 52 per cent, in an island split in two, was enough to make that dominion Canada's 10th province.
But here the sophist begins splitting hairs. The rule of the majority is different, he says, depending on whether you are joining a country or leaving it. As if both did not involve a change in political status that could come about only by using the same democratic standard, that of the simple majority vote!
Mr. Dion prefers international comparisons. He recalls that in the 13 cases of secession that have occurred in non colonial contexts, the average Yes vote in each of the referendums was very high. He is particularly fond of the example of the Baltic states, but neglects to mention that, when the people were consulted, the rule of the simple majority prevailed despite attempts by the Soviet authorities to impose a clearer majority.
When he talks about the international community and the phenomenon of secession, why does he never mention the situation in Scotland? There the ride of the simple majority vote is not questioned, even by the British leaders with whom I spoke very recently, and it would apply in the event that the Scots were given the opportunity to vote on independence.
It is equally obvious, and my discussions with the leaders in Northern Ireland confirm, that the political status of Northern Ireland could be reassessed under the Good Friday Agreement, and that the rule that would apply in any referendum on self-determination would also be that of the simple majority.
2. The clear question. Mr. Dion assumes that clarity entails the use of a certain vocabulary: the word "secession," for example, which has been his fetish ever since he went to Ottawa. According to him, Quebec could not secede on the basis of a referendum question that referred to an economic or political partnership, with the rest of Canada. As the guardian of our virtue, Mr. Dion does not hesitate to bestow on the federal government a duty of which there is no mention in the Supreme Court's opinion: that of evaluating the clarity of any question that could lead to the breakup of the country.
The real problem is that Mr. Dion thinks Ottawa is more credible than the National Assembly when it comes to drafting the question on Quebec's future political status. Quebec has always kept all its options open, has never rejected sovereignty and does not wish to break up Canada, as our sophist claims, since it is proposing to reinvent its relationship with the rest of Canada by giving that relationship the form of an entirely new kind of partnership. No one will be able to convince Quebeckers that they have no right to be asked about a proposal for the future that involves its two fundamental components.
His obsession with secession makes him incapable of envisaging any relationship between Canada and Quebec that is not federal, in the most traditional, the least modem, sense of the word. This obsession is what drives him when he preaches in favour of a question that contains no reference to partnership (which makes him a hard-line supporter of federalism and independence at the same!).
But Quebeckers and their political institutions are less simplistic, more modem, when it comes to their political future. Quebec will not ask for an opinion on secession, or call for a rupture with the parent country, any more than the Baltic states did, or any of the others that have become independent. As the millennium ends, sovereign states, including the many new countries born during the preceding decade, are linking their futures with those of their neighbours, and working with them in more and more areas of common jurisdiction..
It is undoubtedly because Mr. Dion's arguments on the clear majority and the clear question are so unconvincing that he has raised the spectre of secession, of a destabilizing act, of endless uncertainties, of disorder and of a turbulent environment. But however convinced he may be that he has mastered the art of defending Canada's interests, he. will never succeed in making people forget, one year later, that the Supreme Court recognized the existence of an obligation to negotiate with Quebec, and that he can no longer, like some of his predecessors, claim that Canada will not negotiate.